An optimal feedback model to prevent manipulation behaviours in consensus under social network group decision making

The file attached to this record is the author's final peer reviewed version. The Publisher's final version can be found by following the DOI link.A novel framework to prevent manipulation behaviour in consensus reaching process under social network group decision making is proposed, which is based on a theoretically sound optimal feedback model. The manipulation behaviour classification is twofold: (1) ‘individual manipulation’ where each expert manipulates his/her own behaviour to achieve higher importance degree (weight); and (2) ‘group manipulation’ where a group of experts force inconsistent experts to adopt specific recommendation advices obtained via the use of fixed feedback parameter. To counteract ‘individual manipulation’, a behavioural weights assignment method modelling sequential attitude ranging from ‘dictatorship’ to ‘democracy’ is developed, and then a reasonable policy for group minimum adjustment cost is established to assign appropriate weights to experts. To prevent ‘group manipulation’, an optimal feedback model with objective function the individual adjustments cost and constraints related to the threshold of group consensus is investigated. This approach allows the inconsistent experts to balance group consensus and adjustment cost, which enhances their willingness to adopt the recommendation advices and consequently the group reaching consensus on the decision making problem at hand. A numerical example is presented to illustrate and verify the proposed optimal feedback model

Incorporating stakeholders’ knowledge in group decision-making

International audienc

Inflation Targeting, Committee Decision Making and Uncertainty: The Case of the Bank of England’s MPC

The transparency and openness of the monetary policymaking process at the Bank of England has provided very detailed information on both the decisions of individual members of the Monetary Policy Committee and the information on which they are based. In this paper we consider this decision making process in the context of a model in which inflation forecast targeting is used but there is heterogeneity among the members of the committee. We find that internally generated forecasts of output and market generated expectations of medium term inflation provide the best description of discrete changes in interest rates. We also find a role for asset prices through the equity market, foreign exchange market and housing prices. There are also identifiable forms of heterogeneity among members of the committee that improves the predictability of interest rate changes. This can be thought of as supporting the argument that full transparency of monetary policy decision making can be welfare enhancing.Intertemporal macro; Monetary policy; interest rates; monetary policy committee; committee decision making.

Group Modeling : selecting a sequence of television items to suit a group of viewers

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