18 research outputs found
On the Power of Many One-Bit Provers
We study the class of languages, denoted by \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon, s], which
have -prover games where each prover just sends a \emph{single} bit, with
completeness and soundness error . For the case that
(i.e., for the case of interactive proofs), Goldreich, Vadhan and Wigderson
({\em Computational Complexity'02}) demonstrate that \SZK exactly
characterizes languages having 1-bit proof systems with"non-trivial" soundness
(i.e., ). We demonstrate that for the case that
, 1-bit -prover games exhibit a significantly richer structure:
+ (Folklore) When , \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon, s]
= \BPP;
+ When , \MIP[k,
1-\epsilon, s] = \SZK;
+ When , \AM \subseteq \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon,
s];
+ For and sufficiently large , \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon, s]
\subseteq \EXP;
+ For , \MIP[k, 1, 1-\epsilon, s] = \NEXP.
As such, 1-bit -prover games yield a natural "quantitative" approach to
relating complexity classes such as \BPP,\SZK,\AM, \EXP, and \NEXP.
We leave open the question of whether a more fine-grained hierarchy (between
\AM and \NEXP) can be established for the case when
Strong ETH Breaks With Merlin and Arthur: Short Non-Interactive Proofs of Batch Evaluation
We present an efficient proof system for Multipoint Arithmetic Circuit
Evaluation: for every arithmetic circuit of size and
degree over a field , and any inputs ,
the Prover sends the Verifier the values and a proof of length, and
the Verifier tosses coins and can check the proof in about time, with probability of error less than .
For small degree , this "Merlin-Arthur" proof system (a.k.a. MA-proof
system) runs in nearly-linear time, and has many applications. For example, we
obtain MA-proof systems that run in time (for various ) for the
Permanent, Circuit-SAT for all sublinear-depth circuits, counting
Hamiltonian cycles, and infeasibility of - linear programs. In general,
the value of any polynomial in Valiant's class can be certified
faster than "exhaustive summation" over all possible assignments. These results
strongly refute a Merlin-Arthur Strong ETH and Arthur-Merlin Strong ETH posed
by Russell Impagliazzo and others.
We also give a three-round (AMA) proof system for quantified Boolean formulas
running in time, nearly-linear time MA-proof systems for
counting orthogonal vectors in a collection and finding Closest Pairs in the
Hamming metric, and a MA-proof system running in -time for
counting -cliques in graphs.
We point to some potential future directions for refuting the
Nondeterministic Strong ETH.Comment: 17 page
A Protocol for Generating Random Elements with their Probabilities
We give an AM protocol that allows the verifier to sample elements x from a
probability distribution P, which is held by the prover. If the prover is
honest, the verifier outputs (x, P(x)) with probability close to P(x). In case
the prover is dishonest, one may hope for the following guarantee: if the
verifier outputs (x, p), then the probability that the verifier outputs x is
close to p. Simple examples show that this cannot be achieved. Instead, we show
that the following weaker condition holds (in a well defined sense) on average:
If (x, p) is output, then p is an upper bound on the probability that x is
output. Our protocol yields a new transformation to turn interactive proofs
where the verifier uses private random coins into proofs with public coins. The
verifier has better running time compared to the well-known Goldwasser-Sipser
transformation (STOC, 1986). For constant-round protocols, we only lose an
arbitrarily small constant in soundness and completeness, while our public-coin
verifier calls the private-coin verifier only once
Predictable arguments of knowledge
We initiate a formal investigation on the power of predictability for argument of knowledge systems for NP. Specifically, we consider private-coin argument systems where the answer of the prover can be predicted, given the private randomness of the verifier; we call such protocols Predictable Arguments of Knowledge (PAoK).
Our study encompasses a full characterization of PAoK, showing that such arguments can be made extremely laconic, with the prover sending a single bit, and assumed to have only one round (i.e., two messages) of communication without loss of generality.
We additionally explore PAoK satisfying additional properties (including zero-knowledge and the possibility of re-using the same challenge across multiple executions with the prover), present several constructions of PAoK relying on different cryptographic tools, and discuss applications to cryptography
On the Implausibility of Constant-Round Public-Coin Zero-Knowledge Proofs
We consider the problem of whether there exist non-trivial constant-round public-coin zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs. To date, in spite of high interest in the above, there is no definite answer to the question. We focus on the type of ZK proofs that admit a universal simulator (which handles all malicious verifiers), and show a connection between the existence of such proof systems and a seemingly unrelated “program understanding” problem: for a natural class of constant-round public-coin ZK proofs (which we call “canonical,” since all known ZK protocols fall into this category), a session prefix output by the universal simulator can actually be used to distinguish a non-trivial property of the next-step functionality of the verifier’s code.
