TRIP WIRES AND SPEED BUMPS: MANAGING FINANCIAL RISKS AND REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR FINANCIAL CRISES IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES

This paper investigates the shortcomings of the “early warning systems” (EWS) that are currently being promoted with such vigour in the multilateral and academic community. It then advocates an integrated “trip wire-speed bump” regime to reduce financial risk and, as a consequence, to reduce the frequency and depth of financial crises in developing countries. Specifically, this paper achieves four objectives. First, it demonstrates that efforts to develop EWS for banking, currency and generalized financial crises in developing countries have largely failed. It argues that EWS have failed because they are based on faulty theoretical assumptions, not least that the mere provision of information can reduce financial turbulence in developing countries. Second, the paper advances an approach to managing financial risks through trip wires and speed bumps. Trip wires are indicators of vulnerability that can illuminate the specific risks to which developing economies are exposed. Among the most significant of these vulnerabilities are the risk of large-scale currency depreciations, the risk that domestic and foreign investors and lenders may suddenly withdraw capital, the risk that locational and/or maturity mismatches will induce debt distress, the risk that non-transparent financial transactions will induce financial fragility, and the risk that a country will suffer the contagion effects of financial crises that originate elsewhere in the world or within particular sectors of their own economies. It argues that trip wires must be linked to policy responses that alter the context in which investors operate. In this connection, policymakers should link specific speed bumps that change behaviours to each type of trip wire. Third, the paper argues that the proposal for a trip wire-speed bump regime is not intended as a means to prevent all financial instability and crises in developing countries. Indeed, such a goal is fanciful. But insofar as developing countries remain highly vulnerable to financial instability, it is critical that policymakers vigorously pursue avenues for reducing the financial risks to which their economies are exposed and for curtailing the destabilizing effects of unpredictable changes in international private capital flows. Fourth, the paper responds to likely concerns about the response of investors, the IMF and powerful governments to the trip wire-speed bump approach. The paper also considers the issue of technical/institutional capacity to pursue this approach to policy. The paper concludes by arguing that the obstacles confronting the trip wire-speed bump approach are not insurmountable.

Predicting Financial Crisis in Developing Economies: Astronomy or Astrology?

In the aftermath of the European currency crisis of 1992-3, the Mexican financial crisis of 1994-5 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-8, neoclassical economists in the academy and policy community have been engaged in a project to develop predictors or indicators of currency, banking and generalized financial crises in developing economies. This paper critically examines the efforts of the economics profession in this regard on both empirical and theoretical grounds. The paper argues that these predictors perform poorly on empirical grounds--indeed, the predictors developed after each of these crises failed to predict the next major crisis. These predictors are also rejected on theoretical grounds. From a post-Keynesian perspective, there is no reason to expect that the mere provision of information will prevent crises by changing agents' behaviors. The paper will also propose several indicators that are consonant with post-Keynesian economic theory, although it will be argued that these indicators do not represent a sufficient means to prevent financial crisis. Ironically, as agents develop confidence in the predictive capacity of crisis indicators, they may engage in actions that increase the economy's vulnerability to crisis. Far more important to the project of preventing financial crisis in developing economies is the implementation of constraints on those investor behaviors that render liberalized, internationally integrated financial systems inherently prone to instability and crisis. Hence, intellectual capital would be more productively expended on devising appropriate changes in the overall regime in which investors operate (such as measures that compel changes in financing strategies) rather than in searching for new predictors of crisis.Financial Crisis

The macroeconomics of price reform in socialist countries : a dynamic framework

This paper emphasizes the fiscal underpinnings of the inflationary process and those particular dynamics when a dual price system is present. In particular, it explores the links between price controls and decontrols and the government budget, mainly through the flow of subsidies to either consumers or producers. A clear conclusion is that without consistency in macroeconomic policy, price liberalization may simply exacerbate imbalances and ultimately provide a mechanism for sustaining inflation, hencecompromising a basic objective of macroeconomic policy.Access to Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Insurance&Risk Mitigation,Markets and Market Access

