1,725 research outputs found
On the Ring-LWE and Polynomial-LWE problems
The Ring Learning With Errors problem (RLWE) comes in various forms.
Vanilla RLWE is the decision dual-RLWE variant, consisting in distinguishing from uniform a distribution depending on a secret belonging
to the dual O_K^vee of the ring of integers O_K of a specified number field K.
In primal-RLWE, the secret instead belongs to O_K. Both
decision dual-RLWE and primal-RLWE enjoy search counterparts.
Also widely used is (search/decision) Polynomial Learning With Errors (PLWE),
which is not defined
using a ring of integers O_K of a number field K but
a polynomial ring ZZ[x]/f for a monic
irreducible f in ZZ[x].
We show that there exist reductions between all of these six
problems that incur limited parameter losses.
More precisely: we prove that the (decision/search) dual to
primal reduction from Lyubashevsky et al. [EUROCRYPT~2010]
and Peikert [SCN~2016]
can be implemented with a small error rate growth for all rings
(the resulting reduction is non-uniform polynomial time); we
extend it to polynomial-time reductions between (decision/search)
primal RLWE and PLWE that work for a family
of polynomials f that is exponentially large as a function
of deg f (the resulting reduction is also
non-uniform polynomial time); and we
exploit the recent technique from Peikert et al. [STOC~2017]
to obtain a search to decision reduction for RLWE for arbitrary number fields.
The reductions incur error rate increases that depend
on intrinsic quantities related to K and f
Reduction from Module-SIS to Ring-SIS Under Norm Constraint of Ring-SIS
Lattice-based cryptographic scheme is constructed based on hard problems on a lattice such as the short integer solution (SIS) problem and the learning with error (LWE). However, the cryptographic scheme based on SIS or LWE is inefficient since the size of the key is too large. Thus, most cryptographic schemes use the variants of LWE and SIS with ring and module structures. Albrecht and Deo showed that there is a reduction from module-LWE (M-LWE) to ring-LWE (R-LWE) in the polynomial ring (Asiacrypt 2017) by handling the error rate and modulus. However, unlike the LWE problem, the SIS problem does not have an error rate, but there is the upper bound on the norm of the solution of the SIS problem. In this paper, we propose the two novel reductions related to module-SIS (M-SIS) and ring-SIS (R-SIS) on a polynomial ring. We propose (i) the reduction from R-SIS to R-SIS and (ii) the reduction from M-SIS to R-SIS under norm constraint of R-SIS. Combining these two results implies that R-SIS for a specified modulus and number samples is more difficult than M-SIS under norm constraints of R-SIS, which provides the range of possible module ranks for M-SIS
A Thorough Treatment of Highly-Efficient NTRU Instantiations
Cryptography based on the hardness of lattice problems over polynomial rings currently provides the most practical solution for public key encryption in the quantum era. The first encryption scheme utilizing properties of polynomial rings was NTRU (ANTS \u2798), but in the recent decade, most research has focused on constructing schemes based on the hardness of the somewhat related Ring/Module-LWE problem. Indeed, 14 out of the 17 encryption schemes based on the hardness of lattice problems in polynomial rings submitted to the first round of the NIST standardization process used some version of Ring/Module-LWE, with the other three being based on NTRU.
The preference for using Ring/Module-LWE is due to the fact that this problem is at least as hard as NTRU, is more flexible in the algebraic structure due to the fact that no polynomial division is necessary, and that the decryption error is independent of the message. And indeed, the practical NTRU encryption schemes in the literature generally lag their Ring/Module-LWE counterparts in either compactness or speed, or both.
