157 research outputs found
Optimally Secure Tweakable Blockciphers
We consider the generic design of a tweakable blockcipher from one or more evaluations of a classical blockcipher, in such a way that all input and output wires are of size n bits. As a first contribution, we show that any tweakable blockcipher with one primitive call and arbitrary linear pre- and postprocessing functions can be distinguished from an ideal one with an attack complexity of about 2^{n/2}. Next, we introduce the tweakable blockcipher tilde{F}[1]. It consists of one multiplication and one blockcipher call with tweak-dependent key, and achieves 2^{2n/3} security. Finally, we introduce tilde{F}[2], which makes two blockcipher calls, one of which with tweak-dependent key, and achieves optimal 2^n security. Both schemes are more efficient than all existing beyond birthday bound tweakable blockciphers known to date, as long as one blockcipher key renewal is cheaper than one blockcipher evaluation plus one universal hash evaluation
Turning Online Ciphers Off
CAESAR has caused a heated discussion regarding the merits of one-pass encryption and online ciphers. The latter is a keyed, length preserving function which outputs ciphertext blocks as soon as the respective plaintext block is available as input. The immediacy of an online cipher affords a clear performance advantage, but it comes at a price: ciphertext blocks cannot depend on later plaintext blocks, limiting diffusion and hence security. We show how one can attain the best of both worlds by providing provably secure constructions, achieving full cipher security, based on applications of an online cipher around blockwise reordering layers.
Explicitly, we show that with just two calls to the online cipher, prp security up to the birthday bound is both attainable and maximal. Moreover, we demonstrate that three calls to the online cipher suffice to obtain beyond birthday bound security. We provide a full proof of this for a prp construction, and, in the ±prp setting, security against adversaries who make queries of any single length. As part of our investigation, we extend an observation by Rogaway and Zhang by further highlighting the close relationship between online ciphers and tweakable blockciphers with variable-length tweaks
How to Build Fully Secure Tweakable Blockciphers from Classical Blockciphers
This paper focuses on building a tweakable blockcipher from a classical blockcipher whose input and output wires all have a size of bits. The main goal is to achieve full security. Such a tweakable blockcipher was proposed by Mennink at FSE\u2715, and it is also the only tweakable blockcipher so far that claimed full security to our best knowledge. However, we find a key-recovery attack on Mennink\u27s proposal (in the proceeding version) with a complexity of about adversarial queries. The attack well demonstrates that Mennink\u27s proposal has at most security, and therefore invalidates its security claim. In this paper, we study a construction of tweakable blockciphers denoted as that is built on invocations of a blockcipher and additional simple XOR operations. As proven in previous work, at least two invocations of blockcipher with linear mixing are necessary to possibly bypass the birthday-bound barrier of security, we carry out an investigation on the instances of with , and find highly efficient tweakable blockciphers , , , that achieve provable security. Each of these tweakable blockciphers uses two invocations of a blockcipher, one of which uses a tweak-dependent key generated by XORing the tweak to the key (or to a secret subkey derived from the key). We point out the provable security of these tweakable blockciphers is obtained in the ideal blockcipher model due to the usage of the tweak-dependent key
Generic Attack on Iterated Tweakable FX Constructions
International audienceTweakable block ciphers are increasingly becoming a common primitive to build new resilient modes as well as a concept for multiple dedicated designs. While regular block ciphers define a family of permutations indexed by a secret key, tweakable ones define a family of permutations indexed by both a secret key and a public tweak. In this work we formalize and study a generic framework for building such a tweakable block cipher based on regular block ciphers, the iterated tweakable FX construction, which includes many such previous constructions of tweakable block ciphers. Then we describe a cryptanal-ysis from which we can derive a provable security upper-bound for all constructions following this tweakable iterated FX strategy. Concretely, the cryptanalysis of r rounds of our generic construction based on n-bit block ciphers with κ-bit keys requires O(2 r r+1 (n+κ)) online and offline queries. For r = 2 rounds this interestingly matches the proof of the particular case of XHX2 by Lee and Lee (ASIACRYPT 2018) thus proving for the first time its tightness. In turn, the XHX and XHX2 proofs show that our generic cryptanalysis is information theoretically optimal for 1 and 2 rounds
Tweaking a block cipher: multi-user beyond-birthday-bound security in the standard model
