Analytical characterisation of the terahertz in-vivo nano-network in the presence of interference based on TS-OOK communication scheme

The envisioned dense nano-network inside the human body at terahertz (THz) frequency suffers a communication performance degradation among nano-devices. The reason for this performance limitation is not only the path loss and molecular absorption noise, but also the presence of multi-user interference and the interference caused by utilising any communication scheme, such as time spread ON—OFF keying (TS-OOK). In this paper, an interference model utilising TS-OOK as a communication scheme of the THz communication channel inside the human body has been developed and the probability distribution of signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for THz communication within different human tissues, such as blood, skin, and fat, has been analyzed and presented. In addition, this paper evaluates the performance degradation by investigating the mean values of SINR under different node densities in the area and the probabilities of transmitting pulses. It results in the conclusion that the interference restrains the achievable communication distance to approximate 1 mm, and more specific range depends on the particular transmission circumstance. Results presented in this paper also show that by controlling the pulse transmission probability and node density, the system performance can be ameliorated. In particular, SINR of in vivo THz communication between the deterministic targeted transmitter and the receiver with random interfering nodes in the medium improves about 10 dB, when the node density decreases one order. The SINR increases approximate 5 and 2 dB, when the pulse transmitting probability drops from 0.5 to 0.1 and 0.9 to 0.5

Effects of 3D Deployments on Interference and SINR in 5G New Radio Systems

Lately, the extremely high frequency (EHF) band has become one of the factors enabling fifth-generation (5G) mobile cellular technologies. By offering large bandwidth, New Radio (NR) systems operating in the lower part of EHF band, called millimeter waves (mmWave), may satisfy the extreme requirements of future 5G networks in terms of both data transfer rate and latency at the air interface. The use of highly directional antennas in prospective mmWave-based NR communications systems raises an important question: are conventional two-dimensional (2D) cellular network modeling techniques suitable for 5G NR systems? To address this question, we introduced a novel, three-dimensional framework for evaluating the performance of emerging mmWave band wireless networks. The proposed framework explicitly takes into account the blockage effects of propagating mmWave radiation, the vertical and planar directivities at transceiver antennas, and the randomness of user equipment (UE), base station (BS), and blocker heights. The model allows for different levels of accuracy, encompassing a number of models with different levels of computational complexity as special cases. Although the main metric of interest in this thesis is the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), the model can be extended to obtain the Shannon rate of the channel under investigation. The proposed model was numerically evaluated in different deployment cases and communication scenarios with a wide range of system parameters. We found that randomness of UE and BS heights and vertical directionality of the mmWave antennas are essential for accurate evaluation of system performance. We also showed that the results of traditional 2D models are too optimistic and greatly overestimate the actual SINR. In contrast, fixed-height models that ignore the impact of height on the probability of exposure to interference are too pessimistic. Furthermore, we evaluated the models that provide the best trade-off between computational complexity and accuracy in specific scenarios and provided recommendations regarding their use for practical assessment of mmWave-based NR systems

ECONOMIC APPROACHES AND MARKET STRUCTURES FOR TEMPORAL-SPATIAL SPECTRUM SHARING

In wireless communication systems, economic approaches can be applied to spectrum sharing and enhance spectrum utilization. In this research, we develop a model where geographic information, including licensed areas of primary users (PUs) and locations of secondary users (SUs), plays an important role in the spectrum sharing system. We consider a multi-price policy and the pricing power of noncooperative PUs in multiple geographic areas. Meanwhile, the value assessment of a channel is price-related and the demand from the SUs is price-elastic. By applying an evolutionary procedure, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the optimal payoff for each PU selling channels without reserve. In the scenario of selling channels with reserve, we predict the channel prices for the PUs leading to the optimal supplies of the PUs and hence the optimal payoffs. To increase spectrum utilization, the scenario of spatial spectrum reuse is considered. We consider maximizing social welfare via on-demand channel allocation, which describes the overall satisfaction of the SUs when we involve the supply and demand relationship. We design a receiver-centric spectrum reuse mechanism, in which the optimal channel allocation that maximizes social welfare can be achieved by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction for maximal independent groups (MIGs). We prove that truthful bidding is the optimal strategy for the SUs, even though the SUs do not participate in the VCG auction for MIGs directly. Therefore, the MIGs are bidding truthfully and the requirement for social welfare maximization is satisfied. To further improve user satisfaction, user characteristics that enable heterogeneous channel valuations need to be considered in spatial spectrum reuse. We design a channel transaction mechanism for non-symmetric networks and maximize user satisfaction in consideration of multi-level flexible channel valuations of the SUs. Specifically, we introduce a constrained VCG auction. To facilitate the bid formation, we transform the constrained VCG auction to a step-by-step decision process. Meanwhile, the SUs in a coalition play a coalitional game with transferable utilities. We use the Shapley value to realize fair payoff distribution among the SUs in a coalition