Checking and Enforcing Security through Opacity in Healthcare Applications

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a paradigm that can tremendously revolutionize health care thus benefiting both hospitals, doctors and patients. In this context, protecting the IoT in health care against interference, including service attacks and malwares, is challenging. Opacity is a confidentiality property capturing a system's ability to keep a subset of its behavior hidden from passive observers. In this work, we seek to introduce an IoT-based heart attack detection system, that could be life-saving for patients without risking their need for privacy through the verification and enforcement of opacity. Our main contributions are the use of a tool to verify opacity in three of its forms, so as to detect privacy leaks in our system. Furthermore, we develop an efficient, Symbolic Observation Graph (SOG)-based algorithm for enforcing opacity

From Security Enforcement to Supervisory Control in Discrete Event Systems: Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses

Cyber-physical systems are technological systems that involve physical components that are monitored and controlled by multiple computational units that exchange information through a communication network. Examples of cyber-physical systems arise in transportation, power, smart manufacturing, and other classes of systems that have a large degree of automation. Analysis and control of cyber-physical systems is an active area of research. The increasing demands for safety, security and performance improvement of cyber-physical systems put stringent constraints on their design and necessitate the use of formal model-based methods to synthesize control strategies that provably enforce required properties. This dissertation focuses on the higher level control logic in cyber-physical systems using the framework of discrete event systems. It tackles two classes of problems for discrete event systems. The first class of problems is related to system security. This problem is formulated in terms of the information flow property of opacity. In this part of the dissertation, an interface-based approach called insertion/edit function is developed to enforce opacity under the potential inference of malicious intruders that may or may not know the implementation of the insertion/edit function. The focus is the synthesis of insertion/edit functions that solve the opacity enforcement problem in the framework of qualitative and quantitative games on finite graphs. The second problem treated in the dissertation is that of performance optimization in the context of supervisory control under partial observation. This problem is transformed to a two-player quantitative game and an information structure where the game is played is constructed. A novel approach to synthesize supervisors by solving the game is developed. The main contributions of this dissertation are grouped into the following five categories. (i) The transformation of the formulated opacity enforcement and supervisory control problems to games on finite graphs provides a systematic way of performing worst case analysis in design of discrete event systems. (ii) These games have state spaces that are as compact as possible using the notion of information states in each corresponding problem. (iii) A formal model-based approach is employed in the entire dissertation, which results in provably correct solutions. (iv) The approaches developed in this dissertation reveal the interconnection between control theory and formal methods. (v) The results in this dissertation are applicable to many types of cyber-physical systems with security-critical and performance-aware requirements.PHDElectrical and Computer EngineeringUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/150002/1/jiyiding_1.pd

Verification and Enforcement of Opacity Security Properties in Discrete Event Systems.

The need for stringent cybersecurity is becoming significant as computers and networks are integrated into every aspect of our lives. A recent trend in cybersecurity research is to formalize security notions and develop theoretical foundations for designing secure systems. In this dissertation, we address a security notion called opacity based on the control theory for Discrete Event Systems (DES). Opacity is an information-flow property that captures whether a given secret of the system can be inferred by intruders who passively observe the behavior of the system. Finite-state automata are used to capture the dynamics of computer systems that need to be rendered opaque with respect to a given secret. Under the observation of the intruder, the secret of the system is opaque if “whenever the secret has occurred, there exists another non-secret behavior that is observationally equivalent.” This research focuses on the analysis and the enforcement of four notions of opacity. First, we develop algorithms for verifying opacity notions under the attack model of a single intruder and that of multiple colluding intruders. We then consider the enforcement of opacity when the secret is not opaque. Specifically, we propose a novel enforcement mechanism based on event insertion to address opacity enforcement for a class of systems whose dynamics cannot be modified. An insertion function, placed at the output of the system, inserts fictitious observable events to the system’s output without interacting with the system. We develop a finite structure called the All-Insertion Structure (AIS) that enumerates all valid insertion functions. The AIS establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a valid insertion function, and provides a structure to synthesize one insertion function. Furthermore, we introduce the maximum total cost and the maximum mean cost to quantify insertion functions. A condition for determining which cost objective to use is established. For each cost, we develop an algorithmic procedure for synthesizing an optimal insertion function from the AIS. Finally, our analysis and enforcement procedure is applied to ensuring location privacy in location-based services.PHDElectrical Engineering: SystemsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/108905/1/ycwu_1.pd

