Human Resource Management Diffusion and Productivity Imbalances

In this study, we explore spatial variance in management practices and assess its potential contribution to regional imbalances in productivity. The research builds on a growing body of evidence which indicates that differences in management practices can account for a substantial share of cross-country differences in total factor productivity, and which identifies an important role for management practices in explaining differences in productivity between firms in the UK. We contribute to this literature by studying regional variation in HRM and related management practices using workplace-level (i.e. plant-level) data in Britain, taken from the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS). We use these data to map spatial variance in HRM intensity in Britain. We then seek to account for that variance and, in doing so, establish whether regional variance in HRM can help to account for regional variance in productivity. This analysis is complemented by a comparative investigation of equivalent data for France, where levels of productivity and HRM are both higher and less dispersed

The Ownership School vs. the Management School of State Enterprise Reform: Evidence from China

There are two schools of thoughts on the important issue of reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We call them the ownership school and the management school. The ownership school argues that the key to the reform is to diversify SOEs' ownership, including privatization, in order to eliminate government control of SOEs. The management school emphasizes the need to improve government's management of SOEs by, for example, granting SOE employees autonomy and profit incentives. Utilizing a data set of 680 SOEs in China, covering the period of 1980 to 1994, we test the relative effectiveness of these two kinds of reform measures. This is possible due to the fact that reform measures based on each of these two schools of thoughts were practised in China. Our results yield strong support for the ownership school while leaving very mixed evidence for the management school. Moreover, we find that the impact of ownership diversification was of the same order of magnitude on the economic performance of state enterprises as that of enhancing product market competition.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/39819/3/wp435.pd

Relational Investing and Agency Theory

This Article analyzes how, and when, corporate governance could be improved by utilizing "relational investing." The term relational investing is just coming into vogue and there does not yet seem to be a consensus on what it means. Although the term has been trumpeted on the cover of Business Week, before the Conference on Relational Investing at Columbia University, relatively little legal writing had been published on the subject. For the purposes of this Article, we define relational investing to encompass commitments to buy and hold significant blocks of a corporation's stock. And it is particularly important that the relational investors commit not to tender their shares to hostile bidders. Using our definition, relational investing is used to foreclose or reduce hostile takeover threats, replacing this form of external discipline with enhanced internal discipline by the relational investors. The long-term investment induces the relational shareholders to invest more in acquiring information about the effectiveness of management. To be effective internal monitors, however, relational investors must be able to use this information to influence corporate policy. At a minimum, relational investors must be "provocable" -- they must be able to increase the likelihood that poor management or poor policies will be changed. Relational investors might accomplish these changes through either internal (informal negotiation or proxy contest) or external (tender offer) means.Relational Investing; Takeovers; Agency Costs; Moral Hazard

Persistence and ability in the innovation decisions

The main concern of this paper is to analyse the complementarities between the decisions to carry out both product and process innovations. We also try to identify the main determinants of the innovation activity as well as to separate the experience effect of the firm (capacities, routines as organization) from the experience effect of the manager (skills, abilities). It has been common when facing the study of technological change, to consider innovation as a homogeneous activity. The main analyses have focused on the determinants of such activity trying to explain decisions, counts or R and D expenses in the context of a unique activity. Several recent works, however, are worried about the possibility of analysing innovation distinguishing among different types according to the final purpose of this activity. We focus on two different decisions, product and process innovations, using typical discrete choice specifications (univariate and bivariate models) and also binary choice models with heterogeneity. Among the results, we find complementary but asymmetric effects concerning both decisions in static models even controlling heterogeneity. We also test whether the persistence in conducting innovation activities matter. We do so in an extensive database that provides information about manufacturing firms. Our results point towards the importance of both ability of the manager (unobserved heterogeneity) and experience of the firm (dynamics in the equation indicator)

Knowledge Management What Can Organizational Economics Contribute?

