87 research outputs found
On the Power of Many One-Bit Provers
We study the class of languages, denoted by \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon, s], which
have -prover games where each prover just sends a \emph{single} bit, with
completeness and soundness error . For the case that
(i.e., for the case of interactive proofs), Goldreich, Vadhan and Wigderson
({\em Computational Complexity'02}) demonstrate that \SZK exactly
characterizes languages having 1-bit proof systems with"non-trivial" soundness
(i.e., ). We demonstrate that for the case that
, 1-bit -prover games exhibit a significantly richer structure:
+ (Folklore) When , \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon, s]
= \BPP;
+ When , \MIP[k,
1-\epsilon, s] = \SZK;
+ When , \AM \subseteq \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon,
s];
+ For and sufficiently large , \MIP[k, 1-\epsilon, s]
\subseteq \EXP;
+ For , \MIP[k, 1, 1-\epsilon, s] = \NEXP.
As such, 1-bit -prover games yield a natural "quantitative" approach to
relating complexity classes such as \BPP,\SZK,\AM, \EXP, and \NEXP.
We leave open the question of whether a more fine-grained hierarchy (between
\AM and \NEXP) can be established for the case when
Predictable arguments of knowledge
We initiate a formal investigation on the power of predictability for argument of knowledge systems for NP. Specifically, we consider private-coin argument systems where the answer of the prover can be predicted, given the private randomness of the verifier; we call such protocols Predictable Arguments of Knowledge (PAoK).
Our study encompasses a full characterization of PAoK, showing that such arguments can be made extremely laconic, with the prover sending a single bit, and assumed to have only one round (i.e., two messages) of communication without loss of generality.
We additionally explore PAoK satisfying additional properties (including zero-knowledge and the possibility of re-using the same challenge across multiple executions with the prover), present several constructions of PAoK relying on different cryptographic tools, and discuss applications to cryptography
Streaming Verification for Graph Problems: Optimal Tradeoffs and Nonlinear Sketches
We study graph computations in an enhanced data streaming setting, where a
space-bounded client reading the edge stream of a massive graph may delegate
some of its work to a cloud service. We seek algorithms that allow the client
to verify a purported proof sent by the cloud service that the work done in the
cloud is correct. A line of work starting with Chakrabarti et al. (ICALP 2009)
has provided such algorithms, which we call schemes, for several statistical
and graph-theoretic problems, many of which exhibit a tradeoff between the
length of the proof and the space used by the streaming verifier.
This work designs new schemes for a number of basic graph
problems---including triangle counting, maximum matching, topological sorting,
and single-source shortest paths---where past work had either failed to obtain
smooth tradeoffs between these two key complexity measures or only obtained
suboptimal tradeoffs. Our key innovation is having the verifier compute certain
nonlinear sketches of the input stream, leading to either new or improved
tradeoffs. In many cases, our schemes in fact provide optimal tradeoffs up to
logarithmic factors.
Specifically, for most graph problems that we study, it is known that the
product of the verifier's space cost and the proof length must be at
least for -vertex graphs. However, matching upper bounds are
only known for a handful of settings of and on the curve . For example, for counting triangles and maximum
matching, schemes with costs lying on this curve are only known for
, , and
the trivial . A major message of this work
is that by exploiting nonlinear sketches, a significant ``portion'' of costs on
the tradeoff curve can be achieved
Strong ETH Breaks With Merlin and Arthur: Short Non-Interactive Proofs of Batch Evaluation
We present an efficient proof system for Multipoint Arithmetic Circuit
Evaluation: for every arithmetic circuit of size and
degree over a field , and any inputs ,
the Prover sends the Verifier the values and a proof of length, and
the Verifier tosses coins and can check the proof in about time, with probability of error less than .
For small degree , this "Merlin-Arthur" proof system (a.k.a. MA-proof
system) runs in nearly-linear time, and has many applications. For example, we
obtain MA-proof systems that run in time (for various ) for the
Permanent, Circuit-SAT for all sublinear-depth circuits, counting
Hamiltonian cycles, and infeasibility of - linear programs. In general,
the value of any polynomial in Valiant's class can be certified
faster than "exhaustive summation" over all possible assignments. These results
strongly refute a Merlin-Arthur Strong ETH and Arthur-Merlin Strong ETH posed
by Russell Impagliazzo and others.
