Understanding and Enforcing Opacity

Abstract—This paper puts a spotlight on the specification and enforcement of opacity, a security policy for protecting sensitive properties of system behavior. We illustrate the fine granularity of the opacity policy by location privacy and privacy-preserving aggregation scenarios. We present a frame-work for opacity and explore its key differences and formal connections with such well-known information-flow models as noninterference, knowledge-based security, and declassifica-tion. Our results are machine-checked and parameterized in the observational power of the attacker, including progress-insensitive, progress-sensitive, and timing-sensitive attackers. We present two approaches to enforcing opacity: a whitebox monitor and a blackbox sampling-based enforcement. We report on experiments with prototypes that utilize state-of-the-art Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers and the random testing tool QuickCheck to establish opacity for the location and aggregation-based scenarios. I

Specification and Analysis of Information Flow Properties for Distributed Systems

We present a framework for the speci?cation and the analysis of infor- mation ?ow properties in partially speci?ed distributed systems, i.e., sys- tems in which there are several unspeci?ed components located in di?erent places. First we consider the notion of Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC for short) originally proposed for nondeterministic systems and based on trace semantics. We study how this information ?ow property can be extended in order to deal also with distributed partially speci?ed systems. In particular, we develop two di?erent approaches: the cen- tralized NDC (CNDC) and the decentralized NDC (DNDC). According to the former, there is just one unspeci?ed global component that has complete control of the n distributed locations where interaction occurs between the system and the unspeci?ed component. According to DNDC, there is one unspeci?ed component for each distributed location, and the n unspeci?ed components are completely independent, i.e., they cannot coordinate their e?orts or cooperate. Surprisingly enough, we prove that centralized NDC is as discriminating as decentralized NDC. However, when we move to Bisimulation-based Non-Deducibility on Composition, BNDC for short, the situation is completely di?erent. We prove that centralized BNDC (CBNDC for short) is strictly ?ner than decentralizedBNDC (DBNDC for short), hence proving the quite expected fact that a system that can resist to coordinated attacks is also able to resist to simpler attacks performed by independent entities. Hence, by exploiting a variant of the modal ?-calculus that permits to manage tuples of ac- tions, we present a method to analyze when a system is CBNDC and/or DBNDC, that is based on the theory of decomposition of formulas and compositional analysis

Flexible Information-Flow Control

As more and more sensitive data is handled by software, its trustworthinessbecomes an increasingly important concern. This thesis presents work on ensuringthat information processed by computing systems is not disclosed to thirdparties without the user\u27s permission; i.e. to prevent unwanted flows ofinformation. While this problem is widely studied, proposed rigorousinformation-flow control approaches that enforce strong securityproperties like noninterference have yet to see widespread practical use.Conversely, lightweight techniques such as taint tracking are more prevalent inpractice, but lack formal underpinnings, making it unclear what guarantees theyprovide.This thesis aims to shrink the gap between heavyweight information-flow controlapproaches that have been proven sound and lightweight practical techniqueswithout formal guarantees such as taint tracking. This thesis attempts toreconcile these areas by (a) providing formal foundations to taint trackingapproaches, (b) extending information-flow control techniques to more realisticlanguages and settings, and (c) exploring security policies and mechanisms thatfall in between information-flow control and taint tracking and investigating whattrade-offs they incur