How Ontologies Can Help in an eMarketplace

Recently, ontologies have been developed in various business domains with the recent maturing of the Semantic Web technologies. However, ontology-related researches have largely focused on the facilitation of successful matchmaking but not much on traders’ requirement elicitation and potential negotiations in e-marketplaces. Because ontology provides the key knowledge about the inter-relationships among the issues and alternatives of the traders’ requirements, we show how to elicit trade requirements, alternatives, and tradeoff from an agreed ontology. This facilitates the whole business process of the e-marketplace, from matchmaking, recommendation, to negotiation. We further propose a novel methodology for the elicitation of dependencies among traders’ requirements for the formulation of an effective decision plan. As a result, traders can have a better cognition of their requirements and the overall operations of the e-marketplace can be streamlined

Facilitating the housing bargaining with the help of the bargaining decision support system

More than 90 percent home buyers today rely on the Internet as one of their primary research sources and real estate related searches continually grows. Internet helps buyers to find and select bigger number of right homes for sale in a shorter time, so provides more alternatives for bargaining. The bargaining is an inseparable part of the home buying and selling process. However, housing bargaining mostly is conducted face-to face, so there is a growing need for facilitating the housing bargaining and conducting such bargaining on the Web with the help of the systems. The article describes the developed Real-Time Housing Multiple Criteria Bargaining Decision Support System, based on multiple-criteria mathematical methods, which helps to improve the efficiency of bargaining through the following functions: search for housing alternatives; formulation of the initial comparative table of alternatives; multiple criteria analysis of housing alternatives and negotiation tactics; determination of the most useful home option for buying; presentation of recommendations and real-time determination of a home's market value; e-bargaining using templates of bargaining e-mails generated by the system

Regulatory Bundling

Regulatory bundling is the aggregation or disaggregation of legislative rules by administrative agencies. Agencies, in other words, can bundle what would otherwise be multiple rules into just one rulemaking. Conversely, they can split one rule into several. This observation parallels other recent work on how agencies can aggregate adjudications and enforcement actions but now focuses on legislative rules, the most consequential form of agency action. The topic is timely in light of a recent executive order directing agencies to repeal two regulations for every new one promulgated. Agencies now have a greater incentive to pack regulatory provisions together for every two rules they can repeal

The web–based real estate multiple criteria negotiation decision support system: A new generation of decision support systems

The negotiations are an inseparable part of the real estate buying and selling process. Currently real estate are characterized by the intensive creation and use of information, knowledge and automation (software, knowledge and decision support systems, neural networks, etc.) applications. It is commonly agreed that a better integration of information, knowledge and automation applications, as well use of voice stress analysis (one of biometric technologies) might be an efficient mean for decision making in real estate negotiations. Voice stress analysis can help the negotiators to distinguish between truth and lies, improve the value of decisions made, significantly speed up real estate sector processes, help to reach a better real estate sales and purchase agreement terms and decrease the overall cost of real estate search and negotiation processes. The authors’ objective is to improve the quality and efficiency of decision support systems. The article analyses scientific research related to negotiations and presents the developed Web–based Real Estate Multiple Criteria Negotiation Decision Support System with integrated voice stress analysis– a new generation of Decision Support Systems. Santruka Derybos yra neatskiriama nekilnojamojo turto pirkimo ir pardavimo proceso dalis. Dabartiniam nekilnojamojo turto sektoriui būdingas intensyvus informacijos, žiniu ir automatizavimo naudojimas bei kūrimas (programine iranga, žiniu ir sprendimu paramos sistemos, neuroniniai tinklai ir pan.). Sutariama, kad geresnis informacijos, žiniu, automatizavimo, taip pat balso streso analizes (biometrines technologijos) integravimas pagreitina nekilnojamojo turto sektoriaus veikla. Balso streso analize gali padeti derybininkams atskirti, kada sakoma tiesa, o kada meluojama, padidina priimamu sprendimu naudinguma, paspartina nekilnojamojo turto paieškos ir derybu procesus, padeda pasiekti naudingesniu pirkimo ir pardavimo sutarties salygu bei sumažina nekilnojamojo turto paieškos ir derybu proceso kaina. Straipsnio autoriai, siekdami pagerinti sprendimu paramos sistemu kokybe ir efektyvuma, analizuoja mokslininku atliktu derybu srities tyrimu rezultatus ir pristato sukurta nekilnojamojo turto derybu internetine sprendimu paramos sistema su integruota balso streso analizes technologija kaip naujos kartos sprendimu paramos sistema. First Publish Online: 18 Oct 201

Governing Europe for the people? Citizen representation in European Union policy-making

The degree to which European Union (EU) policy-making is representative of citizens’ preferences is a central contested issue in the debate over the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’. Previous studies have demonstrated that in many cases political representatives share their voters’ attitudes to the EU. However, this research has rarely considered the substance of actual legislative policy-making in the EU institutions. Scrutinising the popular image that EU policy-making is unresponsive to public demands, the thesis investigates EU-level representation along the ‘domestic route’, on which citizens’ preferences intrude policymaking through their national governments in the Council of the EU. Using a range of original and existing datasets, the four papers investigate three classic assessment criteria of representation (mandate fulfilment, responsiveness, congruence) with methods ranging from mixed effects regressions to quantitative text analysis. Three central findings emerge: first, national governments are responsive to their domestic public opinion when negotiating and voting on legislative acts in the EU. Regarding legislative conflicts over left-right issues, responsiveness is stronger with majoritarian than proportional electoral systems and peaks when national elections are imminent. When it comes to pro-anti integration conflicts, responsiveness is conditional on the salience of EU issues in national political arenas. Second, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs limit the discretion of national ministers in EU negotiations and help governments to deliver their electoral mandates. Third, final EU policy output is most responsive to and congruent with the views of those national publics that have clear-cut opinions on a policy issue and care intensely about it. These findings are evidence of surprising patterns of citizen representation in EU policy-making. They suggest that politicisation of the EU and the diffusion of executive coordination and parliamentary oversight in EU affairs could strengthen representation. Yet, evidence remains scarce that better representation will end the EU’s legitimacy crisis