We also give a three-round (AMA) proof system for quantified Boolean formulas
running in time, nearly-linear time MA-proof systems for
counting orthogonal vectors in a collection and finding Closest Pairs in the
Hamming metric, and a MA-proof system running in -time for
counting -cliques in graphs.
We point to some potential future directions for refuting the
Nondeterministic Strong ETH.Comment: 17 page
From Laconic Zero-Knowledge to Public-Key Cryptography
Since its inception, public-key encryption (PKE) has been one of the main cornerstones of cryptography. A central goal in cryptographic research is to understand the foundations of public-key encryption and in particular, base its existence on a natural and generic complexity-theoretic assumption. An intriguing candidate for such an assumption is the existence of a cryptographically hard language in the intersection of NP and SZK.
In this work we prove that public-key encryption can be based on the foregoing assumption, as long as the (honest) prover in the zero-knowledge protocol is efficient and laconic. That is, messages that the prover sends should be efficiently computable (given the NP witness) and short (i.e., of sufficiently sub-logarithmic length). Actually, our result is stronger and only requires the protocol to be zero-knowledge for an honest-verifier and sound against computationally bounded cheating provers.
Languages in NP with such laconic zero-knowledge protocols are known from a variety of computational assumptions (e.g., Quadratic Residuocity, Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Learning with Errors, etc.). Thus, our main result can also be viewed as giving a unifying framework for constructing PKE which, in particular, captures many of the assumptions that were already known to yield PKE.
We also show several extensions of our result. First, that a certain weakening of our assumption on laconic zero-knowledge is actually equivalent to PKE, thereby giving a complexity-theoretic characterization of PKE. Second, a mild strengthening of our assumption also yields a (2-message) oblivious transfer protocol
On Succinct Arguments and Witness Encryption from Groups
Succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) enable proofs of NP statements with very low communication. Recently, there has been significant work in both theory and practice on constructing SNARGs with very short proofs. Currently, the state-of-the-art in succinctness is due to Groth (Eurocrypt 2016) who constructed a SNARG from bilinear maps where the proof consists of just 3 group elements.
In this work, we first construct a concretely-efficient designated-verifier (preprocessing) SNARG with inverse polynomial soundness, where the proof consists of just 2 group elements in a standard (generic) group. This leads to a 50% reduction in concrete proof size compared to Groth\u27s construction. We follow the approach of Bitansky et al. (TCC 2013) who describe a compiler from linear PCPs to SNARGs in the preprocessing model. Our improvement is based on a new linear PCP packing technique that allows us to construct 1-query linear PCPs which can then be compiled into a SNARG (using ElGamal encryption over a generic group). An appealing feature of our new SNARG is that the verifier can precompute a statement-independent lookup table in an offline phase; verifying proofs then only requires 2 exponentiations and a single table lookup. This makes our new designated-verifier SNARG appealing in settings that demand fast verification and minimal communication.
We then turn to the question of constructing arguments where the proof consists of a single group element. Here, we first show that any (possibly interactive) argument for a language L where the verification algorithm is generic (i.e., only performs generic group operations) and the proof consists of a single group element, implies a witness encryption scheme for L. We then show that under a yet-unproven, but highly plausible, hypothesis on the hardness of approximating the minimal distance of linear codes, we can construct a 2-message laconic argument for NP where the proof consists of a single group element. Under the same hypothesis, we obtain a witness encryption scheme for NP in the generic group model. Along the way, we show that under a conceptually-similar but proven hardness of approximation result, there is a 2-message laconic argument for NP with negligible soundness error where the prover\u27s message consists of just 2 group elements. In both settings, we obtain laconic arguments (and linear PCPs) with linear decision procedures. Our constructions circumvent a previous lower bound by Groth on such argument systems with linear decision procedures by relying on imperfect completeness. Namely, our constructions have vanishing but not negligible completeness error, while the lower bound of Groth implicitly assumes negligible completeness error of the underlying argument. Our techniques thus highlight new avenues for designing linear PCPs, succinct arguments, and witness encryption schemes
Quasi-Optimal SNARGs via Linear Multi-Prover Interactive Proofs
Succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) enable verifying NP computations with significantly less complexity than that required for classical NP verification. In this work, we focus on simultaneously minimizing the proof size and the prover complexity of SNARGs. Concretely, for a security parameter , we measure the asymptotic cost of achieving soundness error against provers of size . We say a SNARG is quasi-optimally succinct if its proof length is , and that it is quasi-optimal, if moreover, its prover complexity is only polylogarithmically greater than the running time of the classical NP prover. We show that this definition is the best we could hope for assuming that NP does not have succinct proofs. Our definition strictly strengthens the previous notion of quasi-optimality introduced in the work of Boneh et al. (Eurocrypt 2017).