In this paper, we put the efficiency of NTRU-based schemes on equal (even slightly better, actually) footing with their Ring/Module-LWE counterparts. We provide several instantiations and transformations, with security given in the ROM and the QROM, that detach the decryption error from the message, thus eliminating the adversary\u27s power to have any effect on it, which ultimately allows us to decrease parameter sizes. The resulting schemes are on par, compactness-wise, with their counterparts based on Ring/Module-LWE. Performance-wise, the NTRU schemes instantiated in this paper over NTT-friendly rings of the form are the fastest of all public key encryption schemes, whether quantum-safe or not. When compared to the NIST finalist NTRU-HRSS-701, our scheme is more compact and has a X improvement in the round-trip time of ephemeral key exchange, with key generation being X faster, encapsulation being X faster, and decapsulation enjoying a X speedup
Sublattice Attack on Poly-LWE with Wide Error Distributions
The fundamental problem in lattice-based cryptography is the hardness of the Ring-LWE, which has been based on the conjectured hardness of approximating ideal-SIVP or ideal-SVP. Though it is now widely conjectured both are hard in classical and quantum computation model” there is no sufficient attacks proposed and considered. In this paper we propose the subset quadruple attack on general structured LWE problems over any ring endowed with a positive definite inner product and an error distribution. Hence from the view of subset quadruple attacks, the error distributions of feasible non-negligible subset quadruples should be calculated to test the hardness. Sublattice pair with an ideal attack is a special case of subset quadruple attack. A lower bound for the Gaussian error distribution is proved to construct suitable feasible non-negligible sublattices. From the sublattice pair with an ideal attack we prove that the decision Poly-LWE over with certain special inner products and arbitrary polynomially bounded widths of Gaussian error distributions can be solved with the polynomial time for the sufficiently large polynomially bounded modulus parameters .\\
Keywords: Poly-LWE, Ring-LWE, Wide Error distribution, Subset quadruple attack, Sublattice pair with an ideal
Ring-LWE Cryptography for the Number Theorist
In this paper, we survey the status of attacks on the ring and polynomial
learning with errors problems (RLWE and PLWE). Recent work on the security of
these problems [Eisentr\"ager-Hallgren-Lauter, Elias-Lauter-Ozman-Stange] gives
rise to interesting questions about number fields. We extend these attacks and
survey related open problems in number theory, including spectral distortion of
an algebraic number and its relationship to Mahler measure, the monogenic
property for the ring of integers of a number field, and the size of elements
of small order modulo q.Comment: 20 Page
Ring Learning With Errors: A crossroads between postquantum cryptography, machine learning and number theory
The present survey reports on the state of the art of the different
cryptographic functionalities built upon the ring learning with errors problem
and its interplay with several classical problems in algebraic number theory.
The survey is based to a certain extent on an invited course given by the
author at the Basque Center for Applied Mathematics in September 2018.Comment: arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1508.01375 by other
authors/ comment of the author: quotation has been added to Theorem 5.
Learning with Errors is easy with quantum samples
Learning with Errors is one of the fundamental problems in computational
learning theory and has in the last years become the cornerstone of
post-quantum cryptography. In this work, we study the quantum sample complexity
of Learning with Errors and show that there exists an efficient quantum
learning algorithm (with polynomial sample and time complexity) for the
Learning with Errors problem where the error distribution is the one used in
cryptography. While our quantum learning algorithm does not break the LWE-based
encryption schemes proposed in the cryptography literature, it does have some
interesting implications for cryptography: first, when building an LWE-based
scheme, one needs to be careful about the access to the public-key generation
algorithm that is given to the adversary; second, our algorithm shows a
possible way for attacking LWE-based encryption by using classical samples to
approximate the quantum sample state, since then using our quantum learning
algorithm would solve LWE
Digital Signatures Based on the Hardness of Ideal Lattice Problems in all Rings
Many practical lattice-based schemes are built upon the Ring-SIS or Ring-LWE problems, which are problems that are based on the presumed difficulty of finding low-weight solutions to linear equations over polynomial rings . Our belief in the asymptotic computational hardness of these problems rests in part on the fact that there are reduction showing that solving them is as hard as finding short vectors in all lattices that correspond to ideals of the polynomial ring . These reductions, however, do not give us an indication as to the effect that the polynomial , which defines the ring, has on the average-case or worst-case problems. \\
As of today, there haven\u27t been any weaknesses found in Ring-SIS or Ring-LWE problems when one uses an which leads to a meaningful worst-case to average-case reduction, but there have been some recent algorithms for related problems that heavily use the algebraic structures of the underlying rings. It is thus conceivable that some rings could give rise to more difficult instances of Ring-SIS and Ring-LWE than other rings. A more ideal scenario would therefore be if there would be an average-case problem, allowing for efficient cryptographic constructions, that is based on the hardness of finding short vectors in ideals of for \emph{every} .\\
In this work, we show that the above may actually be possible. We construct a digital signature scheme based (in the random oracle model) on a simple adaptation of the Ring-SIS problem which is as hard to break as worst-case problems in every whose degree is bounded by the parameters of the scheme. Up to constant factors, our scheme is as efficient as the highly practical schemes that work over the ring
- …