67,105 research outputs found
On traffic analysis in anonymous communication networks
In this dissertation, we address issues related to traffic analysis attacks and the engineering
in anonymous communication networks.
Mixes have been used in many anonymous communication systems and are supposed
to provide countermeasures that can defeat various traffic analysis attacks. In
this dissertation, we first focus on a particular class of traffic analysis attack, flow
correlation attacks, by which an adversary attempts to analyze the network traffic
and correlate the traffic of a flow over an input link at a mix with that over an output
link of the same mix. Two classes of correlation methods are considered, namely
time-domain methods and frequency-domain methods. We find that a mix with any
known batching strategy may fail against flow correlation attacks in the sense that,
for a given flow over an input link, the adversary can correctly determine which output
link is used by the same flow. We theoretically analyze the effectiveness of a mix
network under flow correlation attacks.
We extend flow correlation attack to perform flow separation: The flow separation
attack separates flow aggregates into either smaller aggregates or individual flows. We
apply blind source separation techniques from statistical signal processing to separate
the traffic in a mix network. Our experiments show that this attack is effective and
scalable. By combining flow separation and frequency spectrum matching method,
a passive attacker can get the traffic map of the mix network. We use a non-trivial network to show that the combined attack works.
The second part of the dissertation focuses on engineering anonymous communication
networks. Measures for anonymity in systems must be on one hand simple and
concise, and on the other hand reflect the realities of real systems. We propose a new
measure for the anonymity degree, which takes into account possible heterogeneity.
We model the effectiveness of single mixes or of mix networks in terms of information
leakage and measure it in terms of covert channel capacity. The relationship between
the anonymity degree and information leakage is described, and an example is shown
TP-DS: A Heuristic Approach for Traffic Pattern Discovery System in MANET’s
As mobile ad hoc network (MANET) systems research has matured and several testbeds have been built to study MANETs, research has focused on developing new MANET applications such as collaborative games, collaborative computing, messaging systems, distributed security schemes, MANET middleware, peer-to-peer file sharing systems, voting systems, resource management and discovery, vehicular computing and collaborative education systems. Many techniques are proposed to enhance the anonymous communication in case of the mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). However, MANETs are vulnerable under certain circumstances like passive attacks and traffic analysis attacks. Traffic analysis problem expose some of the methods and attacks that could infer MANETs are still weak under the passive attacks. In this Research, proposed ‘Traffic pattern Discovery System in MANET’s, aheuristic approach(TP-DS) , enables a passive global adversary to accurately infer the traffic pattern in an anonymous MANET without compromising any node. TP-DS works well on existing on-demand anonymous MANET routing protocols to determine the source node, destination node and the end-to-end communication path. Detailed simulations show that TP-DS can infer the hidden traffic pattern with accuracy as high than the TP-DS and gives the result with accuracy of 95%.
DOI: 10.17762/ijritcc2321-8169.150310
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Traffic Analysis Attacks and Defenses in Low Latency Anonymous Communication
The recent public disclosure of mass surveillance of electronic communication, involving powerful government authorities, has drawn the public's attention to issues regarding Internet privacy. For almost a decade now, there have been several research efforts towards designing and deploying open source, trustworthy and reliable systems that ensure users' anonymity and privacy. These systems operate by hiding the true network identity of communicating parties against eavesdropping adversaries. Tor, acronym for The Onion Router, is an example of such a system. Such systems relay the traffic of their users through an overlay of nodes that are called Onion Routers and are operated by volunteers distributed across the globe. Such systems have served well as anti-censorship and anti-surveillance tools. However, recent publications have disclosed that powerful government organizations are seeking means to de-anonymize such systems and have deployed distributed monitoring infrastructure to aid their efforts.
