376 research outputs found
Measuring the Impact of Spectre and Meltdown
The Spectre and Meltdown flaws in modern microprocessors represent a new
class of attacks that have been difficult to mitigate. The mitigations that
have been proposed have known performance impacts. The reported magnitude of
these impacts varies depending on the industry sector and expected workload
characteristics. In this paper, we measure the performance impact on several
workloads relevant to HPC systems. We show that the impact can be significant
on both synthetic and realistic workloads. We also show that the performance
penalties are difficult to avoid even in dedicated systems where security is a
lesser concern
Software-Based Side Channel Attacks and the Future of Hardened Microarchitecture
Side channel attack vectors found in microarchitecture of computing devices expose systems to potentially system-level breaches. This thesis consists of a comprehensive report on current exploits of this nature, describing their fundamental basis and usage, paving the way to further research into hardware mitigations that may be utilized to combat these and future vulnerabilities. It will discuss several modern software-based side channel attacks, describing the mechanisms they utilize to gain access to privileged information. Attack vectors will be exemplified, along with applicability to various architectures utilized in modern computing. Finally, discussion of how future architectural changes must successfully harden chips against attacks of this type will occur, ending with a reinforced call for development of these integral architectural revisions to resolve the threat
Model-Checking Speculation-Dependent Security Properties: Abstracting and Reducing Processor Models for Sound and Complete Verification
Spectre and Meltdown attacks in modern microprocessors represent a new class of attacks that have been difficult to deal with. They underline vulnerabilities in hardware design that have been going unnoticed for years. This shows the weakness of the state-of-the-art verification process and design practices. These attacks are OS-independent, and they do not exploit any software vulnerabilities. Moreover, they violate all security assumptions ensured by standard security procedures, (e.g., address space isolation), and, as a result, every security mechanism built upon these guarantees. These vulnerabilities allow the attacker to retrieve leaked data without accessing the secret directly. Indeed, they make use of covert channels, which are mechanisms of hidden communication that convey sensitive information without any visible information flow between the malicious party and the victim. The root cause of this type of side-channel attacks lies within the speculative and out-of-order execution of modern high-performance microarchitectures. Since modern processors are hard to verify with standard formal verification techniques, we present a methodology that shows how to transform a realistic model of a speculative and out-of-order processor into an abstract one. Following related formal verification approaches, we simplify the model under consideration by abstraction and refinement steps. We also present an approach to formally verify the abstract model using a standard model checker. The theoretical flow, reliant on established formal verification results, is introduced and a sketch of proof is provided for soundness and correctness. Finally, we demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, by applying it on a pipelined DLX RISC-inspired processor architecture. We show preliminary experimental results to support our claim, performing Bounded Model-Checking with a state-of-the-art model checker
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