Optimal preventive strike strategy vs. optimal attack strategy in a defense-attack game

This paper analyzes an attack-defense game between one defender and one attacker. Among, the defender moves first and allocates its resources to three different methods: employing a preventive strike, founding false targets, and protecting its genuine object. The preventive strike may expose the genuine object, and different from previous literature, a false target may also be detected to be false. The attacker, observing the actions taken by the defender and allocating its resources to three methods: protecting its own base from the preventive strike, founding false bases, and attacking the defender's genuine object. Similarly, a false base may be correctly identified. Different from previous methods in evaluating the potential outcome, for each of the defender's given strategies, the attacker tries to maximize its cumulative prospect value considering different possible outcomes. Similarly, the defender maximizes its cumulative prospect value, assuming that the attacker chooses the strategy to maximize the attacker's cumulative prospect value. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate the optimal number of bases to attack by preventive strike, and the optimal number of targets to attack by attacker

Schelling, von Neumann, and the Event that Didn’t Occur

Thomas Schelling was recognized by the Nobel Prize committee as a pioneer in the application of game theory and rational choice analysis to problems of politics and international relations. However, although he makes frequent references in his writings to this approach, his main explorations and insights depend upon and require acknowledgment of its limitations. One of his principal concerns was how a country could engage in successful deterrence. If the behavioral assumptions that commonly underpin game theory are taken seriously and applied consistently, however, nuclear adversaries are almost certain to engage in devastating conflict, as John von Neumann forcefully asserted. The history of the last half century falsified von Neumann’s prediction, and the “event that didn’t occur” formed the subject of Schelling’s Nobel lecture. The answer to the question “why?” is the central concern of this paper

Risk-attitude-based defense strategy considering proactive strike, preventive strike and imperfect false targets

This paper analyzes the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in an attack–defense game, considering the risk attitudes of both parties. The defender moves first, allocating its limited resources to three different measures: launching a proactive strike or preventive strike, building false targets, and protecting its genuine object. It is assumed that (a) launching a proactive strike has limited effectiveness on its rival and does not expose the genuine object itself, (b) a false target might be correctly identified as false, and (c) launching a preventive strike consumes less resources than a proactive strike and might expose the genuine object. The attacker moves after observing the defender's movements, allocating its limited resources to three measures: protecting its own base from a proactive strike or preventive strike, building false bases, and attacking the defender's genuine object. For each of the defender's given strategies, the attacker chooses the attack strategy that maximizes its cumulative prospect value, which accounts for the players’ risk attitudes. Similarly, the defender maximizes its cumulative prospect value by anticipating that the attacker will always choose the strategy combination that maximizes its own cumulative prospect value. Backward induction is used to obtain the optimal defense, attack strategies, and their corresponding cumulative prospect values. Our results show that the introduction of risk attitudes leads the game to a lose-lose situation under some circumstances and benefits one party in other cases

The Moral Reality of War: Defensive Force and Just War Theory

The permissible use of defensive force is a central tenet of the traditional legal and philosophical justification for war and its practice. Just War Theory holds a nation’s right to resist aggressive attack with defensive force as the clearest example of a just cause for war. Just War Theory also stipulates norms for warfare derived from a conception of defensive force asserted to be consistent with the moral reality of war. Recently, these aspects of Just War Theory have been criticized. David Rodin has challenged the status of national defense as an uncontroversial just cause. Jeff McMahan has charged that Just War Theory’s norms that govern warfare are inconsistent with the norms of permissive defensive force. In this thesis I defend the status of national defense as a clear case of a just cause. However, my defense may require revision of Just War Theory’s norms that govern warfare

THE FAILED APPLICATION OF JUST WAR DOCTRINE TO CYBERWARFARE

Just War Theory has not followed with the most recent evolution of warfare. The last iteration of Just War Theory was created by Michael Walzer following the evolution of the tools of war in World War II. The current status of jus ad bellum and jus in bello are only applicable to conventional warfare, as this paper will show. Many current problems exist when attempting to analyze cyber attacks including the necessity of a proper definition, the determination of use of force, and how cyber attacks can be addressed in the future. These problems must be addressed so states can properly decide on how to make policies in relation to cyber attacks

Optimal defence-attack strategies between one defender and two attackers

This paper analyses the optimal strategies for one defender and two attackers in a defence-attack game, where a) the defender allocates its resource into defending against and attacking the two attackers, and b) the two attackers, after observing the action of the defender, allocate their resources into attacking and defending against the defender, on either a cooperative or non-cooperative basis. On a cooperative basis, for each of the defender’s given strategies, the two attackers work together to maximise the sum of their cumulative prospect values while anticipating the eight possible game outcomes. On a non-cooperative basis, for each of the defender’s given strategies, each attacker simultaneously yet independently tries to maximise their own cumulative prospect value. In both cases, the defender maximises its cumulative prospect value while anticipating the attackers’ actions. Backward induction is employed to obtain the optimal defence and attack strategies for all scenarios. Numerical examples are performed to illustrate the applications of the strategies. In general, we find two opposing effects considering the attackers’ strategies and analyse the alteration of strategies for the participants under two different risk preferences: risk-averse and risk seeking. The reasons for the alteration are also performed to illustrate the practical applications

A Safe Culture for Neuroscience

When examining the future impact of neuroscience on the law, the first step requires narrowing the scope of the inquiry: advances in neuroscience are exciting, but the beneficial or harmful effects of those advances will depend on the specific culture in which they occur. In some cultures—such as in Norway or Sweden—integrating advances in neuroscience into the criminal justice system is likely to enhance understanding and improve the treatment of offenders and potential offenders. In the neoliberal culture of the United States, advances are more likely to exacerbate the profound wrongs of the criminal justice system rather than ameliorate them. The important question for neoliberal cultures is whether advances in neuroscience might contribute to the reform of those cultures. While neuroscience can contribute to that goal, there is a danger that neuroscience advances might encourage the radical individualist orientation of neoliberalism and revive a “nothing works” attitude toward rehabilitation. The benefits of neuroscience are more likely to emerge when the worst elements of neoliberal culture have been reformed

Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space

Explores what countermeasures China and Russia are likely to take if the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, and what the broader implications for international security will be