Agency Theory and Supply Chain Management: Goals and Incentives in Supply Chain Organisations

Purpose Agency theory (AT) offers opportunities to examine how the risk of opportunism can be prevented or minimised along supply chain organisations using incentives to achieve goal alignment. Methodology The study presents evidence of how members of such organisations achieve goal alignment through the use of incentives by empirically examining two complete supply chain organisations, including final customers, within the UK agri-food industry using a case study methodology. Findings The findings show that contractual goals can be divided into two different categories, shared supply chain organisational goals, and independent goals of each individual participant. In addition to monitoring ability, incentives can also be classified into short term financial and long term social incentives. Product attributes, in particular credence attributes, are also identified as having implications for both goals and incentives. Research limitations The supply chain perspective and case study methodology mean that the research findings cannot be generalised to other supply chains. A further limitation of the research is the use of different methods of data collection at the final customer point. Practical Implications Managers must ensure that appropriate incentives for all departments and individuals are designed to deliver the strategic goals of the supply chain organisation

Designing effective contracts within the buyer-seller context: a DEMATEL and ANP study

This study examines the factors that contribute to effective contract design within the context of buyer-seller relationship. Research streams on contract factors, supply chain factors, environmental factors, and competitive factors were reviewed to arrive at 18 contract factors. A hybrid model of Decision-Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) and Analytic Hierarchy Process (ANP) analysed empirical data collected from 17 experts to weight the importance of contract factors. It was found that most important factors are, in order of significance: policies, supplier technology, force majeure, formality, relationship learning, buyer power, legal actions, liquidated damages, supplier power and partnership

A needs theory of governance

New-institutional economics hypothesizes imperfect rationality, self-seeking preferences, monetary-related needs, and opportunism as fundamental features of human behavior. Consistently, new-institutionalist models of governance highlight the efficiency and transaction costs minimizing features of control rights and governance. Differently, needs theory of governance, as here presented, hypothesizes imperfect rationality, multiple needs, and reciprocity, in which case opportunism is reduced to an exception to individual behavior. Consistently, it presents a theory that links production governance with the wellbeing of those partaking in production. Building on Maslow’s human psychology, the governance model suggested in this paper is aimed at evidencing the self-actualization potential of control rights, organizational structures and practices. The application of Maslow’s theory to the institutional structure of organizations suggests that the deepest organizational layers (control rights and governance) broadly correspond to the most basic needs in Maslow’s theory (survival, security and belonging), while the outer layers (managerial models and employment relations) correspond to the fulfillment of the highest needs (self-esteem and self-actualization). Cooperative firms are used as an illustration of governance solutions consistent with needs theory in human psychology

Inter-Organizational Learning and Collective Memory in Small Firms Clusters: an Agent-Based Approach

Literature about Industrial Districts has largely emphasized the importance of both economic and social factors in determining the competitiveness of these particular firms\' clusters. For thirty years, the Industrial District productive and organizational model represented an alternative to the integrated model of fordist enterprise. Nowadays, the district model suffers from competitive gaps, largely due to the increase of competitive pressure of globalization. This work aims to analyze, through an agent-based simulation model, the influence of informal socio-cognitive coordination mechanisms on district\'s performances, in relation to different competitive scenarios. The agent-based simulation approach is particularly fit for this purpose as it is able to represent the Industrial District\'s complexity. Furthermore, it permits to develop dynamic analysis of district\'s performances according to different types of environment evolution. The results of this work question the widespread opinion that cooperative districts can answer to environmental changes more effectively that non-cooperative ones. In fact, the results of simulations show that, in the presence of turbulent scenarios, the best performer districts are those in which cooperation and competition, trust and opportunism balance out.Firm Networks, Collective Memory, Agent Based Models, Uncertainty

Temporal, cognitive and behavioral dimensions of transaction costs: To an understanding of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations

transaction costs;costs and cost price

MAKE-OR-BUY THEORIES: WHERE DO WE STAND?

The aim of this paper is to discuss the state-of-the art and the directions for research on the make-orbuy problem. After thirty years of research efforts, we now have numerous contributions explaining different aspects of the nature and existence of the firm. The search for a unified theory, however, still remains, at a theoretical level, a challenge. The task is not easy, perhaps because the theory of the firm develops along two different strands, one analyzing the factors influencing the boundaries, and the other one relating to the internal structure; or because, even inside the same research strand, it is not really easy to grasp the similarities and differences between contributions that have followed one another in rapid succession over the last few years. This paper examines the theories concerning the make-or-buy problem, focusing on recent contributions that have tried to develop a unified framework and emphasizes the role of incomplete contracts as a common and significant trait of the theories discussed

Learning and Governance in Inter-Firm Relations

This paper connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. The theory of governance used incorporates learning and trust. The paper identifies two kinds of relational risk: hold-up and spillover. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk, it develops a box of instruments which includes trust, next to instruments derived and adapted from TCE. These instruments are geared to problems that are specific to learning in interaction between firms. They also include additional roles for go-betweens.transaction cost economics;trust;inter-organizational learning

Sources, measurement and effect of trust in the governance of buyer-supplier relations

The paper considers a (static) portfolio system that satisfies adding-up contraints and the gross substitution theorem. The paper shows the relationship of the two conditions to the weak dominant diagonal property of the matrix of interest rate elasticities. This enables to investigate the impact of simultaneous changes in interest rates on the asset demands.

The role of structural embeddedness in an IT outsourcing network

The design of governance to safeguard against a vendor's opportunistic behaviour is one of the critical issues in information technology outsourcing (ITO) since this behaviour causes cost escalation and service debasement. The roles of structural embeddedness underlying network governance have been gaining its importance as complementary or substitutable governance in ITO. Our research attempts to reveal how structural embeddedness can affect the decision-makings of clients and vendors and their resulting outcomes in an ITO network and how these effects are moderated by various ITO network structures according to outsourced IT services. An agent-based simulation and game-theoretic approach are adopted to build a simulation model to describe ITO networks with various structures and ITO transactions between clients and vendors. Finally, the future research directions are discussed