On the Computational Complexity of Non-dictatorial Aggregation

We investigate when non-dictatorial aggregation is possible from an algorithmic perspective, where non-dictatorial aggregation means that the votes cast by the members of a society can be aggregated in such a way that the collective outcome is not simply the choices made by a single member of the society. We consider the setting in which the members of a society take a position on a fixed collection of issues, where for each issue several different alternatives are possible, but the combination of choices must belong to a given set $X$ of allowable voting patterns. Such a set $X$ is called a possibility domain if there is an aggregator that is non-dictatorial, operates separately on each issue, and returns values among those cast by the society on each issue. We design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides, given a set $X$ of voting patterns, whether or not $X$ is a possibility domain. Furthermore, if $X$ is a possibility domain, then the algorithm constructs in polynomial time such a non-dictatorial aggregator for $X$. We then show that the question of whether a Boolean domain $X$ is a possibility domain is in NLOGSPACE. We also design a polynomial-time algorithm that decides whether $X$ is a uniform possibility domain, that is, whether $X$ admits an aggregator that is non-dictatorial even when restricted to any two positions for each issue. As in the case of possibility domains, the algorithm also constructs in polynomial time a uniform non-dictatorial aggregator, if one exists. Then, we turn our attention to the case where $X$ is given implicitly, either as the set of assignments satisfying a propositional formula, or as a set of consistent evaluations of an sequence of propositional formulas. In both cases, we provide bounds to the complexity of deciding if $X$ is a (uniform) possibility domain.Comment: 21 page

Aggregation of Votes with Multiple Positions on Each Issue

We consider the problem of aggregating votes cast by a society on a fixed set of issues, where each member of the society may vote for one of several positions on each issue, but the combination of votes on the various issues is restricted to a set of feasible voting patterns. We require the aggregation to be supportive, i.e. for every issue $j$ the corresponding component $f_j$ of every aggregator on every issue should satisfy $f_j(x_1, ,\ldots, x_n) \in \{x_1, ,\ldots, x_n\}$. We prove that, in such a set-up, non-dictatorial aggregation of votes in a society of some size is possible if and only if either non-dictatorial aggregation is possible in a society of only two members or a ternary aggregator exists that either on every issue $j$ is a majority operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies $f_j(x,x,y) = f_j(x,y,x) = f_j(y,x,x) =x, \forall x,y$, or on every issue is a minority operation, i.e. the corresponding component satisfies $f_j(x,x,y) = f_j(x,y,x) = f_j(y,x,x) =y, \forall x,y.$ We then introduce a notion of uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator, which is defined to be an aggregator that on every issue, and when restricted to an arbitrary two-element subset of the votes for that issue, differs from all projection functions. We first give a characterization of sets of feasible voting patterns that admit a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator. Then making use of Bulatov's dichotomy theorem for conservative constraint satisfaction problems, we connect social choice theory with combinatorial complexity by proving that if a set of feasible voting patterns $X$ has a uniformly non-dictatorial aggregator of some arity then the multi-sorted conservative constraint satisfaction problem on $X$, in the sense introduced by Bulatov and Jeavons, with each issue representing a sort, is tractable; otherwise it is NP-complete

The Complexity of Surjective Homomorphism Problems -- a Survey

We survey known results about the complexity of surjective homomorphism problems, studied in the context of related problems in the literature such as list homomorphism, retraction and compaction. In comparison with these problems, surjective homomorphism problems seem to be harder to classify and we examine especially three concrete problems that have arisen from the literature, two of which remain of open complexity

Improved Parameterized Algorithms for Constraint Satisfaction

For many constraint satisfaction problems, the algorithm which chooses a random assignment achieves the best possible approximation ratio. For instance, a simple random assignment for {\sc Max-E3-Sat} allows 7/8-approximation and for every \eps >0 there is no polynomial-time (7/8+\eps)-approximation unless P=NP. Another example is the {\sc Permutation CSP} of bounded arity. Given the expected fraction $\rho$ of the constraints satisfied by a random assignment (i.e. permutation), there is no (\rho+\eps)-approximation algorithm for every \eps >0, assuming the Unique Games Conjecture (UGC). In this work, we consider the following parameterization of constraint satisfaction problems. Given a set of $m$ constraints of constant arity, can we satisfy at least $\rho m +k$ constraint, where $\rho$ is the expected fraction of constraints satisfied by a random assignment? {\sc Constraint Satisfaction Problems above Average} have been posed in different forms in the literature \cite{Niedermeier2006,MahajanRamanSikdar09}. We present a faster parameterized algorithm for deciding whether $m/2+k/2$ equations can be simultaneously satisfied over ${\mathbb F}_2$. As a consequence, we obtain $O(k)$-variable bikernels for {\sc boolean CSPs} of arity $c$ for every fixed $c$, and for {\sc permutation CSPs} of arity 3. This implies linear bikernels for many problems under the "above average" parameterization, such as {\sc Max-$c$-Sat}, {\sc Set-Splitting}, {\sc Betweenness} and {\sc Max Acyclic Subgraph}. As a result, all the parameterized problems we consider in this paper admit $2^{O(k)}$-time algorithms. We also obtain non-trivial hybrid algorithms for every Max $c$-CSP: for every instance $I$, we can either approximate $I$ beyond the random assignment threshold in polynomial time, or we can find an optimal solution to $I$ in subexponential time.Comment: A preliminary version of this paper has been accepted for IPEC 201

Rainbow Coloring Hardness via Low Sensitivity Polymorphisms

A k-uniform hypergraph is said to be r-rainbow colorable if there is an r-coloring of its vertices such that every hyperedge intersects all r color classes. Given as input such a hypergraph, finding a r-rainbow coloring of it is NP-hard for all k >= 3 and r >= 2. Therefore, one settles for finding a rainbow coloring with fewer colors (which is an easier task). When r=k (the maximum possible value), i.e., the hypergraph is k-partite, one can efficiently 2-rainbow color the hypergraph, i.e., 2-color its vertices so that there are no monochromatic edges. In this work we consider the next smaller value of r=k-1, and prove that in this case it is NP-hard to rainbow color the hypergraph with q := ceil[(k-2)/2] colors. In particular, for k <=6, it is NP-hard to 2-color (k-1)-rainbow colorable k-uniform hypergraphs. Our proof follows the algebraic approach to promise constraint satisfaction problems. It proceeds by characterizing the polymorphisms associated with the approximate rainbow coloring problem, which are rainbow colorings of some product hypergraphs on vertex set [r]^n. We prove that any such polymorphism f: [r]^n -> [q] must be C-fixing, i.e., there is a small subset S of C coordinates and a setting a in [q]^S such that fixing x_{|S} = a determines the value of f(x). The key step in our proof is bounding the sensitivity of certain rainbow colorings, thereby arguing that they must be juntas. Armed with the C-fixing characterization, our NP-hardness is obtained via a reduction from smooth Label Cover