Complexity Jumps In Multiagent Justification Logic Under Interacting Justifications

The Logic of Proofs, LP, and its successor, Justification Logic, is a refinement of the modal logic approach to epistemology in which proofs/justifications are taken into account. In 2000 Kuznets showed that satisfiability for LP is in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, a result which has been successfully repeated for all other one-agent justification logics whose complexity is known. We introduce a family of multi-agent justification logics with interactions between the agents' justifications, by extending and generalizing the two-agent versions of the Logic of Proofs introduced by Yavorskaya in 2008. Known concepts and tools from the single-agent justification setting are adjusted for this multiple agent case. We present tableau rules and some preliminary complexity results. In several cases the satisfiability problem for these logics remains in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy, while for others it is PSPACE or EXP-hard. Furthermore, this problem becomes PSPACE-hard even for certain two-agent logics, while there are EXP-hard logics of three agents

NEXP-completeness and Universal Hardness Results for Justification Logic

We provide a lower complexity bound for the satisfiability problem of a multi-agent justification logic, establishing that the general NEXP upper bound from our previous work is tight. We then use a simple modification of the corresponding reduction to prove that satisfiability for all multi-agent justification logics from there is hard for the Sigma 2 p class of the second level of the polynomial hierarchy - given certain reasonable conditions. Our methods improve on these required conditions for the same lower bound for the single-agent justification logics, proven by Buss and Kuznets in 2009, thus answering one of their open questions.Comment: Shorter version has been accepted for publication by CSR 201

Self-Referential Justifications in Epistemic Logic

This paper is devoted to the study of self-referential proofs and/or justifications, i.e.,valid proofs that prove statements about these same proofs. The goal is to investigate whether such self-referential justifications are present in the reasoning described by standard modal epistemic logics such as $\mathsf{S4}$ . We argue that the modal language by itself is too coarse to capture this concept of self-referentiality and that the language of justification logic can serve as an adequate refinement. We consider well-known modal logics of knowledge/belief and show, using explicit justifications, that $\mathsf{S4}$ , $\mathsf{D4}$ , $\mathsf{K4}$ , and $\mathsf{T}$ with their respective justification counterparts $\mathsf{LP}$ , $\mathsf{JD4}$ , $\mathsf{J4}$ , and $\mathsf{JT}$ describe knowledge that is self-referential in some strong sense. We also demonstrate that self-referentiality can be avoided for $\mathsf{K}$ and $\mathsf{D}$ . In order to prove the former result, we develop a machinery of minimal evidence functions used to effectively build models for justification logics. We observe that the calculus used to construct the minimal functions axiomatizes the reflected fragments of justification logics. We also discuss difficulties that result from an introduction of negative introspectio