The Political Nature of Defense Policy in Congress

Is defense policy more collegial than other policy issues addressed by Congress? More specifically, what are the institutional and political motives which drive a majority of the members of Congress to consistently transcend partisanship in order to pass defense focused legislation into law? The purpose of this study was to test whether or not the consideration of defense policy in the House of Representatives is unique in its ability to transcend partisanship. And if so, why? Hypothesis: The formulation of defense policy in the U.S. House of Representatives is approached with more collegiality than other policy issue areas, mainly due to institutional, domestic, and international political pressures on members that transcend competing partisan motivations. Defense policy was operationalized by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). “Other types of policy” was operationalized by the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill. “Collegiality,” the primary dependent variable, was defined as exceptional and consistent cooperative interaction among colleagues over time that rendered legislation which garnered support of at least a bipartisan supermajority (two-thirds) of the House of Representatives upon its final passage. A mixed methods approach was employed using the annual NDAA process as a study vehicle. Qualitative and quantitative analysis included case studies of U.S. legislative history that compared the NDAA process with that of the Farm Bill and Highway Bill. Deliberations over the bills were explored during three five-year periods of notable partisanship in U.S. politics that coupled with notable U.S. security concerns abroad: 1961-66, 1993-98, and 2007-12. Case studies were complemented by interviews with 25 members of the policy community The study concluded that the NDAA is essentially a de facto annual omnibus authorization bill with unparalleled political and institutional momentum that serves individual policymaker interests as well as the public interest. As such, the NDAA is an institution unto itself and its annual process consistently demands House members approach it in a uniquely collegial manner, providing strong evidence defense policy formulation is more collegial than other policy areas

Entangling Alliances: Presidents and Strategic Issue Linkage in International Negotiations

Abstract Why are issues linked in international negotiations? I propose one mechanism by which executives can use agenda control to both force and block linkage in international negotiations to their advantage. In so doing, I improve on Putna

The Theory and Practice of Contestatory Federalism

Madisonian theory holds that a federal division of power is necessary to the protection of liberty, but that federalism is a naturally unstable form of government organization that is in constant danger of collapsing into either unitarism or fragmentation. Despite its inherent instability, this condition may be permanently maintained, according to Madison, through a constitutional design that keeps the system in equipoise by institutionalizing a form of perpetual contestation between national and subnational governments. The theory, however, does not specify how that contestation actually occurs, and by what means. This paper investigates Madison’s hypothesis by documenting the methods actually deployed on the ground to influence or to thwart national policy making used by subnational units in nine federal or quasi-federal states: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. The study produces two notable findings. First, the evidence confirms Madison’s prediction that subnational units in federal states will from time to time assert themselves against national power – ambition does appear to counteract, or at least to be deployed against, ambition. Second, the data show strikingly that subnational units in federal states have energetically developed a great variety of methods to attempt to shape, influence, or thwart national policies. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that subnational units have not confined themselves to the use of tools of influence provided by their constitutions, but have in many cases creatively developed new tools of influence outside of the formal constitutional scheme. This phenomenon raises the possibility that Madison’s institutional prescription for constitutional stabilization may have the perverse effect of creating the conditions for constitutional destabilization instead. This conclusion in turn throws doubt on the Madisonian premise that constitutions can, through careful engineering, be made to stabilize themselves at their initial design specifications

The Theory and Practice of Contestatory Federalism

Madisonian theory holds that a federal division of power is necessary to the protection of liberty, but that federalism is a naturally unstable form of government organization that is in constant danger of collapsing into either unitarism or fragmentation. Despite its inherent instability, this condition may be permanently maintained, according to Madison, through a constitutional design that keeps the system in equipoise by institutionalizing a form of perpetual contestation between national and subnational governments. The theory, however, does not specify how that contestation actually occurs, and by what means. This paper investigates Madison’s hypothesis by documenting the methods actually deployed on the ground to influence or to thwart national policy making used by subnational units in nine federal or quasi-federal states: Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. The study produces two notable findings. First, the evidence confirms Madison’s prediction that subnational units in federal states will from time to time assert themselves against national power—ambition does appear to counteract, or at least to be deployed against, ambition. Second, the data show strikingly that subnational units in federal states have energetically developed a great variety of methods to attempt to shape, influence, or thwart national policies. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates that subnational units have not confined themselves to the use of tools of influence provided by their constitutions, but have in many cases creatively developed new tools of influence outside of the formal constitutional scheme. This phenomenon raises the possibility that Madison’s institutional prescription for constitutional stabilization may have the perverse effect of creating the conditions for constitutional destabilization instead. This conclusion in turn throws doubt on the Madisonian premise that constitutions can, through careful engineering, be made to stabilize themselves at their initial design specifications