1,302 research outputs found
Variable types for meaning assembly: a logical syntax for generic noun phrases introduced by most
This paper proposes a way to compute the meanings associated with sentences
with generic noun phrases corresponding to the generalized quantifier most. We
call these generics specimens and they resemble stereotypes or prototypes in
lexical semantics. The meanings are viewed as logical formulae that can
thereafter be interpreted in your favourite models. To do so, we depart
significantly from the dominant Fregean view with a single untyped universe.
Indeed, our proposal adopts type theory with some hints from Hilbert
\epsilon-calculus (Hilbert, 1922; Avigad and Zach, 2008) and from medieval
philosophy, see e.g. de Libera (1993, 1996). Our type theoretic analysis bears
some resemblance with ongoing work in lexical semantics (Asher 2011; Bassac et
al. 2010; Moot, Pr\'evot and Retor\'e 2011). Our model also applies to
classical examples involving a class, or a generic element of this class, which
is not uttered but provided by the context. An outcome of this study is that,
in the minimalism-contextualism debate, see Conrad (2011), if one adopts a type
theoretical view, terms encode the purely semantic meaning component while
their typing is pragmatically determined
G\"odel's Notre Dame Course
This is a companion to a paper by the authors entitled "G\"odel's natural
deduction", which presented and made comments about the natural deduction
system in G\"odel's unpublished notes for the elementary logic course he gave
at the University of Notre Dame in 1939. In that earlier paper, which was
itself a companion to a paper that examined the links between some
philosophical views ascribed to G\"odel and general proof theory, one can find
a brief summary of G\"odel's notes for the Notre Dame course. In order to put
the earlier paper in proper perspective, a more complete summary of these
interesting notes, with comments concerning them, is given here.Comment: 18 pages. minor additions, arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1604.0307
An Intuitionistic Formula Hierarchy Based on High-School Identities
We revisit the notion of intuitionistic equivalence and formal proof
representations by adopting the view of formulas as exponential polynomials.
After observing that most of the invertible proof rules of intuitionistic
(minimal) propositional sequent calculi are formula (i.e. sequent) isomorphisms
corresponding to the high-school identities, we show that one can obtain a more
compact variant of a proof system, consisting of non-invertible proof rules
only, and where the invertible proof rules have been replaced by a formula
normalisation procedure.
Moreover, for certain proof systems such as the G4ip sequent calculus of
Vorob'ev, Hudelmaier, and Dyckhoff, it is even possible to see all of the
non-invertible proof rules as strict inequalities between exponential
polynomials; a careful combinatorial treatment is given in order to establish
this fact.
Finally, we extend the exponential polynomial analogy to the first-order
quantifiers, showing that it gives rise to an intuitionistic hierarchy of
formulas, resembling the classical arithmetical hierarchy, and the first one
that classifies formulas while preserving isomorphism
Ecumenical modal logic
The discussion about how to put together Gentzen's systems for classical and
intuitionistic logic in a single unified system is back in fashion. Indeed,
recently Prawitz and others have been discussing the so called Ecumenical
Systems, where connectives from these logics can co-exist in peace. In Prawitz'
system, the classical logician and the intuitionistic logician would share the
universal quantifier, conjunction, negation, and the constant for the absurd,
but they would each have their own existential quantifier, disjunction, and
implication, with different meanings. Prawitz' main idea is that these
different meanings are given by a semantical framework that can be accepted by
both parties. In a recent work, Ecumenical sequent calculi and a nested system
were presented, and some very interesting proof theoretical properties of the
systems were established. In this work we extend Prawitz' Ecumenical idea to
alethic K-modalities
The Varieties of Ought-implies-Can and Deontic STIT Logic
STIT logic is a prominent framework for the analysis of multi-agent choice-making. In the available deontic extensions of STIT, the principle of Ought-implies-Can (OiC) fulfills a central role. However, in the philosophical literature a variety of alternative
OiC interpretations have been proposed and discussed. This paper provides a modular framework for deontic STIT that accounts for a multitude of OiC readings. In particular, we discuss, compare, and formalize ten such readings. We provide sound and complete sequent-style calculi for all of the various STIT logics accommodating these OiC principles. We formally analyze the resulting logics and discuss how the different OiC principles are logically related. In particular, we propose an endorsement principle describing which OiC readings logically commit one to other OiC readings
Characterization of quantum states in predicative logic
We develop a characterization of quantum states by means of first order
variables and random variables, within a predicative logic with equality, in
the framework of basic logic and its definitory equations. We introduce the
notion of random first order domain and find a characterization of pure states
in predicative logic and mixed states in propositional logic, due to a focusing
condition. We discuss the role of first order variables and the related
contextuality, in terms of sequents.Comment: 14 pages, Boston, IQSA10, to appea
Decidability of quantified propositional intuitionistic logic and S4 on trees
Quantified propositional intuitionistic logic is obtained from propositional
intuitionistic logic by adding quantifiers \forall p, \exists p over
propositions. In the context of Kripke semantics, a proposition is a subset of
the worlds in a model structure which is upward closed. Kremer (1997) has shown
that the quantified propositional intuitionistic logic H\pi+ based on the class
of all partial orders is recursively isomorphic to full second-order logic. He
raised the question of whether the logic resulting from restriction to trees is
axiomatizable. It is shown that it is, in fact, decidable. The methods used can
also be used to establish the decidability of modal S4 with propositional
quantification on similar types of Kripke structures.Comment: v2, 9 pages, corrections and additions; v1 8 page
A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax
In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his
1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of
problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a
[standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be
created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and
problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative
extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical
predicate calculus QC.
The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a
pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying
posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation
translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto
QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal
propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment,
identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic
modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel -
and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type
theories.
The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the
axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual
interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation
(incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof
interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two
interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC
neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a
simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic
From IF to BI: a tale of dependence and separation
We take a fresh look at the logics of informational dependence and
independence of Hintikka and Sandu and Vaananen, and their compositional
semantics due to Hodges. We show how Hodges' semantics can be seen as a special
case of a general construction, which provides a context for a useful
completeness theorem with respect to a wider class of models. We shed some new
light on each aspect of the logic. We show that the natural propositional logic
carried by the semantics is the logic of Bunched Implications due to Pym and
O'Hearn, which combines intuitionistic and multiplicative connectives. This
introduces several new connectives not previously considered in logics of
informational dependence, but which we show play a very natural role, most
notably intuitionistic implication. As regards the quantifiers, we show that
their interpretation in the Hodges semantics is forced, in that they are the
image under the general construction of the usual Tarski semantics; this
implies that they are adjoints to substitution, and hence uniquely determined.
As for the dependence predicate, we show that this is definable from a simpler
predicate, of constancy or dependence on nothing. This makes essential use of
the intuitionistic implication. The Armstrong axioms for functional dependence
are then recovered as a standard set of axioms for intuitionistic implication.
We also prove a full abstraction result in the style of Hodges, in which the
intuitionistic implication plays a very natural r\^ole.Comment: 28 pages, journal versio
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