2,937 research outputs found
Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Quadratic Isomorphism of Polynomials: The Regular Case
Let and be
two sets of nonlinear polynomials over
( being a field). We consider the computational problem of finding
-- if any -- an invertible transformation on the variables mapping
to . The corresponding equivalence problem is known as {\tt
Isomorphism of Polynomials with one Secret} ({\tt IP1S}) and is a fundamental
problem in multivariate cryptography. The main result is a randomized
polynomial-time algorithm for solving {\tt IP1S} for quadratic instances, a
particular case of importance in cryptography and somewhat justifying {\it a
posteriori} the fact that {\it Graph Isomorphism} reduces to only cubic
instances of {\tt IP1S} (Agrawal and Saxena). To this end, we show that {\tt
IP1S} for quadratic polynomials can be reduced to a variant of the classical
module isomorphism problem in representation theory, which involves to test the
orthogonal simultaneous conjugacy of symmetric matrices. We show that we can
essentially {\it linearize} the problem by reducing quadratic-{\tt IP1S} to
test the orthogonal simultaneous similarity of symmetric matrices; this latter
problem was shown by Chistov, Ivanyos and Karpinski to be equivalent to finding
an invertible matrix in the linear space of matrices over and to compute the square root in a matrix
algebra. While computing square roots of matrices can be done efficiently using
numerical methods, it seems difficult to control the bit complexity of such
methods. However, we present exact and polynomial-time algorithms for computing
the square root in for various fields (including
finite fields). We then consider \\#{\tt IP1S}, the counting version of {\tt
IP1S} for quadratic instances. In particular, we provide a (complete)
characterization of the automorphism group of homogeneous quadratic
polynomials. Finally, we also consider the more general {\it Isomorphism of
Polynomials} ({\tt IP}) problem where we allow an invertible linear
transformation on the variables \emph{and} on the set of polynomials. A
randomized polynomial-time algorithm for solving {\tt IP} when
is presented. From an algorithmic point
of view, the problem boils down to factoring the determinant of a linear matrix
(\emph{i.e.}\ a matrix whose components are linear polynomials). This extends
to {\tt IP} a result of Kayal obtained for {\tt PolyProj}.Comment: Published in Journal of Complexity, Elsevier, 2015, pp.3
Fast Quantum Algorithm for Solving Multivariate Quadratic Equations
In August 2015 the cryptographic world was shaken by a sudden and surprising
announcement by the US National Security Agency NSA concerning plans to
transition to post-quantum algorithms. Since this announcement post-quantum
cryptography has become a topic of primary interest for several standardization
bodies. The transition from the currently deployed public-key algorithms to
post-quantum algorithms has been found to be challenging in many aspects. In
particular the problem of evaluating the quantum-bit security of such
post-quantum cryptosystems remains vastly open. Of course this question is of
primarily concern in the process of standardizing the post-quantum
cryptosystems. In this paper we consider the quantum security of the problem of
solving a system of {\it Boolean multivariate quadratic equations in
variables} (\MQb); a central problem in post-quantum cryptography. When ,
under a natural algebraic assumption, we present a Las-Vegas quantum algorithm
solving \MQb{} that requires the evaluation of, on average,
quantum gates. To our knowledge this is the fastest algorithm for solving
\MQb{}
The ElGamal cryptosystem over circulant matrices
In this paper we study extensively the discrete logarithm problem in the
group of non-singular circulant matrices. The emphasis of this study was to
find the exact parameters for the group of circulant matrices for a secure
implementation. We tabulate these parameters. We also compare the discrete
logarithm problem in the group of circulant matrices with the discrete
logarithm problem in finite fields and with the discrete logarithm problem in
the group of rational points of an elliptic curve
Hankel Rhotrices and Constructions of Maximum Distance Separable Rhotrices over Finite Fields
Many block ciphers in cryptography use Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) matrices to strengthen the diffusion layer. Rhotrices are represented by coupled matrices. Therefore, use of rhotrices in the cryptographic ciphers doubled the security of the cryptosystem. We define Hankel rhotrix and further construct the maximum distance separable rhotrices over finite fields
Polynomial-Time Key Recovery Attack on the Faure-Loidreau Scheme based on Gabidulin Codes
Encryption schemes based on the rank metric lead to small public key sizes of
order of few thousands bytes which represents a very attractive feature
compared to Hamming metric-based encryption schemes where public key sizes are
of order of hundreds of thousands bytes even with additional structures like
the cyclicity. The main tool for building public key encryption schemes in rank
metric is the McEliece encryption setting used with the family of Gabidulin
codes. Since the original scheme proposed in 1991 by Gabidulin, Paramonov and
Tretjakov, many systems have been proposed based on different masking
techniques for Gabidulin codes. Nevertheless, over the years all these systems
were attacked essentially by the use of an attack proposed by Overbeck.
In 2005 Faure and Loidreau designed a rank-metric encryption scheme which was
not in the McEliece setting. The scheme is very efficient, with small public
keys of size a few kiloBytes and with security closely related to the
linearized polynomial reconstruction problem which corresponds to the decoding
problem of Gabidulin codes. The structure of the scheme differs considerably
from the classical McEliece setting and until our work, the scheme had never
been attacked. We show in this article that this scheme like other schemes
based on Gabidulin codes, is also vulnerable to a polynomial-time attack that
recovers the private key by applying Overbeck's attack on an appropriate public
code. As an example we break concrete proposed bits security parameters in
a few seconds.Comment: To appear in Designs, Codes and Cryptography Journa
Discrete logarithms in curves over finite fields
A survey on algorithms for computing discrete logarithms in Jacobians of
curves over finite fields
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