On the Complexity of the Highway Pricing Problem

The highway pricing problem asks for prices to be determined for segments of a single highway such as to maximize the revenue obtainable from a given set of customers with known valuations. The problem is (weakly) NP-hard and a recent quasi-PTAS suggests that a PTAS might be in reach. Yet, so far it has resisted any attempt for constant-factor approximation algorithms. We relate the tractability of the problem to structural properties of customers' valuations. We show that the problem becomes NP-hard as soon as the average valuations of customers are not homogeneous, even under further restrictions such as monotonicity. Moreover, we derive an efficient approximation algorithm, parameterized along the inhomogeneity of customers' valuations. Finally, we discuss extensions of our results that go beyond the highway pricing problem.\u

The Design of Arbitrage-Free Data Pricing Schemes

Motivated by a growing market that involves buying and selling data over the web, we study pricing schemes that assign value to queries issued over a database. Previous work studied pricing mechanisms that compute the price of a query by extending a data seller's explicit prices on certain queries, or investigated the properties that a pricing function should exhibit without detailing a generic construction. In this work, we present a formal framework for pricing queries over data that allows the construction of general families of pricing functions, with the main goal of avoiding arbitrage. We consider two types of pricing schemes: instance-independent schemes, where the price depends only on the structure of the query, and answer-dependent schemes, where the price also depends on the query output. Our main result is a complete characterization of the structure of pricing functions in both settings, by relating it to properties of a function over a lattice. We use our characterization, together with information-theoretic methods, to construct a variety of arbitrage-free pricing functions. Finally, we discuss various tradeoffs in the design space and present techniques for efficient computation of the proposed pricing functions.Comment: full pape

Optimal Bundle Pricing for Homogeneous Items

We consider a revenue maximization problem where we are selling a set of m items, each of which available in a certain quantity (possibly unlimited) to a set of n bidders. Bidders are single minded, that is, each bidder requests exactly one subset, or bundle of items. Each bidder has a valuation for the requested bundle that we assume to be known to the seller. The task is to find an envy-free pricing such as to maximize the revenue of the seller. We derive several complexity results and algorithms for several variants of this pricing problem. In fact, the settings that we consider address problems where the different items are `homogeneous'' in some sense. First, we introduce the notion of affne price functions that can be used to model situations much more general than the usual combinatorial pricing model that is mostly addressed in the literature. We derive fixed-parameter polynomial time algorithms as well as inapproximability results. Second, we consider the special case of combinatorial pricing, and introduce a monotonicity constraint that can also be seen as `global'' envy-freeness condition. We show that the problem remains strongly NP-hard, and we derive a PTAS - thus breaking the inapproximability barrier known for the general case. As a special case, we finally address the notorious highway pricing problem under the global envy-freeness condition.operations research and management science;

Optimal Bundle Pricing with Monotonicity Constraint

We consider the problem to price (digital) items in order to maximize the revenue obtainable from a set of bidders. We suggest a natural monotonicity constraint on bundle prices, show that the problem remains NP-hard, and we derive a PTAS. We also discuss a special case, the highway pricing problem.operations research and management science;