Financial Liberalization and Monetary Policy Cooperation in East Asia

As the countries in East Asia embark on financial liberalization, a key issue that confronts policymakers is the greater complexity of risks that is injected into the financial system. In particular, capital account liberalization may potentially increase the vulnerability of individual countries to external financial shocks. This paper advocates the optimally cascading of financial liberalization that is consistent across three dimensions: extent of domestic financial liberalization; the degree of exchange rate flexibility; and the scope of capital account liberalization. Unless the process of liberalization is properly managed, it could provoke destabilizing capital flows and lead to volatile exchange rates. Smooth responses to fluctuating capital flows require accelerated institutional reforms in individual countries and an upgraded regional financial infrastructure. We argue that informal monetary arrangements, sequenced from simple to more intensive commitments, can go a long way in improving sovereign and regional institutions both to handle ongoing financial liberalization and to promote intra-regional currency stability.

"Explaining the September 1992 ERM Crisis: The Maastricht Bargain and Domestic Politics in Germany, France and Great Britain"

At the time of the September 1992 crisis, the conventional wisdom held in the ERM was due to an unfortunate contuence of exceptional circumstances -- the shock of German reunification, a debt-driven recession in Britain, and the uncertainties caused by the Danish and French referenda on Maastricht. This paper points to systemic factors at both the EC and domestic levels in explaining the September crisis. At the Community level, it is argued that the ERM was the victim of an underlying structural flaw in the Maastricht 3-stage plan for EMU. Intergovemmental bargaining, reflecting the differing national preferences of Germany and France in particular, produced an untenable compromise with potentially chaotic consequences: the matching of demanding economic convergence criteria with a strict timetable for their fulfillment, upon commencement of Stage II of the EMU process set for January 1994. Far from being epiphenomenal, this bargain was only the latest manifestation of an ongoing debate between "economist" and monetarist" approaches to monetary integration, tracing back to the early 1970s. and I argue that the "framing effects" of the Stage II criteria fundamentally altered the nature of economic discourse at Stage I, beginning in 1990. Specific reference numbers for debt ratios and relative and interest rate targets emphasized economic divergence in countries with clearly overvalued currencies, and invited markets to test the strength of govemments' political commitments to their exchange rate pegs. The second component of my explanation of the September crisis lies at the domestic level. Even though strict convergence criteria and timetables provided a severe test of the credibility of members' European commitments, it was not a foregone conclusion that the Maastricht bargain would result in turbulence on the currency markets. A margin of maneuver was left to the member governments, through the demonstration of a willingness to take painful measures, such as fiscal and wage restraint or timely interest rate hikes, to defend the ERM commitment

Bringing Agriculture into the GATT: Designing Acceptable Agricultural Policies

Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,

Survey of Army/NASA rotorcraft aeroelastic stability research

Theoretical and experimental developments in the aeroelastic and aeromechanical stability of helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft are addressed. Included are the underlying nonlinear structural mechanics of slender rotating beams, necessary for accurate modeling of elastic cantilever rotor blades, and the development of dynamic inflow, an unsteady aerodynamic theory for low frequency aeroelastic stability applications. Analytical treatment of isolated rotor stability in hover and forward flight, coupled rotor-fuselage stability are considered. Results of parametric investigations of system behavior are presented, and correlations between theoretical results and experimental data from small- and large-scale wind tunnel and flight testing are discussed

Rotorcraft aeroelastic stability

Theoretical and experimental developments in the aeroelastic and aeromechanical stability of helicopters and tilt-rotor aircraft are addressed. Included are the underlying nonlinear structural mechanics of slender rotating beams, necessary for accurate modeling of elastic cantilever rotor blades, and the development of dynamic inflow, an unsteady aerodynamic theory for low-frequency aeroelastic stability applications. Analytical treatment of isolated rotor stability in hover and forward flight, coupled rotor-fuselage stability in hover and forward flight, and analysis of tilt-rotor dynamic stability are considered. Results of parametric investigations of system behavior are presented, and correlation between theoretical results and experimental data from small and large scale wind tunnel and flight testing are discussed