Are Aquinas and Whitehead Metaphorical and Analogical All the Way Down?

The paper argues from the perspective of a significant strand of interpretation of Aquinas and from insights in cognitive linguistics that a fruitful dialogue between Whitehead and Thomism needs to take into account that metaphysics and talk about God are metaphorical and analogical all the way down. Cognitive linguistics provides an explanatory scheme for explaining how Aquinas’s tectonic use of analogy shifts the ground of our conventional fields of meanings to create space to conceptualize what otherwise would be beyond grasp and to make inferences possible that otherwise would be unthinkable. The essay concludes with a question, admittedly from a particular trajectory of Thomism and cognitive linguistics, about whether Whitehead’s conception of God adequately accounts for the radically metaphorical “imaginative leap” entailed in the Christian conception of God

Reasoning under uncertainty: the role of two informal fallacies in an emerging scientific inquiry

It is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or non-fallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific inquiry, certain traditional fallacies function by conferring epistemic gains upon inquiry. Specifically, I argue that these fallacies facilitate the progression of inquiry, particularly in the initial stages of inquiry when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. The conception of these fallacies that emerges is that of heuristics of reasoning in contexts of epistemic uncertainty

The relation between language and theory of mind in development and evolution

Considering the close relation between language and theory of mind in development and their tight connection in social behavior, it is no big leap to claim that the two capacities have been related in evolution as well. But what is the exact relation between them? This paper attempts to clear a path toward an answer. I consider several possible relations between the two faculties, bring conceptual arguments and empirical evidence to bear on them, and end up arguing for a version of co-evolution. To model this co-evolution, we must distinguish between different stages or levels of language and theory of mind, which fueled each other’s evolution in a protracted escalation process

Coping with uncertainty in public health: the use of heuristics

The observation that experts and lay people use cognitive shortcuts or heuristics to arrive at judgements about complex problems is certainly not new. But what is new is the finding that a group of reasoning strategies, which have been maligned by philosophers and logicians alike, have demonstrable value in helping members of the public come to a judgement about public health problems. These problems, which span food safety crises, immunization scares and risks associated with exposure to environmental toxins, presuppose knowledge and expertise which falls outside of the epistemic and technical competence of most members of the public. Notwithstanding the complexity of these problems, they are not perceived by lay people to be wholly unintelligible or incomprehensible. This short communication reports on the findings of a questionnaire-based investigation into the use of these reasoning strategies by 879 members of the public. The results reveal a rational competence on the part of lay people which has been hitherto unexamined, and which may be usefully exploited in all aspects of public health work

The use of "no evidence" statements in public health

Public health communication makes extensive use of a linguistic formulation that will be called the "no evidence" statement. This is a written or spoken statement of the form "There is no evidence that P" where P stands for a proposition that typically describes a human health risk. Danger lurks in these expressions for the hearer or reader who is not logically perspicacious, as arguments that use them are only warranted under certain conditions. The extent to which members of the public are able to determine what those conditions are will be considered by examining data obtained from 879 subjects. The role of "no evidence" statements as cognitive heuristics in public health reasoning is considered

Knowledge transformers : a link between learning and creativity

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether knowledge transformers that are featured in the learning process are also present in the creative process. First, this was achieved by reviewing accounts of inventions and discoveries with the view of explaining them in terms of knowledge transformers. Second, this was achieved by reviewing models and theories of creativity and identifying the existence of the knowledge transformers. The investigation shows that there is some evidence to show that the creative process can be explained through knowledge transformers. Hence, it is suggested that one of links between learning and creativity is through the knowledge transformers

Knowledge transformers : a link between learning and creativity

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether knowledge transformers which are featured in the learning process, are also present in the creative process. This is achieved by reviewing models and theories of creativity and identifying the existence of the knowledge transformers. The investigation shows that there is some evidence to show that the creative process can be explained through knowledge transformers. Hence, it is suggested that one of links between learning and creativity is through the knowledge transformers

Acquisition of Autonomy in Biotechnology and Artificial Intelligence

This presentation discusses a notion encountered across disciplines, and in different facets of human activity: autonomous activity. We engage it in an interdisciplinary way. We start by considering the reactions and behaviors of biological entities to biotechnological intervention. An attempt is made to characterize the degree of freedom of embryos & clones, which show openness to different outcomes when the epigenetic developmental landscape is factored in. We then consider the claim made in programming and artificial intelligence that automata could show self-directed behavior as to the determination of their step-wise decisions on courses of action. This question remains largely open and calls for some important qualifications. We try to make sense of the presence of claims of freedom in agency, first in common sense, then by ascribing developmental plasticity in biology and biotechnology, and in the mapping of programmed systems in the presence of environmental cues and self-referenced circuits as well as environmental coupling. This is the occasion to recall attempts at working out a logical and methodological approach to the openness of concepts that are still to be found, and assess whether they can operate the structuring intelligibility of a yet undeveloped or underdeveloped field of study, where a “bisociation" and a unification of knowledge might be possible