Neurophenomenology revisited: second-person methods for the study of human consciousness

In the study of consciousness, neurophenomenology was originally established as a novel research program attempting to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable methodologies in psychology: qualitative and quantitative methods. Its potential relies on Francisco Varela's idea of reciprocal constraints, in which first-person accounts and neurophysiological data mutually inform each other. However, since its first conceptualization, neurophenomenology has encountered methodological problems. These problems have emerged mainly because of the difficulty of obtaining and analyzing subjective reports in a systematic manner. However, more recently, several interview techniques for describing subjective accounts have been developed, collectively known as ‘second-person methods’. Second-person methods refer to interview techniques that solicit both verbal and non-verbal information from participants in order to obtain systematic and detailed subjective reports. Here, we examine the potential for employing second-person methodologies in the neurophenomenological study of consciousness. Thus, we first describe second-person methodologies available in the literature for analyzing subjective reports, identifying specific constraints on the status of the first-, second- and third- person methods. Second, we analyze two experimental studies that explicitly incorporate second-person methods for traversing the ‘gap’ between phenomenology and neuroscience. Third, we analyze the challenges that second-person accounts face in establishing an objective methodology for comparing results across different participants and interviewers: this is the ‘validation’ problem. Finally, we synthesize the common aspects of the interview methods described above. In conclusion, our arguments emphasize that second-person methods represent a powerful approach for closing the gap between the experiential and the neurobiological levels of description in the study of human consciousness

Design spaces and EEG frequency band power in constrained and open design

Design space is a common abstraction used in the investigation of design cognition. Characteristic properties of design spaces and how they change are underexplored. Design spaces can vary with the design task and its constraints, which are assumed to result in differences in neurocognitive processes. We review general cognition, creative cognition and design neurocognition EEG studies. We analyzed the brain activity of 32 professional mechanical engineers and industrial designers while performing constrained and open design tasks. The neurophysiological activations during reading the task, earliest reaction, and open externalization stages of constrained and open design are compared based on EEG frequency band power. Significant differences between constrained and open design for the beta bands were found in the earliest reaction stage. Significant differences between constrained and open design for alpha 2 and the beta bands were found in the open externalization stage. We discuss the results and relate the higher brain activity and significant differences in open design to cognitive functions of interest to design cognition. We show that EEG brain activation is sensitive to the level of constraints in designing, in particular alpha 2 and beta bands can act as proxies of the change and expansion of design spaces

A critical analysis of the present neuropsychological and neuroanatomical theories and knowledge of art perception and artistic production taking creativity into account

The present paper analyses the neuroanatomical and neuropsychological backgrounds of art reception and art creation in modern visual art and creative processes. It critically presents two models of aesthetic experience to provide a comprehensive theoretical basis for the discussion. The research purpose is to show that with increasing experience and expertise the referential frame of the aesthetic judgment is changing and that neural processes involved in object recognition provide a starting point for visual aesthetics. Thus, the investigation focuses on constructing and testing neuropsychological theories that fall in the domain called 'neuroaesthetics'. These theories, in turn, serve as a starting point to formulate neural laws of art and aesthetics and aesthetic experience. Some artistic styles, such as expressionism, reflect specific neural processes. Various studies indicate correlations between hemispheric specialisation and art or creativity and show the right hemisphere plays a particular role in it. However, studies exploring the neural correlates of aesthetic preference have yielded mixed results. Furthermore, neuroimaging studies have proved that different categories of modern artworks are processed in different areas of the brain. These diverging results will be discussed in a critical assessment of the two models of aesthetic experience. Besides, the question of identifying exclusive neural correlates of aesthetic preference will be raised. Comparing amateurs and experts has revealed the more reduced the cortical activation, the more efficiently it works. Biological and neuropsychological factors of creativity point out the meaning of the activation level, cognitive inhibition and prefrontal cortex. Divergent thinking differs from convergent thinking in terms of the neural level. Neurodegenerative processes and brain injuries sometimes influence the artistic output surprisingly or even launch it. Lesion studies contributing to understanding art experience will be explained.PsychologyM.A. (Psychology

Backwards is the way forward: feedback in the cortical hierarchy predicts the expected future

Clark offers a powerful description of the brain as a prediction machine, which offers progress on two distinct levels. First, on an abstract conceptual level, it provides a unifying framework for perception, action, and cognition (including subdivisions such as attention, expectation, and imagination). Second, hierarchical prediction offers progress on a concrete descriptive level for testing and constraining conceptual elements and mechanisms of predictive coding models (estimation of predictions, prediction errors, and internal models)

Towards a complete multiple-mechanism account of predictive language processing [Commentary on Pickering & Garrod]

Although we agree with Pickering & Garrod (P&G) that prediction-by-simulation and prediction-by-association are important mechanisms of anticipatory language processing, this commentary suggests that they: (1) overlook other potential mechanisms that might underlie prediction in language processing, (2) overestimate the importance of prediction-by-association in early childhood, and (3) underestimate the complexity and significance of several factors that might mediate prediction during language processing

Change blindness: eradication of gestalt strategies

Arrays of eight, texture-defined rectangles were used as stimuli in a one-shot change blindness (CB) task where there was a 50% chance that one rectangle would change orientation between two successive presentations separated by an interval. CB was eliminated by cueing the target rectangle in the first stimulus, reduced by cueing in the interval and unaffected by cueing in the second presentation. This supports the idea that a representation was formed that persisted through the interval before being 'overwritten' by the second presentation (Landman et al, 2003 Vision Research 43149–164]. Another possibility is that participants used some kind of grouping or Gestalt strategy. To test this we changed the spatial position of the rectangles in the second presentation by shifting them along imaginary spokes (by ±1 degree) emanating from the central fixation point. There was no significant difference seen in performance between this and the standard task [F(1,4)=2.565, p=0.185]. This may suggest two things: (i) Gestalt grouping is not used as a strategy in these tasks, and (ii) it gives further weight to the argument that objects may be stored and retrieved from a pre-attentional store during this task

An integrated theory of language production and comprehension

Currently, production and comprehension are regarded as quite distinct in accounts of language processing. In rejecting this dichotomy, we instead assert that producing and understanding are interwoven, and that this interweaving is what enables people to predict themselves and each other. We start by noting that production and comprehension are forms of action and action perception. We then consider the evidence for interweaving in action, action perception, and joint action, and explain such evidence in terms of prediction. Specifically, we assume that actors construct forward models of their actions before they execute those actions, and that perceivers of others' actions covertly imitate those actions, then construct forward models of those actions. We use these accounts of action, action perception, and joint action to develop accounts of production, comprehension, and interactive language. Importantly, they incorporate well-defined levels of linguistic representation (such as semantics, syntax, and phonology). We show (a) how speakers and comprehenders use covert imitation and forward modeling to make predictions at these levels of representation, (b) how they interweave production and comprehension processes, and (c) how they use these predictions to monitor the upcoming utterances. We show how these accounts explain a range of behavioral and neuroscientific data on language processing and discuss some of the implications of our proposal