Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process – asymmetries and uncertainties in particular – by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players’ optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players’ strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players’ behaviour and modify the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing.bargaining, non-cooperative game theory, simulation models, uncertainty

Modelling Negotiated Decision Making: a Multilateral, Multiple Issues, Non-Cooperative Bargaining Model with Uncertainty

The relevance of bargaining to everyday life can easily be ascertained, yet the study of any bargaining process is extremely hard, involving a multiplicity of questions and complex issues. The objective of this paper is to provide new insights on some dimensions of the bargaining process – asymmetries and uncertainties in particular – by using a non-cooperative game theory approach. We develop a computational model which simulates the process of negotiation among more than two players, who bargain over the sharing of more than one pie. Through numerically simulating several multiple issues negotiation games among multiple players, we identify the main features of players’ optimal strategies and equilibrium agreements. As in most economic situations, uncertainty crucially affects also bargaining processes. Therefore, in our analysis, we introduce uncertainty over the size of the pies to be shared and assess the impacts on players’ strategic behaviour. Our results confirm that uncertainty crucially affects players’ behaviour and modifies the likelihood of a self-enforcing agreement to emerge. The model proposed here can have several applications, in particular in the field of natural resource management, where conflicts over how to share a resource of a finite size are increasing.Bargaining, Non-Cooperative Game Theory, Simulation Models, Uncertainty

Referendums and agendas : The challenge of single-issue votes

Referendums are a potential alternative to representative institutions in democratic practice. In fact, referendums have been promoted as particularly democratic because they connect the electorate to policy decisions directly, avoiding the layer of representation altogether. However, even though the electorate can freely choose how to cast their votes, they cannot exert control over the agenda, more specifically the decision alternatives on the ballot. Depending on the rules in place, there may also exist opportunities for strategic voting, which further distorts the expression of the popular will. When referendums are held, there may exist any number of potential items that could reasonably be added onto the agenda, depending on the issue at hand, but there does not appear to be any evident universal method of determining suitable agendas in a non-arbitrary way. The choice of included decision alternatives affects the ultimate outcome, undermining the democratic legitimacy of referendums and their policy decisions. This may also leave voter groups disenfranchised, as their preferred alternatives are not featured on the ballot. It may appear tempting to hold referendums issue by issue. This approach is endorsed by Hugh Ward and Albert Weale in "Is rule by majorities special?" in which they formulate a system labeled "majorities rule." They argue that it is highly responsive to the popular will and immune to strategic voting. However, if such a system is adopted, the problems with agendas grow even greater. Even if each individual issue is decided by majority, the combined outcome on multiple issues may turn out highly unpalatable to the electorate. Real-world issues may be closely intertwined, and it is unclear which topics should be considered single issues to begin with. In this thesis, problems related to agenda formulation and strategic voting are examined analytically with the tools of social choice theory, a field that studies the aggregation of individual preferences into collective decisions. Relevant examples are also provided, including both hypothetical scenarios and real-life referendums. Of the latter, it most prominently features the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union, less formally known as Brexit

First Things First? The Agenda Formation Problem for Multi-issue Committees

It is often argued that multi-issue committees should discuss issues simultaneously to avoid ineciency. However, in practice, parties can be constrained to discuss issues sequentially and in this case, existing game-theoretical models give inconclusive results: either parties have dierent preferences over agendas or they are indierent. We show that when there is an important issue, parties have the same preferences over agendas, in particular they prefer to discuss the most important issue Þrst. Moreover, when an issue is dicult/urgent (in the sense that the rejection of a proposal on this issue implies a game breakdown with a positive probability) parties prefer to postpone the negotiations over the dicult/urgent issue. We highlight several incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas. Since theseareoften in conßict, the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda is of particular interest.

Curious Negotiator

n negotiation the exchange of information is as important as the exchange of offers. The curious negotiator is a multiagent system with three types of agents. Two negotiation agents, each representing an individual, develop consecutive offers, supported by information, whilst requesting information from its opponent. A mediator agent, with experience of prior negotiations, suggests how the negotiation may develop. A failed negotiation is a missed opportunity. An observer agent analyses failures looking for new opportunities. The integration of negotiation theory and data mining enables the curious negotiator to discover and exploit negotiation opportunities. Trials will be conducted in electronic business

Advances in negotiation theory : bargaining, coalitions, and fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (such as climate change control). What factors determinethe outcomes of such negotiations? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? The authors address these questions by focusing on a noncooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, noncooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, they try to identify the connections among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate progress toward a unified framework.Economic Theory&Research,Social Protections&Assistance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Scientific Research&Science Parks,Science Education

Advances in Negotiation Theory: Bargaining, Coalitions and Fairness

Bargaining is ubiquitous in real-life. It is a major dimension of political and business activities. It appears at the international level, when governments negotiate on matters ranging from economic issues (such as the removal of trade barriers), to global security (such as fighting against terrorism) to environmental and related issues (e.g. climate change control). What factors determine the outcome of negotiations such as those mentioned above? What strategies can help reach an agreement? How should the parties involved divide the gains from cooperation? With whom will one make alliances? This paper addresses these questions by focusing on a non-cooperative approach to negotiations, which is particularly relevant for the study of international negotiations. By reviewing noncooperative bargaining theory, non-cooperative coalition theory, and the theory of fair division, this paper will try to identify the connection among these different facets of the same problem in an attempt to facilitate the progress towards a unified framework.Negotiation theory, Bragaining, Coalitions, Fairness, Agreements

Case study: a negotiation between a shopping center and a retailer

A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and EconomicsThe main purpose of our project consisted in analyzing a real negotiation between a shopping centre and a retailer, which took place in the Spanish market. Through its analysis and by studying different approaches to a negotiation, we were able to understand negative aspects as well as identify several improvement opportunities. We concluded that having a package-deal approach, where parties attempt to link all variables brought to the discussion, is crucial for the creation of value is this sort of negotiation. Additionally, we developed a case study to be used on Negotiation analysis courses as a tool to introduce differences between single and multiple-issue negotiations. The case study was also developed in order to understand how the discussion could have been conducted more effectively, leading parties to achieve a mutually beneficial deal