In this paper, we present a generic construction to create a secure tweakable block cipher from a secure block cipher. Our construction is very natural, requiring four calls to the underlying block cipher for each call of the tweakable block cipher. Moreover, it is provably secure in the standard model while keeping the security degradation minimal in the multi-user setting. In more details, if the underlying blockcipher E uses n-bit blocks and 2n-bit keys, then our construction is proven secure against multi-user adversaries using up to roughly 2n time and queries as long as E is a secure block cipher
Tweakable Blockciphers for Efficient Authenticated Encryptions with Beyond the Birthday-Bound Security
Modular design via a tweakable blockcipher (TBC) offers efficient authenticated encryption (AE) schemes (with associated data) that call a blockcipher once for each data block (of associated data or a plaintext). However, the existing efficient blockcipher-based TBCs are secure up to the birthday bound, where the underlying keyed blockcipher is a secure strong pseudorandom permutation. Existing blockcipher-based AE schemes with beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) security are not efficient, that is, a blockcipher is called twice or more for each data block. In this paper, we present a TBC, XKX, that offers efficient blockcipher-based AE schemes with BBB security, by combining with efficient TBC-based AE schemes such as ΘCB3 an
Beyond-Birthday-Bound Security for Tweakable Even-Mansour Ciphers with Linear Tweak and Key Mixing
The iterated Even-Mansour construction defines a block cipher from a tuple of public -bit permutations by alternatively xoring some -bit round key , , and applying permutation to the state. The \emph{tweakable} Even-Mansour construction generalizes the conventional Even-Mansour construction by replacing the -bit round keys by -bit strings derived from a master key \emph{and a tweak}, thereby defining a tweakable block cipher. Constructions of this type have been previously analyzed, but they were either secure only up to the birthday bound, or they used a nonlinear mixing function of the key and the tweak (typically, multiplication of the key and the tweak seen as elements of some finite field) which might be costly to implement. In this paper, we tackle the question of whether it is possible to achieve beyond-birthday-bound security for such a construction by using only linear operations for mixing the key and the tweak into the state. We answer positively, describing a 4-round construction with a -bit master key and an -bit tweak which is provably secure in the Random Permutation Model up to roughly adversarial queries
Tight Security of Cascaded LRW2
At CRYPTO \u2712, Landecker et al. introduced the cascaded LRW2 (or CLRW2) construction, and proved that it is a secure tweakable block cipher up to roughly queries. Recently, Mennink presented a distinguishing attack on CLRW2 in queries. In the same paper, he discussed some non-trivial bottlenecks in proving tight security bound, i.e. security up to queries. Subsequently, he proved security up to queries for a variant of CLRW2 using -wise independent AXU assumption and the restriction that each tweak value occurs at most times. Moreover, his proof relies on a version of mirror theory which is yet to be publicly verified. In this paper, we resolve the bottlenecks in Mennink\u27s approach and prove that the original CLRW2 is indeed a secure tweakable block cipher up to roughly queries. To do so, we develop two new tools: First, we give a probabilistic result that provides improved bound on the joint probability of some special collision events; Second, we present a variant of Patarin\u27s mirror theory in tweakable permutation settings with a self-contained and concrete proof. Both these results are of generic nature, and can be of independent interests. To demonstrate the applicability of these tools, we also prove tight security up to roughly queries for a variant of DbHtS, called DbHtS-p, that uses two independent universal hash functions
Cascading Four Round LRW1 is Beyond Birthday Bound Secure
In CRYPTO\u2702, Liskov et al. have introduced a new symmetric key primitive called tweakable block cipher. They have proposed two constructions of designing a tweakable block cipher from block ciphers. The first proposed construction is called and the second proposed construction is called . Although, has been extended in later works to provide beyond birthday bound security (e.g., cascaded in CRYPTO\u2712 by Landecker et al.), but extension of the has received no attention until the work of Bao et al. in EUROCRYPT\u2720, where the authors have shown that one round extension of , i.e., masking the output of with the given tweak and then re-encrypting it with the same block cipher, gives security up to queries. Recently, Khairallah has shown a birthday bound distinguishing attack on the construction and hence invalidated the security claim of Bao et al. This has led to the open research question, that {\em how many round are required for cascading to achieve beyond birthday bound security ?}
In this paper, we have shown that cascading up to four rounds is sufficient for ensuring beyond the birthday bound security. In particular, we have shown that provides security up to queries. Security analysis of our construction is based on the recent development of the mirror theory technique for tweakable random permutations under the framework of the Expectation Method
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