Resource Allocation in a MAC with and without security via Game Theoretic Learning

In this paper a $K$-user fading multiple access channel with and without security constraints is studied. First we consider a F-MAC without the security constraints. Under the assumption of individual CSI of users, we propose the problem of power allocation as a stochastic game when the receiver sends an ACK or a NACK depending on whether it was able to decode the message or not. We have used Multiplicative weight no-regret algorithm to obtain a Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (CCE). Then we consider the case when the users can decode ACK/NACK of each other. In this scenario we provide an algorithm to maximize the weighted sum-utility of all the users and obtain a Pareto optimal point. PP is socially optimal but may be unfair to individual users. Next we consider the case where the users can cooperate with each other so as to disagree with the policy which will be unfair to individual user. We then obtain a Nash bargaining solution, which in addition to being Pareto optimal, is also fair to each user. Next we study a $K$-user fading multiple access wiretap Channel with CSI of Eve available to the users. We use the previous algorithms to obtain a CCE, PP and a NBS. Next we consider the case where each user does not know the CSI of Eve but only its distribution. In that case we use secrecy outage as the criterion for the receiver to send an ACK or a NACK. Here also we use the previous algorithms to obtain a CCE, PP or a NBS. Finally we show that our algorithms can be extended to the case where a user can transmit at different rates. At the end we provide a few examples to compute different solutions and compare them under different CSI scenarios.Comment: 27 pages, 12 figures. Part of the paper was presented in 2016 IEEE Information theory and applicaitons (ITA) Workshop, San Diego, USA in Feb. 2016. Submitted to journa

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Multi crteria decision making and its applications : a literature review

This paper presents current techniques used in Multi Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) and their applications. Two basic approaches for MCDM, namely Artificial Intelligence MCDM (AIMCDM) and Classical MCDM (CMCDM) are discussed and investigated. Recent articles from international journals related to MCDM are collected and analyzed to find which approach is more common than the other in MCDM. Also, which area these techniques are applied to. Those articles are appearing in journals for the year 2008 only. This paper provides evidence that currently, both AIMCDM and CMCDM are equally common in MCDM

OPTIMAL CONTROL FOR A CONTROLLED ILL-POSED WAVE EQUATION WITHOUT REQUIRING THE SLATER HYPOTHESIS

In this paper, we investigate the problem of optimal control for an ill-posed wave equation without using the extra hypothesis of Slater i.e. the set of admissible controls has a non-empty interior. Firstly, by a controllability approach, we make the ill-posed wave equation a well-posed equation with some incomplete data initial condition. The missing data requires us to use the no-regret control notion introduced by Lions to control distributed systems with  ncomplete data. After approximating the no-regret control by a low-regret control sequence, we characterize the optimal control by a singular optimality system