On the complexity of problems on simple games

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes–no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand, each of these collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of games. This analysis as usual depends on the game representation used as input. We consider four natural explicit representations: winning, losing, minimal winning, and maximal losing. We first analyze the complexity of testing whether a game is simple and testing whether a game is weighted. We show that, for the four types of representations, both problems can be solved in polynomial time. Finally, we provide results on the complexity of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type. We analyze strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity, which are desirable properties to be fulfilled for a simple game. We finalize with some considerations on the possibility of representing a game in a more succinct representation showing a natural representation in which the recognition problem is hard.Preprin

Cooperation through social influence

We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a cooperative simple game in which a team (or coalition) of players succeeds if it is able to convince enough agents to participate in the task (to vote in favor of a decision). We take the linear threshold model as the influence model. We show first the expressiveness of influence games showing that they capture the class of simple games. Then we characterize the computational complexity of various problems on influence games, including measures (length and width), values (Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf) and properties (of teams and players). Finally, we analyze those problems for some particular extremal cases, with respect to the propagation of influence, showing tighter complexity characterizations.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author’s final draft

Model-checking Quantitative Alternating-time Temporal Logic on One-counter Game Models

We consider quantitative extensions of the alternating-time temporal logics ATL/ATLs called quantitative alternating-time temporal logics (QATL/QATLs) in which the value of a counter can be compared to constants using equality, inequality and modulo constraints. We interpret these logics in one-counter game models which are infinite duration games played on finite control graphs where each transition can increase or decrease the value of an unbounded counter. That is, the state-space of these games are, generally, infinite. We consider the model-checking problem of the logics QATL and QATLs on one-counter game models with VASS semantics for which we develop algorithms and provide matching lower bounds. Our algorithms are based on reductions of the model-checking problems to model-checking games. This approach makes it quite simple for us to deal with extensions of the logical languages as well as the infinite state spaces. The framework generalizes on one hand qualitative problems such as ATL/ATLs model-checking of finite-state systems, model-checking of the branching-time temporal logics CTL and CTLs on one-counter processes and the realizability problem of LTL specifications. On the other hand the model-checking problem for QATL/QATLs generalizes quantitative problems such as the fixed-initial credit problem for energy games (in the case of QATL) and energy parity games (in the case of QATLs). Our results are positive as we show that the generalizations are not too costly with respect to complexity. As a byproduct we obtain new results on the complexity of model-checking CTLs in one-counter processes and show that deciding the winner in one-counter games with LTL objectives is 2ExpSpace-complete.Comment: 22 pages, 12 figure

Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation

It has been suggested that players often produce simplified and/or misspecified mental representations of interactive decision problems (Kreps, 1990). We submit that the relational structure of players’ preferences in a game induces cognitive complexity, and may be an important driver of such simplifications. We provide a formal classification of order structures in two-person normal form games based on the two properties of monotonicity and projectivity, and present experiments in which subjects must first construct a representation of games of different relational complexity, and subsequently play the games according to their own representation. Experimental results support the hypothesis that relational complexity matters. More complex games are harder to represent, and this difficulty is correlated with measures of short term memory capacity. Furthermore, most erroneous representations are less complex than the correct ones. In addition, subjects who misrepresent the games behave consistently with such representations according to simple but rational decision criteria. This suggests that in many strategic settings individuals may act optimally on the ground of simplified and mistaken premises.pure motive, mixed motive, preferences, bi-orders, language, cognition, projectivity, monotonicity, short term memory, experiments

