Logical Omnipotence and Two notions of Implicit Belief

The most widespread models of rational reasoners (the model based on modal epistemic logic and the model based on probability theory) exhibit the problem of logical omniscience. The most common strategy for avoiding this problem is to interpret the models as describing the explicit beliefs of an ideal reasoner, but only the implicit beliefs of a real reasoner. I argue that this strategy faces serious normative issues. In this paper, I present the more fundamental problem of logical omnipotence, which highlights the normative content of the problem of logical omniscience. I introduce two developments of the notion of implicit belief (accessible and stable belief ) and use them in two versions of the most common strategy applied to the problem of logical omnipotence

Choosing Your Nonmonotonic Logic: A Shopper’s Guide

The paper presents an exhaustive menu of nonmonotonic logics. The options are individuated in terms of the principles they reject. I locate, e.g., cumulative logics and relevance logics on this menu. I highlight some frequently neglected options, and I argue that these neglected options are particularly attractive for inferentialists

El sistema de Poole: un estudio formal

Con el auge de la Inteligencia Artificial comenzaron a proliferar, a partir de la década de los 80, sistemas cuyo objetivo es reconstruir formalmente el razonamiento revocable. Los sistemas de Poole y Reiter se inscriben en esta vertiente. El estudio metateórico de los sistemas para razonamiento revocable condujo a Gabbay, Makinson y otros a definir propiedades debilitadas como la monotonía cauta, la monotonía racional, etc.: propiedades positivas mínimas esperables en sistemas no-monótonos. En el presente trabajo proponemos algunas definiciones alternativas y ofrecemos pruebas que evidencian ventajas comparativas del sistema de Poole