Knowledge management has emerged as a very successful organization practice and has been extensively treated in a large body of academic work. Surprisingly, however, organizational economics (i.e., transaction cost economics, agency theory, team theory and property rights theory) has played no role in the development of knowledge management. We argue that organizational economics insights can further the theory and practice of knowledge management in several ways. Specifically, we apply notions of contracting, team production, complementaries, hold-up, etc. to knowledge management issues (i.e., creating and integration knowledge, rewarding knowledge workers, etc.) , and derive refutable implications that are novel to the knowledge management field from our discussion.Transaction costs, organizational economics

An integrative model of the management of hospital physician relationships

Hospital Physician Relationships (HPRs) are of major importance to the health care sector. Drawing on agency theory and social exchange theory, we argue that both economic and noneconomic integration strategies are important to effective management of HPRs. We developed a model of related antecedents and outcomes and conducted a systematic review to assess the evidence base of both integration strategies and their interplay. We found that more emphasis should be placed on financial risk sharing, trust and physician organizational commitment

Institutional Diversity, Agency and Governance for Sustainable Value

Extant views of (shareholder) value, (corporate) governance, and competitiveness have a narrow view of 'agency', a poorly developed theory of value and pay little attention to sustainability. In this paper we develop a perspective on the determinants of value-wealth creation at the firm, meso-, and national levels, explore the limitations of extant theory of the firm, concerning governance and value in its context, and discuss some prerequisites of sustainability. We conclude that the pursuit of value is not antithetical to, but it derives from, the notion of sustainability, that sustainability requires both internal and external controls and that institutional diversity can help effect mutual 'stewardship' and monitoring. Moreover, for sustainable value creation, corporate governance needs to be aligned to national and global governance.institutions, agency, governance, sustainability, value

What's Behind the Increase in Inequality?

The focus of this paper is the increase in earnings inequality over the last 30-plus years. Economists have well-developed theories that explain differences in wage levels among different categories of workers. Differences in educational attainment and skills are a major source of these differences; large organizations typically employ workers with a wide range of skills and responsibilities and pay them accordingly. As a result, the level of wage inequality within organizations is quite large. This paper does not challenge these results. It argues, however, that these theories are not adequate to explain a relatively recent phenomenon: the increase in recent decades in wage inequality among workers with similar levels of education and similar demographic characteristics who are employed in similar occupations but in different firms or establishments. These differences in wages are how most people experience inequality. Yet much of the analysis by economists has focused on developments that have enabled leading firms in the U.S. to increase their ability to extract monopoly rents.This paper reviews a wide-ranging literature that examines the increased ability of leading firms to extract monopoly rents. It also reviews the more recent and still thin literature on the increase in inequality among workers with similar characteristics but different employers. The contribution of this paper is the identification of a mechanism that reconciles these two strains of economic research and explains how the increase in rent extraction is linked to the increasingly unequal pay of U.S. workers with similar characteristics. I draw on joint work with Rosemary Batt (2014) to identify new opportunities for rent seeking behavior, and on joint work with Annette Bernhardt, Rosemary Batt and Susan Houseman (2016, 2017) on domestic outsourcing, inter-firm contracting and the growing importance of production networks to establish a mechanism that connects the increase in rents with this new type of increase in wage inequality

Voluntary Disclosure and Political Sensitivity: The Case of Executive Remuneration

This study investigates the relation between firm political sensitivity and the quality and quantity of voluntary disclosures, with special reference to the case of executive remuneration disclosures. I study the relation between firm political sensitivity and the quality and quantity of annual bonus plan disclosures, applying two competing (but not mutually exclusive) theories: political cost theory and managerial power theory. Political sensitivity is proxied using the magnitude of the annual bonus rather than firm size, which while popular in existing literature, is not a perfect proxy for political sensitivity (Ball and Foster, 1982, Meek et al, 1995; Cormier et al, 2005). Results reveal a significant positive relation between disclosure quantity and political sensitivity measures, and a significant negative relation between disclosure quality and political sensitivity proxies. This indicates that managers who are more susceptible to political sanctions related to their remuneration tend to disclose higher volumes of lower quality information. Consistent with earlier studies, the results confirm that firm size is related to voluntary disclosure, and the results also reveal that the use of remuneration consultants have a significant positive effect on disclosure quantity but no impact on disclosure quality

Count on Your Subordinates: Young Managers and Innovation Efficiency

We investigate the relationship between executives’ horizons and firms’ innovation efficiency. Motivated by Acharya, Myers, and Rajan’s (2011, JF) theory, we devise a measure of internal governance based on the difference in expected horizons between a CEO and her subordinates. Consistent with our conjecture, we find robust evidence that subordinate managers with longer horizon compared to the CEO can improve firm’s innovation efficiency. Internal governance has a stronger effect on innovation efficiency for firms with elder, generalist CEOs and when the number of subordinates on the board is higher. However, while the presence of powerful CEOs attenuates the effect, overconfident CEOs do not negate the internal governance effect. Our proposed internal governance mechanism seems to be able to address the managerial myopia issue in corporate settings