The Complexity of All-switches Strategy Improvement

Strategy improvement is a widely-used and well-studied class of algorithms for solving graph-based infinite games. These algorithms are parameterized by a switching rule, and one of the most natural rules is "all switches" which switches as many edges as possible in each iteration. Continuing a recent line of work, we study all-switches strategy improvement from the perspective of computational complexity. We consider two natural decision problems, both of which have as input a game $G$, a starting strategy $s$, and an edge $e$. The problems are: 1.) The edge switch problem, namely, is the edge $e$ ever switched by all-switches strategy improvement when it is started from $s$ on game $G$? 2.) The optimal strategy problem, namely, is the edge $e$ used in the final strategy that is found by strategy improvement when it is started from $s$ on game $G$? We show $\mathtt{PSPACE}$-completeness of the edge switch problem and optimal strategy problem for the following settings: Parity games with the discrete strategy improvement algorithm of V\"oge and Jurdzi\'nski; mean-payoff games with the gain-bias algorithm [14,37]; and discounted-payoff games and simple stochastic games with their standard strategy improvement algorithms. We also show $\mathtt{PSPACE}$-completeness of an analogous problem to edge switch for the bottom-antipodal algorithm for finding the sink of an Acyclic Unique Sink Orientation on a cube

The Complexity of Testing Properties of Simple Games

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of ``yea'' votes yield passage of the issue at hand. A collection of ``yea'' voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested on performing a complexity analysis of problems on such games depending on the game representation. We consider four natural explicit representations, winning, loosing, minimal winning, and maximal loosing. We first analyze the computational complexity of obtaining a particular representation of a simple game from a different one. We show that some cases this transformation can be done in polynomial time while the others require exponential time. The second question is classifying the complexity for testing whether a game is simple or weighted. We show that for the four types of representation both problem can be solved in polynomial time. Finally, we provide results on the complexity of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type. In this way, we analyze strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity, which are desirable properties to be fulfilled for a simple game.Comment: 18 pages, LaTex fil

One-Counter Stochastic Games

We study the computational complexity of basic decision problems for one-counter simple stochastic games (OC-SSGs), under various objectives. OC-SSGs are 2-player turn-based stochastic games played on the transition graph of classic one-counter automata. We study primarily the termination objective, where the goal of one player is to maximize the probability of reaching counter value 0, while the other player wishes to avoid this. Partly motivated by the goal of understanding termination objectives, we also study certain "limit" and "long run average" reward objectives that are closely related to some well-studied objectives for stochastic games with rewards. Examples of problems we address include: does player 1 have a strategy to ensure that the counter eventually hits 0, i.e., terminates, almost surely, regardless of what player 2 does? Or that the liminf (or limsup) counter value equals infinity with a desired probability? Or that the long run average reward is >0 with desired probability? We show that the qualitative termination problem for OC-SSGs is in NP intersection coNP, and is in P-time for 1-player OC-SSGs, or equivalently for one-counter Markov Decision Processes (OC-MDPs). Moreover, we show that quantitative limit problems for OC-SSGs are in NP intersection coNP, and are in P-time for 1-player OC-MDPs. Both qualitative limit problems and qualitative termination problems for OC-SSGs are already at least as hard as Condon's quantitative decision problem for finite-state SSGs.Comment: 20 pages, 1 figure. This is a full version of a paper accepted for publication in proceedings of FSTTCS 201

The Complexity of Model Checking Higher-Order Fixpoint Logic

Higher-Order Fixpoint Logic (HFL) is a hybrid of the simply typed \lambda-calculus and the modal \lambda-calculus. This makes it a highly expressive temporal logic that is capable of expressing various interesting correctness properties of programs that are not expressible in the modal \lambda-calculus. This paper provides complexity results for its model checking problem. In particular we consider those fragments of HFL built by using only types of bounded order k and arity m. We establish k-fold exponential time completeness for model checking each such fragment. For the upper bound we use fixpoint elimination to obtain reachability games that are singly-exponential in the size of the formula and k-fold exponential in the size of the underlying transition system. These games can be solved in deterministic linear time. As a simple consequence, we obtain an exponential time upper bound on the expression complexity of each such fragment. The lower bound is established by a reduction from the word problem for alternating (k-1)-fold exponential space bounded Turing Machines. Since there are fixed machines of that type whose word problems are already hard with respect to k-fold exponential time, we obtain, as a corollary, k-fold exponential time completeness for the data complexity of our fragments of HFL, provided m exceeds 3. This also yields a hierarchy result in expressive power.Comment: 33 pages, 2 figures, to be published in Logical Methods in Computer Scienc