2,630 research outputs found
The role of bot squads in the political propaganda on Twitter
Social Media are nowadays the privileged channel for information spreading
and news checking. Unexpectedly for most of the users, automated accounts, also
known as social bots, contribute more and more to this process of news
spreading. Using Twitter as a benchmark, we consider the traffic exchanged,
over one month of observation, on a specific topic, namely the migration flux
from Northern Africa to Italy. We measure the significant traffic of tweets
only, by implementing an entropy-based null model that discounts the activity
of users and the virality of tweets. Results show that social bots play a
central role in the exchange of significant content. Indeed, not only the
strongest hubs have a number of bots among their followers higher than
expected, but furthermore a group of them, that can be assigned to the same
political tendency, share a common set of bots as followers. The retwitting
activity of such automated accounts amplifies the presence on the platform of
the hubs' messages.Comment: Under Submissio
The Alt-Right and Global Information Warfare
The Alt-Right is a neo-fascist white supremacist movement that is involved in
violent extremism and shows signs of engagement in extensive disinformation
campaigns. Using social media data mining, this study develops a deeper
understanding of such targeted disinformation campaigns and the ways they
spread. It also adds to the available literature on the endogenous and
exogenous influences within the US far right, as well as motivating factors
that drive disinformation campaigns, such as geopolitical strategy. This study
is to be taken as a preliminary analysis to indicate future methods and
follow-on research that will help develop an integrated approach to
understanding the strategies and associations of the modern fascist movement.Comment: Presented and published through IEEE 2019 Big Data Conferenc
Coordination patterns reveal online political astroturfing across the world.
Online political astroturfing-hidden information campaigns in which a political actor mimics genuine citizen behavior by incentivizing agents to spread information online-has become prevalent on social media. Such inauthentic information campaigns threaten to undermine the Internet's promise to more equitable participation in public debates. We argue that the logic of social behavior within the campaign bureaucracy and principal-agent problems lead to detectable activity patterns among the campaign's social media accounts. Our analysis uses a network-based methodology to identify such coordination patterns in all campaigns contained in the largest publicly available database on astroturfing published by Twitter. On average, 74% of the involved accounts in each campaign engaged in a simple form of coordination that we call co-tweeting and co-retweeting. Comparing the astroturfing accounts to various systematically constructed comparison samples, we show that the same behavior is negligible among the accounts of regular users that the campaigns try to mimic. As its main substantive contribution, the paper demonstrates that online political astroturfing consistently leaves similar traces of coordination, even across diverse political and country contexts and different time periods. The presented methodology is a reliable first step for detecting astroturfing campaigns
Analyzing the Digital Traces of Political Manipulation: The 2016 Russian Interference Twitter Campaign
Until recently, social media was seen to promote democratic discourse on
social and political issues. However, this powerful communication platform has
come under scrutiny for allowing hostile actors to exploit online discussions
in an attempt to manipulate public opinion. A case in point is the ongoing U.S.
Congress' investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election
campaign, with Russia accused of using trolls (malicious accounts created to
manipulate) and bots to spread misinformation and politically biased
information. In this study, we explore the effects of this manipulation
campaign, taking a closer look at users who re-shared the posts produced on
Twitter by the Russian troll accounts publicly disclosed by U.S. Congress
investigation. We collected a dataset with over 43 million election-related
posts shared on Twitter between September 16 and October 21, 2016, by about 5.7
million distinct users. This dataset included accounts associated with the
identified Russian trolls. We use label propagation to infer the ideology of
all users based on the news sources they shared. This method enables us to
classify a large number of users as liberal or conservative with precision and
recall above 90%. Conservatives retweeted Russian trolls about 31 times more
often than liberals and produced 36x more tweets. Additionally, most retweets
of troll content originated from two Southern states: Tennessee and Texas.
Using state-of-the-art bot detection techniques, we estimated that about 4.9%
and 6.2% of liberal and conservative users respectively were bots. Text
analysis on the content shared by trolls reveals that they had a mostly
conservative, pro-Trump agenda. Although an ideologically broad swath of
Twitter users was exposed to Russian Trolls in the period leading up to the
2016 U.S. Presidential election, it was mainly conservatives who helped amplify
their message
Who let the trolls out? Towards understanding state-sponsored trolls
Recent evidence has emerged linking coordinated campaigns by state-sponsored actors to manipulate public opinion on the Web. Campaigns revolving around major political events are enacted via mission-focused ?trolls." While trolls are involved in spreading disinformation on social media, there is little understanding of how they operate, what type of content they disseminate, how their strategies evolve over time, and how they influence the Web's in- formation ecosystem. In this paper, we begin to address this gap by analyzing 10M posts by 5.5K Twitter and Reddit users identified as Russian and Iranian state-sponsored trolls. We compare the behavior of each group of state-sponsored trolls with a focus on how their strategies change over time, the different campaigns they embark on, and differences between the trolls operated by Russia and Iran. Among other things, we find: 1) that Russian trolls were pro-Trump while Iranian trolls were anti-Trump; 2) evidence that campaigns undertaken by such actors are influenced by real-world events; and 3) that the behavior of such actors is not consistent over time, hence detection is not straightforward. Using Hawkes Processes, we quantify the influence these accounts have on pushing URLs on four platforms: Twitter, Reddit, 4chan's Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), and Gab. In general, Russian trolls were more influential and efficient in pushing URLs to all the other platforms with the exception of /pol/ where Iranians were more influential. Finally, we release our source code to ensure the reproducibility of our results and to encourage other researchers to work on understanding other emerging kinds of state-sponsored troll accounts on Twitter.https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.03130.pdfAccepted manuscrip
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