Homo Socionicus: a Case Study of Simulation Models of Norms

This paper describes a survey of normative agent-based social simulation models. These models are examined from the perspective of the foundations of social theory. Agent-based modelling contributes to the research program of methodological individualism. Norms are a central concept in the role theoretic concept of action in the tradition of Durkheim and Parsons. This paper investigates to what extend normative agent-based models are able to capture the role theoretic concept of norms. Three methodological core problems are identified: the question of norm transmission, normative transformation of agents and what kind of analysis the models contribute. It can be shown that initially the models appeared only to address some of these problems rather than all of them simultaneously. More recent developments, however, show progress in that direction. However, the degree of resolution of intra agent processes remains too low for a comprehensive understanding of normative behaviour regulation.Norms, Normative Agent-Based Social Simulation, Role Theory, Methodological Individualism

The Current State of Normative Agent-Based Systems

Recent years have seen an increase in the application of ideas from the social sciences to computational systems. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the domain of multiagent systems. Because multiagent systems are composed of multiple individual agents interacting with each other many parallels can be drawn to human and animal societies. One of the main challenges currently faced in multiagent systems research is that of social control. In particular, how can open multiagent systems be configured and organized given their constantly changing structure? One leading solution is to employ the use of social norms. In human societies, social norms are essential to regulation, coordination, and cooperation. The current trend of thinking is that these same principles can be applied to agent societies, of which multiagent systems are one type. In this article, we provide an introduction to and present a holistic viewpoint of the state of normative computing (computational solutions that employ ideas based on social norms.) To accomplish this, we (1) introduce social norms and their application to agent-based systems; (2) identify and describe a normative process abstracted from the existing research; and (3) discuss future directions for research in normative multiagent computing. The intent of this paper is to introduce new researchers to the ideas that underlie normative computing and survey the existing state of the art, as well as provide direction for future research.Norms, Normative Agents, Agents, Agent-Based System, Agent-Based Simulation, Agent-Based Modeling

Adaptive deterrence sanctions in a normative framework

Normative environments are used to regulate multi-agent interactions. In business encounters, agents representing business entities make contracts including norms that prescribe what agents should do. Agent autonomy, however, gives agents the ability to decide whether they fulfill or violate their commitments. In this paper we present an adaptive mechanism that enables a normative framework to change deterrence sanctions according to an agent population, in order to preclude agents from exploiting potential normative flaws. The system tries to avoid institutional control beyond what is strictly necessary, seeking to maximize agent contracting activity while ensuring a certain commitment compliance level, when agents have unknown risk and social attitudes

The distribution of oportunities: a normative theory

In this paper, we consider the problem of ranking protiles of opportunity sets. First, we take each agent's preferences over (individual) opportunity sets as given. Then, rather than discriminate among possibly competing evaluative criteria, we consider minimal standards for any such ranking. We impose four normative principies, in each case limiting the conditions under which ethical conclusions might be drawn to only those cases that are unambiguous. The first three principles are subrestrictions of the Pareto criterion; they require that Pareto improvements unambiguously enhance social welfare only when they do not conflict with other social objectives. The fourth principle is a minimal equity condition. It requires that if an agent can be identified as being the worst-off, then a necessary condition for social welfare to unambiguously increase when sorne agents gain is that this agent gains as well, however slightly. We then study the properties of social optima under these restrictions. We show that while optima need not be Pareto efficient, they must be envy-free. Thus, accepting these principies requires commitment to a world in which no agent envies the opportunities available to another

Obligation Norm Identification in Agent Societies

Most works on norms have investigated how norms are regulated using institutional mechanisms. Very few works have focused on how an agent may infer the norms of a society without the norm being explicitly given to the agent. This paper describes a mechanism for identifying one type of norm, an obligation norm. The Obligation Norm Inference (ONI) algorithm described in this paper makes use of an association rule mining approach to identify obligation norms. Using agent based simulation of a virtual restaurant we demonstrate how an agent can identify the tipping norm. The experiments that we have conducted demonstrate that an agent in the system is able to add, remove and modify norms dynamically. An agent can also flexibly modify the parameters of the system based on whether it is successful in identifying a norm.Norms, Social Norms, Obligations, Norm Identification, Agent-Based Simulation, Simulation of Norms, Artificial Societies, Normative Multi-Agent Systems (NorMAS)

Trading Off Generations: Infinitely Lived Agent Versus OLG

The prevailing literature discusses intergenerational trade-offs in climate change predominantly in terms of the Ramsey equation relying on the infinitely lived agent model. We discuss these trade-offs in a continuous time OLG framework and relate our results to the infinitely lived agent setting. We identify three shortcomings of the latter: First, underlying normative assumptions about social preferences cannot be deduced unambiguously. Second, the distribution among generations living at the same time cannot be captured. Third, the optimal solution may not be implementable in overlapping generations market economies.climate change, discounting, infinitely lived agents, intergenerational equity, overlapping generations, time preference

The distribution of oportunities: a normative theory.

In this paper, we consider the problem of ranking protiles of opportunity sets. First, we take each agent's preferences over (individual) opportunity sets as given. Then, rather than discriminate among possibly competing evaluative criteria, we consider minimal standards for any such ranking. We impose four normative principies, in each case limiting the conditions under which ethical conclusions might be drawn to only those cases that are unambiguous. The first three principles are subrestrictions of the Pareto criterion; they require that Pareto improvements unambiguously enhance social welfare only when they do not conflict with other social objectives. The fourth principle is a minimal equity condition. It requires that if an agent can be identified as being the worst-off, then a necessary condition for social welfare to unambiguously increase when sorne agents gain is that this agent gains as well, however slightly. We then study the properties of social optima under these restrictions. We show that while optima need not be Pareto efficient, they must be envy-free. Thus, accepting these principies requires commitment to a world in which no agent envies the opportunities available to another.

Normative Multi-Agent Organizations: Modeling, Support and Control, Draft Version

http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/902/pdf/07122.BoissierOlivier.Paper.902.pdfInternational audienceIn the last years, social and organizational aspects of agency have become a major issue in multi-agent systems' research. Recent applications of MAS enforce the need of using these aspects in order to ensure some social order within these systems. Tools to control and regulate the overall functioning of the system are needed in order to enforce global laws on the autonomous agents operating in it. This paper presents a normative organization system composed of a normative organization modeling language MOISEInst used to define the normative organization of a MAS, accompanied with SYNAI, a normative organization implementation architecture which is itself regulated with an explicit normative organization specification

Trading Off Generations: Infinitely-Lived Agent Versus OLG

The prevailing literature discusses intergenerational trade-offs predominantly in infinitely-lived agent models despite the finite lifetime of individuals. We discuss these trade-offs in a continuous time OLG framework and relate the results to the infinitely-lived agent setting. We identify three shortcomings of the latter: First, underlying normative assumptions about social preferences cannot be deduced unambiguously. Second, the distribution among generations living at the same time cannot be captured. Third, the optimal solution may not be implementable in overlapping generations market economies. Regarding the recent debate on climate change, we conclude that it is indispensable to explicitly consider the generations' life cycles.climate change; discounting; infinitely-lived agents; intergenerational equity; overlapping generations; time preference