Generalized sequential assignment problem

The Sequential Stochastic Assignment Problem (SSAP) deals with assigning sequentially arriving tasks with stochastic parameters to workers with fixed success rates. The reward of each assignment is the product of the worker's success rate and the task value assigned to the worker. The objective is to maximize the total expected reward. There has been a surge of interest in studying sequential assignment problems due to their applications in online matching markets, asset selling, and organ transplant. This dissertation studies several variations of SSAP by relaxing the main assumptions. The first part assumes that the workers' success rates are random values coming from a known distribution. This generalization modifies the SSAP from a problem with a single random value (i.e., the task value) at each stage to an online matching problem with several random parameters (i.e., the task value and the workers' success rates). The optimal assignment policy uses backward induction to first solve smaller subproblems, and then use them to optimally assign tasks to workers from the first stage. An approximation algorithm is proposed that achieves a fraction of the optimal reward in a polynomial time. Assuming that the value of sequentially arriving elements are independently drawn from a known distribution is unrealistic in many applications. The second part of thesis relaxes this assumption and uses the well-known Secretary Problem to derive constant-competitive algorithms for SSAP with tasks having a random arrival order. Several deterministic and randomized algorithms are proposed and their performance are compared with the maximum offline reward. These algorithms use the first stages of the problem as a training phase to compute thresholds for the task values. These thresholds are used to assign tasks to workers after the training phase. The third part uses the linear programming technique to derive bounds on the performance of optimal policy for several variations of SSAP. Formulating an online matching problem as a linear program is a useful tool. In addition to deriving bounds on performance of optimal policies, the linear programming technique can be used to formulate extensions of the problem as linear programs by simple changes in the objective function and constraints of the basic formulation. The linear programming formulation of the incentive compatible problem and the sequential assignment problem with unknown number of elements are also proposed. The edge-weighted online bipartite matching problem is used to design assignment policies for each of the formulated problems. The last part relaxes the assumption that at most one task must be assigned to each worker in SSAP. It is assumed that a worker is available for possible future assignments after performing the previously assigned task. The number of stages that the worker is not available due to a prior task assignment is referred to as the task duration. This problem is studied under various models for the task duration. First, it is assumed that the task duration is fixed. Then, assignment policies are proposed for the problem with a memoryless model for the task duration. The proposed algorithms are extensions of the optimal algorithm for the sequential assignment problem. They divide the n-stage assignment process to periods whose lengths are equal to the expected task duration. Then, they assign tasks to workers in each period by applying the optimal algorithm of the sequential assignment problem

On the number of kk-cycles in the assignment problem for random matrices

We continue the study of the assignment problem for a random cost matrix. We analyse the number of $k$-cycles for the solution and their dependence on the symmetry of the random matrix. We observe that for a symmetric matrix one and two-cycles are dominant in the optimal solution. In the antisymmetric case the situation is the opposite and the one and two-cycles are suppressed. We solve the model for a pure random matrix (without correlations between its entries) and give analytic arguments to explain the numerical results in the symmetric and antisymmetric case. We show that the results can be explained to great accuracy by a simple ansatz that connects the expected number of $k$-cycles to that of one and two cycles.Comment: To appear in Journal of Statistical Mechanic

Many Hard Examples in Exact Phase Transitions with Application to Generating Hard Satisfiable Instances

This paper first analyzes the resolution complexity of two random CSP models (i.e. Model RB/RD) for which we can establish the existence of phase transitions and identify the threshold points exactly. By encoding CSPs into CNF formulas, it is proved that almost all instances of Model RB/RD have no tree-like resolution proofs of less than exponential size. Thus, we not only introduce new families of CNF formulas hard for resolution, which is a central task of Proof-Complexity theory, but also propose models with both many hard instances and exact phase transitions. Then, the implications of such models are addressed. It is shown both theoretically and experimentally that an application of Model RB/RD might be in the generation of hard satisfiable instances, which is not only of practical importance but also related to some open problems in cryptography such as generating one-way functions. Subsequently, a further theoretical support for the generation method is shown by establishing exponential lower bounds on the complexity of solving random satisfiable and forced satisfiable instances of RB/RD near the threshold. Finally, conclusions are presented, as well as a detailed comparison of Model RB/RD with the Hamiltonian cycle problem and random 3-SAT, which, respectively, exhibit three different kinds of phase transition behavior in NP-complete problems.Comment: 19 pages, corrected mistakes in Theorems 5 and

Efficiency of Truthful and Symmetric Mechanisms in One-sided Matching

We study the efficiency (in terms of social welfare) of truthful and symmetric mechanisms in one-sided matching problems with {\em dichotomous preferences} and {\em normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences}. We are particularly interested in the well-known {\em Random Serial Dictatorship} mechanism. For dichotomous preferences, we first show that truthful, symmetric and optimal mechanisms exist if intractable mechanisms are allowed. We then provide a connection to online bipartite matching. Using this connection, it is possible to design truthful, symmetric and tractable mechanisms that extract 0.69 of the maximum social welfare, which works under assumption that agents are not adversarial. Without this assumption, we show that Random Serial Dictatorship always returns an assignment in which the expected social welfare is at least a third of the maximum social welfare. For normalized von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences, we show that Random Serial Dictatorship always returns an assignment in which the expected social welfare is at least \frac{1}{e}\frac{\nu(\opt)^2}{n}, where \nu(\opt) is the maximum social welfare and $n$ is the number of both agents and items. On the hardness side, we show that no truthful mechanism can achieve a social welfare better than \frac{\nu(\opt)^2}{n}.Comment: 13 pages, 1 figur