Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems

Crowdsourcing markets have emerged as a popular platform for matching available workers with tasks to complete. The payment for a particular task is typically set by the task's requester, and may be adjusted based on the quality of the completed work, for example, through the use of "bonus" payments. In this paper, we study the requester's problem of dynamically adjusting quality-contingent payments for tasks. We consider a multi-round version of the well-known principal-agent model, whereby in each round a worker makes a strategic choice of the effort level which is not directly observable by the requester. In particular, our formulation significantly generalizes the budget-free online task pricing problems studied in prior work. We treat this problem as a multi-armed bandit problem, with each "arm" representing a potential contract. To cope with the large (and in fact, infinite) number of arms, we propose a new algorithm, AgnosticZooming, which discretizes the contract space into a finite number of regions, effectively treating each region as a single arm. This discretization is adaptively refined, so that more promising regions of the contract space are eventually discretized more finely. We analyze this algorithm, showing that it achieves regret sublinear in the time horizon and substantially improves over non-adaptive discretization (which is the only competing approach in the literature). Our results advance the state of art on several different topics: the theory of crowdsourcing markets, principal-agent problems, multi-armed bandits, and dynamic pricing.Comment: This is the full version of a paper in the ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM-EC), 201

Is Big Data Sufficient for a Reliable Detection of Non-Technical Losses?

Non-technical losses (NTL) occur during the distribution of electricity in power grids and include, but are not limited to, electricity theft and faulty meters. In emerging countries, they may range up to 40% of the total electricity distributed. In order to detect NTLs, machine learning methods are used that learn irregular consumption patterns from customer data and inspection results. The Big Data paradigm followed in modern machine learning reflects the desire of deriving better conclusions from simply analyzing more data, without the necessity of looking at theory and models. However, the sample of inspected customers may be biased, i.e. it does not represent the population of all customers. As a consequence, machine learning models trained on these inspection results are biased as well and therefore lead to unreliable predictions of whether customers cause NTL or not. In machine learning, this issue is called covariate shift and has not been addressed in the literature on NTL detection yet. In this work, we present a novel framework for quantifying and visualizing covariate shift. We apply it to a commercial data set from Brazil that consists of 3.6M customers and 820K inspection results. We show that some features have a stronger covariate shift than others, making predictions less reliable. In particular, previous inspections were focused on certain neighborhoods or customer classes and that they were not sufficiently spread among the population of customers. This framework is about to be deployed in a commercial product for NTL detection.Comment: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Intelligent System Applications to Power Systems (ISAP 2017

The long and winding road: Routine creation and replication in multi-site organizations

Prior research on organizational routines in the ‘capabilities’ literature has either studied how new routines are created during an exploratory process of variation and selection or how existing routines are replicated during a phase of exploitation. Few studies have analyzed the life cycle of new routine creation and replication as an integrated process. In an in-depth case study of England’s Highways Agency, this paper shows that the creation and replication of a new routine across multiple sites involves four sequential steps: envisioning, experimenting, entrenching and enacting. We contribute to the capabilities research in two ways: first, by showing how different organizational levels, capabilities and logics (cognitive and behavioural) shape the development of new routines; and second, by identifying how distinct evolutionary cycles of variation and selective retention occur during each step in the process. In contrast with prior research on replication as an exact copy of a template or existing routine, our study focuses on the replication of an entirely new routine (based on novel principles) that is adapted to fit local operational conditions during its large-scale replication across multiple sites. We draw upon insights from adjacent ‘practice research’ and suggest how capabilities and practice studies may complement each other in future research on the evolution of routines

Society-in-the-Loop: Programming the Algorithmic Social Contract

Recent rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning have raised many questions about the regulatory and governance mechanisms for autonomous machines. Many commentators, scholars, and policy-makers now call for ensuring that algorithms governing our lives are transparent, fair, and accountable. Here, I propose a conceptual framework for the regulation of AI and algorithmic systems. I argue that we need tools to program, debug and maintain an algorithmic social contract, a pact between various human stakeholders, mediated by machines. To achieve this, we can adapt the concept of human-in-the-loop (HITL) from the fields of modeling and simulation, and interactive machine learning. In particular, I propose an agenda I call society-in-the-loop (SITL), which combines the HITL control paradigm with mechanisms for negotiating the values of various stakeholders affected by AI systems, and monitoring compliance with the agreement. In short, `SITL = HITL + Social Contract.'Comment: (in press), Ethics of Information Technology, 201

Towards Smart Hybrid Fuzzing for Smart Contracts

Smart contracts are Turing-complete programs that are executed across a blockchain network. Unlike traditional programs, once deployed they cannot be modified. As smart contracts become more popular and carry more value, they become more of an interesting target for attackers. In recent years, smart contracts suffered major exploits, costing millions of dollars, due to programming errors. As a result, a variety of tools for detecting bugs has been proposed. However, majority of these tools often yield many false positives due to over-approximation or poor code coverage due to complex path constraints. Fuzzing or fuzz testing is a popular and effective software testing technique. However, traditional fuzzers tend to be more effective towards finding shallow bugs and less effective in finding bugs that lie deeper in the execution. In this work, we present CONFUZZIUS, a hybrid fuzzer that combines evolutionary fuzzing with constraint solving in order to execute more code and find more bugs in smart contracts. Evolutionary fuzzing is used to exercise shallow parts of a smart contract, while constraint solving is used to generate inputs which satisfy complex conditions that prevent the evolutionary fuzzing from exploring deeper paths. Moreover, we use data dependency analysis to efficiently generate sequences of transactions, that create specific contract states in which bugs may be hidden. We evaluate the effectiveness of our fuzzing strategy, by comparing CONFUZZIUS with state-of-the-art symbolic execution tools and fuzzers. Our evaluation shows that our hybrid fuzzing approach produces significantly better results than state-of-the-art symbolic execution tools and fuzzers

Incentivizing the Dynamic Workforce: Learning Contracts in the Gig-Economy

In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions her wage only on possible outcomes. In this work, we consider a model in which the principal is unaware of the agent's utility and action space. She sequentially offers contracts to identical agents, and observes the resulting outcomes. We present an algorithm for learning the optimal contract under mild assumptions. We bound the number of samples needed for the principal obtain a contract that is within $\epsilon$ of her optimal net profit for every $\epsilon>0$