Supervisory Control and Analysis of Partially-observed Discrete Event Systems

Nowadays, a variety of real-world systems fall into discrete event systems (DES). In practical scenarios, due to facts like limited sensor technique, sensor failure, unstable network and even the intrusion of malicious agents, it might occur that some events are unobservable, multiple events are indistinguishable in observations, and observations of some events are nondeterministic. By considering various practical scenarios, increasing attention in the DES community has been paid to partially-observed DES, which in this thesis refer broadly to those DES with partial and/or unreliable observations. In this thesis, we focus on two topics of partially-observed DES, namely, supervisory control and analysis. The first topic includes two research directions in terms of system models. One is the supervisory control of DES with both unobservable and uncontrollable events, focusing on the forbidden state problem; the other is the supervisory control of DES vulnerable to sensor-reading disguising attacks (SD-attacks), which is also interpreted as DES with nondeterministic observations, addressing both the forbidden state problem and the liveness-enforcing problem. Petri nets (PN) are used as a reference formalism in this topic. First, we study the forbidden state problem in the framework of PN with both unobservable and uncontrollable transitions, assuming that unobservable transitions are uncontrollable. For ordinary PN subject to an admissible Generalized Mutual Exclusion Constraint (GMEC), an optimal on-line control policy with polynomial complexity is proposed provided that a particular subnet, called observation subnet, satisfies certain conditions in structure. It is then discussed how to obtain an optimal on-line control policy for PN subject to an arbitrary GMEC. Next, we still consider the forbidden state problem but in PN vulnerable to SD-attacks. Assuming the control specification in terms of a GMEC, we propose three methods to derive on-line control policies. The first two lead to an optimal policy but are computationally inefficient for large-size systems, while the third method computes a policy with timely response even for large-size systems but at the expense of optimality. Finally, we investigate the liveness-enforcing problem still assuming that the system is vulnerable to SD-attacks. In this problem, the plant is modelled as a bounded PN, which allows us to off-line compute a supervisor starting from constructing the reachability graph of the PN. Then, based on repeatedly computing a more restrictive liveness-enforcing supervisor under no attack and constructing a basic supervisor, an off-line method that synthesizes a liveness-enforcing supervisor tolerant to an SD-attack is proposed. In the second topic, we care about the verification of properties related to system security. Two properties are considered, i.e., fault-predictability and event-based opacity. The former is a property in the literature, characterizing the situation that the occurrence of any fault in a system is predictable, while the latter is a newly proposed property in the thesis, which describes the fact that secret events of a system cannot be revealed to an external observer within their critical horizons. In the case of fault-predictability, DES are modeled by labeled PN. A necessary and sufficient condition for fault-predictability is derived by characterizing the structure of the Predictor Graph. Furthermore, two rules are proposed to reduce the size of a PN, which allow us to analyze the fault-predictability of the original net by verifying that of the reduced net. When studying event-based opacity, we use deterministic finite-state automata as the reference formalism. Considering different scenarios, we propose four notions, namely, K-observation event-opacity, infinite-observation event-opacity, event-opacity and combinational event-opacity. Moreover, verifiers are proposed to analyze these properties

Property Enforcement for Partially-Observed Discrete-Event Systems

Engineering systems that involve physical elements, such as automobiles, aircraft, or electric power pants, that are controlled by a computational infrastructure that consists of several computers that communicate through a communication network, are called Cyber-Physical Systems. Ever-increasing demands for safety, security, performance, and certi cation of these critical systems put stringent constraints on their design and necessitate the use of formal model-based approaches to synthesize provably-correct feedback controllers. This dissertation aims to tackle these challenges by developing a novel methodology for synthesis of control and sensing strategies for Discrete Event Systems (DES), an important class of cyber-physical systems. First, we develop a uniform approach for synthesizing property enforcing supervisors for a wide class of properties called information-state-based (IS-based) properties. We then consider the enforcement of non-blockingness in addition to IS-based properties. We develop a nite structure called the All Enforcement Structure (AES) that embeds all valid supervisors. Furthermore, we propose novel and general approaches to solve the sensor activation problem for partially-observed DES. We extend our results for the sensor activation problem from the centralized case to the decentralized case. The methodology in the dissertation has the following novel features: (i) it explicitly considers and handles imperfect state information, due to sensor noise, and limited controllability, due to unexpected environmental disturbances; (ii) it is a uniform information-state-based approach that can be applied to a variety of user-speci ed requirements; (iii) it is a formal model-based approach, which results in provably correct solutions; and (iv) the methodology and associated theoretical foundations developed are generic and applicable to many types of networked cyber-physical systems with safety-critical requirements, in particular networked systems such as aircraft electric power systems and intelligent transportation systems.PHDElectrical Engineering: SystemsUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/137097/1/xiangyin_1.pd