484 research outputs found
Mechanism Design without Money via Stable Matching
Mechanism design without money has a rich history in social choice
literature. Due to the strong impossibility theorem by Gibbard and
Satterthwaite, exploring domains in which there exist dominant strategy
mechanisms is one of the central questions in the field. We propose a general
framework, called the generalized packing problem (\gpp), to study the
mechanism design questions without payment. The \gpp\ possesses a rich
structure and comprises a number of well-studied models as special cases,
including, e.g., matroid, matching, knapsack, independent set, and the
generalized assignment problem.
We adopt the agenda of approximate mechanism design where the objective is to
design a truthful (or strategyproof) mechanism without money that can be
implemented in polynomial time and yields a good approximation to the socially
optimal solution. We study several special cases of \gpp, and give constant
approximation mechanisms for matroid, matching, knapsack, and the generalized
assignment problem. Our result for generalized assignment problem solves an
open problem proposed in \cite{DG10}.
Our main technical contribution is in exploitation of the approaches from
stable matching, which is a fundamental solution concept in the context of
matching marketplaces, in application to mechanism design. Stable matching,
while conceptually simple, provides a set of powerful tools to manage and
analyze self-interested behaviors of participating agents. Our mechanism uses a
stable matching algorithm as a critical component and adopts other approaches
like random sampling and online mechanisms. Our work also enriches the stable
matching theory with a new knapsack constrained matching model
Robust randomized matchings
The following game is played on a weighted graph: Alice selects a matching
and Bob selects a number . Alice's payoff is the ratio of the weight of
the heaviest edges of to the maximum weight of a matching of size at
most . If guarantees a payoff of at least then it is called
-robust. In 2002, Hassin and Rubinstein gave an algorithm that returns
a -robust matching, which is best possible.
We show that Alice can improve her payoff to by playing a
randomized strategy. This result extends to a very general class of
independence systems that includes matroid intersection, b-matchings, and
strong 2-exchange systems. It also implies an improved approximation factor for
a stochastic optimization variant known as the maximum priority matching
problem and translates to an asymptotic robustness guarantee for deterministic
matchings, in which Bob can only select numbers larger than a given constant.
Moreover, we give a new LP-based proof of Hassin and Rubinstein's bound
Assortment optimisation under a general discrete choice model: A tight analysis of revenue-ordered assortments
The assortment problem in revenue management is the problem of deciding which
subset of products to offer to consumers in order to maximise revenue. A simple
and natural strategy is to select the best assortment out of all those that are
constructed by fixing a threshold revenue and then choosing all products
with revenue at least . This is known as the revenue-ordered assortments
strategy. In this paper we study the approximation guarantees provided by
revenue-ordered assortments when customers are rational in the following sense:
the probability of selecting a specific product from the set being offered
cannot increase if the set is enlarged. This rationality assumption, known as
regularity, is satisfied by almost all discrete choice models considered in the
revenue management and choice theory literature, and in particular by random
utility models. The bounds we obtain are tight and improve on recent results in
that direction, such as for the Mixed Multinomial Logit model by
Rusmevichientong et al. (2014). An appealing feature of our analysis is its
simplicity, as it relies only on the regularity condition.
We also draw a connection between assortment optimisation and two pricing
problems called unit demand envy-free pricing and Stackelberg minimum spanning
tree: These problems can be restated as assortment problems under discrete
choice models satisfying the regularity condition, and moreover revenue-ordered
assortments correspond then to the well-studied uniform pricing heuristic. When
specialised to that setting, the general bounds we establish for
revenue-ordered assortments match and unify the best known results on uniform
pricing.Comment: Minor changes following referees' comment
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