Attacks against anonymous communication systems, like Tor, often involve trac analysis. In such attacks, an adversary, capable of observing network traffic statistics in several different networks, correlates the trac patterns in these networks, and associates otherwise seemingly unrelated network connections. The process can lead an adversary to the source of an anonymous connection. However, due to their design, consisting of globally distributed relays, the users of anonymity networks like Tor, can route their traffic virtually via any network; hiding their tracks and true identities from their communication peers and eavesdropping adversaries. De-anonymization of a random anonymous connection is hard, as the adversary is required to correlate traffic patterns in one network link to those in virtually all other networks. Past research mostly involved reducing the complexity of this process by rst reducing the set of relays or network routers to monitor, and then identifying the actual source of anonymous traffic among network connections that are routed via this reduced set of relays or network routers to monitor. A study of various research efforts in this field reveals that there have been many more efforts to reduce the set of relays or routers to be searched than to explore methods for actually identifying an anonymous user amidst the network connections using these routers and relays. Few have tried to comprehensively study a complete attack, that involves reducing the set of relays and routers to monitor and identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Although it is believed that systems like Tor are trivially vulnerable to traffic analysis, there are various technical challenges and issues that can become obstacles to accurately identifying the source of anonymous connection. It is hard to adjudge the vulnerability of anonymous communication systems without adequately exploring the issues involved in identifying the source of anonymous traffic.
We take steps to ll this gap by exploring two novel active trac analysis attacks, that solely rely on measurements of network statistics. In these attacks, the adversary tries to identify the source of an anonymous connection arriving to a server from an exit node. This generally involves correlating traffic entering and leaving the Tor network, linking otherwise unrelated connections. To increase the accuracy of identifying the victim connection among several connections, the adversary injects a traffic perturbation pattern into a connection arriving to the server from a Tor node, that the adversary wants to de-anonymize. One way to achieve this is by colluding with the server and injecting a traffic perturbation pattern using common traffic shaping tools. Our first attack involves a novel remote bandwidth estimation technique to conrm the identity of Tor relays and network routers along the path connecting a Tor client and a server by observing network bandwidth fluctuations deliberately injected by the server. The second attack involves correlating network statistics, for connections entering and leaving the Tor network, available from existing network infrastructure, such as Cisco's NetFlow, for identifying the source of an anonymous connection. Additionally, we explored a novel technique to defend against the latter attack. Most research towards defending against traffic analysis attacks, involving transmission of dummy traffic, have not been implemented due to fears of potential performance degradation. Our novel technique involves transmission of dummy traffic, consisting of packets with IP headers having small Time-to-Live (TTL) values. Such packets are discarded by the routers before they reach their destination. They distort NetFlow statistics, without degrading the client's performance. Finally, we present a strategy that employs transmission of unique plain-text decoy traffic, that appears sensitive, such as fake user credentials, through Tor nodes to decoy servers under our control. Periodic tallying of client and server logs to determine unsolicited connection attempts at the server is used to identify the eavesdropping nodes. Such malicious Tor node operators, eavesdropping on users' traffic, could be potential traffic analysis attackers
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Detecting Traffic Snooping in Anonymity Networks Using Decoys
Anonymous communication networks like Tor partially protect the confidentiality of their users' traffic by encrypting all intra-overlay communication. However, when the relayed traffic reaches the boundaries of the overlay network towards its actual destination, the original user traffic is inevitably exposed. At this point, unless end-to-end encryption is used, sensitive user data can be snooped by a malicious or compromised exit node, or by any other rogue network entity on the path towards the actual destination. We explore the use of decoy traffic for the detection of traffic interception on anonymous proxying systems. Our approach is based on the injection of traffic that exposes bait credentials for decoy services that require user authentication. Our aim is to entice prospective eavesdroppers to access decoy accounts on servers under our control using the intercepted credentials. We have deployed our prototype implementation in the Tor network using decoy IMAP and SMTP servers. During the course of six months, our system detected eight cases of traffic interception that involved eight different Tor exit nodes. We provide a detailed analysis of the detected incidents, discuss potential improvements to our system, and outline how our approach can be extended for the detection of HTTP session hijacking attacks