Our result can be viewed as extended new evidence against the existence of constant-round public-coin ZK proofs, since the existence of such a proof system will bring about either one
of the following: (1) a positive result for the above program-understanding problem, a typical goal in reverse-engineering attempts, commonly believed to be notoriously hard, or (2) a rather unfathomable simulation strategy beyond the only known (straight-line simulation) technique for their argument counterpart, as we also argue. Earlier negative evidence on constant-round public-coin ZK proofs is Barack, Lindell and Vadhan [FOCS ’03]’s result, which was based on the incomparable assumption of the existence of certain entropy-preserving hash functions, now (due to further work) known not to be achievable from standard assumptions via black-box reduction.
The core of our technical contribution is showing that there exists a single verifier step for constant-round public-coin ZK proofs whose functionality (rather than its code) is crucial for a successful simulation. This is proved by combining a careful analysis of the behavior of a set of verifiers in the above protocols and during simulation, with an improved structure-preserving version of the well-known Babai-Moran Speedup (de-randomization) Theorem, a key tool of independent interest
Impossibilities in Succinct Arguments: Black-box Extraction and More
The celebrated result by Gentry and Wichs established a theoretical barrier for succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs), showing that for (expressive enough) hard-on-average languages, we must assume non-falsifiable assumptions.
We further investigate those barriers by showing new negative and positive results related to the proof size.
1. We start by formalizing a folklore lower bound for the proof size of black-box extractable arguments based on the hardness of the language. This separates knowledge-sound SNARGs (SNARKs) in the random oracle model (that can have black-box extraction) and those in the standard model.
2. We find a positive result in the non-adaptive setting. Under the existence of non-adaptively sound SNARGs (without extractability) and from standard assumptions, it is possible to build SNARKs with black-box extractability for a non-trivial subset of NP.
3. On the other hand, we show that (under some mild assumptions) all NP languages cannot have SNARKs with black-box extractability even in the non-adaptive setting.
4. The Gentry-Wichs result does not account for the preprocessing model, under which fall several efficient constructions. We show that also, in the preprocessing model, it is impossible to construct SNARGs that rely on falsifiable assumptions in a black-box way.
Along the way, we identify a class of non-trivial languages, which we dub “trapdoor languages”, that bypass some of these impossibility results
Witness-Succinct Universally-Composable SNARKs
Zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zkSNARKs) are becoming an increasingly fundamental tool in many real-world applications where the proof compactness is of the utmost importance, including blockchains. A proof of security for SNARKs in the Universal Composability (UC) framework (Canetti, FOCS\u2701) would rule out devastating malleability attacks. To retain security of SNARKs in the UC model, one must show their simulation-extractability such that the knowledge extractor is both black-box and straight-line, which would imply that proofs generated by honest provers are non-malleable. However, existing simulation-extractability results on SNARKs either lack some of these properties, or alternatively have to sacrifice witness succinctness to prove UC security.
In this paper, we provide a compiler lifting any simulation-extractable NIZKAoK into a UC-secure one in the global random oracle model, importantly, while preserving the same level of witness succinctness. Combining this with existing zkSNARKs, we achieve, to the best of our knowledge, the first zkSNARKs simultaneously achieving UC-security and constant sized proofs
PCD
Thesis (M. Eng.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2010.Page 96 blank. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-95).The security of systems can often be expressed as ensuring that some property is maintained at every step of a distributed computation conducted by untrusted parties. Special cases include integrity of programs running on untrusted platforms, various forms of confidentiality and side-channel resilience, and domain-specific invariants. We propose a new approach, proof-carrying data (PCD), which sidesteps the threat of faults and leakage by reasoning about properties of a computation's output data, regardless of the process that produced it. In PCD, the system designer prescribes the desired properties of a computation's outputs. Corresponding proofs are attached to every message flowing through the system, and are mutually verified by the system's components. Each such proof attests that the message's data and all of its history comply with the prescribed properties. We construct a general protocol compiler that generates, propagates, and verifies such proofs of compliance, while preserving the dynamics and efficiency of the original computation. Our main technical tool is the cryptographic construction of short non-interactive arguments (computationally-sound proofs) for statements whose truth depends on "hearsay evidence": previous arguments about other statements. To this end, we attain a particularly strong proof-of-knowledge property. We realize the above, under standard cryptographic assumptions, in a model where the prover has blackbox access to some simple functionality - essentially, a signature card.by Alessandro Chiesa.M.Eng