4,886 research outputs found
Critiques of Minimal Realism
Saatsiâs minimal realism holds that science makes theoretical progress. It is designed to get around the pessimistic induction, to fall between scientific realism and instrumentalism, and to explain the success of scientific theories. I raise the following two objections to it. First, it is not clear whether minimal realism lies between realism and instrumentalism, given that minimal realism does not entail instrumentalism. Second, it is not clear whether minimal realism can explain the success of scientific theories, given that it is doubtful that theoretical progress makes success likely. In addition to raising these two objections, I develop and criticize a new position that truly falls between realism and instrumentalism
Towards a theory of singular thought about abstract mathematical objects
This essay uses a mental files theory of singular thoughtâa theory saying that singular thought about and reference to a particular object requires possession of a mental store of information taken to be about that objectâto explain how we could have such thoughts about abstract mathematical objects. After showing why we should want an explanation of this I argue that none of three main contemporary mental files theories of singular thoughtâacquaintance theory, semantic instrumentalism, and semantic cognitivismâcan give it. I argue for two claims intended to advance our understanding of singular thought about mathematical abstracta. First, that the conditions for possession of a file for an abstract mathematical object are the same as the conditions for possessing a file for an object perceived in the pastânamely, that the agent retains information about the object. Thus insofar as we are able to have memory-based files for objects perceived in the past, we ought to be able to have files for abstract mathematical objects too. Second, at least one recently articulated condition on a fileâs being a device for singular thoughtâthat it be capable of surviving a certain kind of change in the information it containsâcan be satisfied by files for abstract mathematical objects
Hilbert's Program Then and Now
Hilbert's program was an ambitious and wide-ranging project in the philosophy
and foundations of mathematics. In order to "dispose of the foundational
questions in mathematics once and for all, "Hilbert proposed a two-pronged
approach in 1921: first, classical mathematics should be formalized in
axiomatic systems; second, using only restricted, "finitary" means, one should
give proofs of the consistency of these axiomatic systems. Although Godel's
incompleteness theorems show that the program as originally conceived cannot be
carried out, it had many partial successes, and generated important advances in
logical theory and meta-theory, both at the time and since. The article
discusses the historical background and development of Hilbert's program, its
philosophical underpinnings and consequences, and its subsequent development
and influences since the 1930s.Comment: 43 page
Principles of Acquaintance
The thesis that in order to genuinely think about a particular object one must be (in some sense) acquainted with that object has been thoroughly explored since it was put forward by Bertrand Russell. Recently, the thesis has come in for mounting criticism. The aim of this paper is to point out that neither the exploration nor the criticism have been sensitive to the fact that the thesis can be interpreted in two different ways, yielding two different principles of acquaintance. One principle uses the notion of content in distinguishing genuine thinking-about things from a merely derivative kind of thinking-about things. The other principle is quiet about content, focusing instead on a distinction between satisfactional and non-satisfactional means of bringing things into thought. Most work has focused on the first, content-based principle of acquaintance. But criticisms of this principle do not apply straightforwardly to the non-content-based principle. I shall argue that the latter principle merits independent assessment as part of the broader effort to account for genuine thinking about particular objects. In the final section of the paper, I will sketch a roadmap for this assessment
Andreas Osiander v dÄjinĂĄch filosofie, vÄdy a filosofii vÄdy
The article deals with the position of Lutheran theologian Andreas Osiander sen. in the history of philosophy, history of science and philosophy of science. It works on humanistic foundation of Osianderâs thought and his elaboration of the tradition of the antient wisdom and Christian cabbala of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in particular in the biblical exegesis. The article deals with Osianderâs edition of Nicolaus Copernicusâ book De revolutionibus orbium caelestium as well and with his edition of the mathematical work of Girolamo Cardano. In the context of philosophy of science Osianderâs foreword to Copernicus is analyzed and its role in the controversy between instrumentalism and realism is assessed. Osianderâs instrumentalism is viewed as an anachronism. Finally, the influence of Neoplatonism and Paracelsism in Osianderâs theology is analyzed and judged as too general
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