Correlation-Based Traffic Analysis Attacks on Anonymity Networks
In this paper, we address attacks that exploit the timing behavior of TCP and other protocols and applications in low-latency anonymity networks. Mixes have been used in many anonymous communication systems and are supposed to provide countermeasures to defeat traffic analysis attacks. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of traffic analysis attacks, flow-correlation attacks, by which an adversary attempts to analyze the network traffic and correlate the traffic of a flow over an input link with that over an output link. Two classes of correlation methods are considered, namely time-domain methods and frequency-domain methods. Based on our threat model and known strategies in existing mix networks, we perform extensive experiments to analyze the performance of mixes. We find that all but a few batching strategies fail against flow-correlation attacks, allowing the adversary to either identify ingress and egress points of a flow or to reconstruct the path used by the flow. Counterintuitively, some batching strategies are actually detrimental against attacks. The empirical results provided in this paper give an indication to designers of Mix networks about appropriate configurations and mechanisms to be used to counter flow-correlation attacks
Correlation-Based Traffic Analysis Attacks on Anonymity Networks
In this paper, we address attacks that exploit the timing behavior of TCP and other protocols and applications in low-latency anonymity networks. Mixes have been used in many anonymous communication systems and are supposed to provide countermeasures to defeat traffic analysis attacks. In this paper, we focus on a particular class of traffic analysis attacks, flow-correlation attacks, by which an adversary attempts to analyze the network traffic and correlate the traffic of a flow over an input link with that over an output link. Two classes of correlation methods are considered, namely time-domain methods and frequency-domain methods. Based on our threat model and known strategies in existing mix networks, we perform extensive experiments to analyze the performance of mixes. We find that all but a few batching strategies fail against flow-correlation attacks, allowing the adversary to either identify ingress and egress points of a flow or to reconstruct the path used by the flow. Counterintuitively, some batching strategies are actually detrimental against attacks. The empirical results provided in this paper give an indication to designers of Mix networks about appropriate configurations and mechanisms to be used to counter flow-correlation attacks
Social networking for anonymous communication systems: a survey
Anonymous communication systems have been around for sometime, providing anonymity, enhanced privacy, and censorship circumvention. A lot has been done, since Chaum's seminal paper on mix networks, in preventing attacks able to undermine the anonymity provided by these systems. This, however, is goal difficult to achieve due to the de-centralized nature of these systems. In the end it boils down to finding a subset of trusted nodes to be placed in critical positions of the communication path. But the question remains: "How to know if a given node can be trusted?". In this paper we present a survey of a new research area which goal is to exploit trust in social links to solve some of the shortcomings of anonymous communication systems. Recent research shows that by using social networking features it is possible to prevent traffic analysis attacks and even detect Sybil attacks
Introducing Accountability to Anonymity Networks
Many anonymous communication (AC) networks rely on routing traffic through
proxy nodes to obfuscate the originator of the traffic. Without an
accountability mechanism, exit proxy nodes risk sanctions by law enforcement if
users commit illegal actions through the AC network. We present BackRef, a
generic mechanism for AC networks that provides practical repudiation for the
proxy nodes by tracing back the selected outbound traffic to the predecessor
node (but not in the forward direction) through a cryptographically verifiable
chain. It also provides an option for full (or partial) traceability back to
the entry node or even to the corresponding user when all intermediate nodes
are cooperating. Moreover, to maintain a good balance between anonymity and
accountability, the protocol incorporates whitelist directories at exit proxy
nodes. BackRef offers improved deployability over the related work, and
introduces a novel concept of pseudonymous signatures that may be of
independent interest.
We exemplify the utility of BackRef by integrating it into the onion routing
(OR) protocol, and examine its deployability by considering several
system-level aspects. We also present the security definitions for the BackRef
system (namely, anonymity, backward traceability, no forward traceability, and
no false accusation) and conduct a formal security analysis of the OR protocol
with BackRef using ProVerif, an automated cryptographic protocol verifier,
establishing the aforementioned security properties against a strong
adversarial model
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