This work gives the first quasi-optimal SNARG for Boolean circuit satisfiability from a concrete cryptographic assumption. Our construction takes a two-step approach. The first is an information-theoretic construction of a quasi-optimal linear multi-prover interactive proof (linear MIP) for circuit satisfiability. Then, we describe a generic cryptographic compiler that transforms our quasi-optimal linear MIP into a quasi-optimal SNARG by relying on the notion of linear-only vector encryption over rings introduced by Boneh et al. Combining these two primitives yields the first quasi-optimal SNARG based on linear-only vector encryption. Moreover, our linear MIP construction leverages a new robust circuit decomposition primitive that allows us to decompose a circuit satisfiability instance into several smaller circuit satisfiability instances. This primitive may be of independent interest.
Finally, we consider (designated-verifier) SNARGs that provide optimal succinctness for a non-negligible soundness error. Concretely, we put forward the notion of 1-bit SNARGs that achieve soundness error 1/2 with only one bit of proof. We first show how to build 1-bit SNARGs from indistinguishability obfuscation, and then show that 1-bit SNARGs also suffice for realizing a form of witness encryption. The latter result highlights a two-way connection between the soundness of very succinct argument systems and powerful forms of encryption
Imbalanced Cryptographic Protocols
Efficiency is paramount when designing cryptographic protocols, heavy mathematical operations often increase computation time, even for modern computers. Moreover, they produce large amounts of data that need to be sent through (often limited) network connections. Therefore, many research efforts are invested in improving efficiency, sometimes leading to imbalanced cryptographic protocols. We define three types of imbalanced protocols, computationally, communicationally, and functionally imbalanced protocols.
Computationally imbalanced cryptographic protocols appear when optimizing a protocol for one party having significantly more computing power. In communicationally imbalanced cryptographic protocols the messages mainly flow from one party to the others. Finally, in functionally imbalanced cryptographic protocols the functional requirements of one party strongly differ from the other parties.
We start our study by looking into laconic cryptography, which fits both the computational and communicational category. The emerging area of laconic cryptography involves the design of two-party protocols involving a sender and a receiver, where the receiver’s input is large. The key efficiency requirement is that the protocol communication complexity must be independent of the receiver’s input size. We show a new way to build laconic OT based on the new notion of Set Membership Encryption (SME) – a new member in the area of laconic cryptography. SME allows a sender to encrypt to one recipient from a universe of receivers, while using a small digest from a large subset of receivers. A recipient is only able to decrypt the message if and only if it is part of the large subset.
As another example of a communicationally imbalanced protocol we will look at NIZKs. We consider the problem of proving in zero-knowledge the existence of exploits in executables compiled to run on real-world processors.
Finally, we investigate the problem of constructing law enforcement access systems that mitigate the possibility of unauthorized surveillance, as a functionally imbalanced cryptographic protocol. We present two main constructions. The first construction enables prospective access, allowing surveillance only if encryption occurs after a warrant has been issued and activated. The second allows retrospective access to communications that occurred prior to a warrant’s issuance
A Protocol for Generating Random Elements with their Probabilities
We give an AM protocol that allows the verifier to sample elements x from a
probability distribution P, which is held by the prover. If the prover is
honest, the verifier outputs (x, P(x)) with probability close to P(x). In case
the prover is dishonest, one may hope for the following guarantee: if the
verifier outputs (x, p), then the probability that the verifier outputs x is
close to p. Simple examples show that this cannot be achieved. Instead, we show
that the following weaker condition holds (in a well defined sense) on average:
If (x, p) is output, then p is an upper bound on the probability that x is
output. Our protocol yields a new transformation to turn interactive proofs
where the verifier uses private random coins into proofs with public coins. The
verifier has better running time compared to the well-known Goldwasser-Sipser
transformation (STOC, 1986). For constant-round protocols, we only lose an
arbitrarily small constant in soundness and completeness, while our public-coin
verifier calls the private-coin verifier only once
- …