Non-primitive Recursive Function Definitions

This paper presents an approach to the problem of introducingnon-primitive recursive function definitions in higher order logic. Arecursive specification is translated into a domain theory version, wherethe recursive calls are treated as potentially non-terminating. Once wehave proved termination, the original specification can be derived easily.A collection of algorithms are presented which hide the domain theoryfrom a user. Hence, the derivation of a domain theory specificationhas been automated completely, and for well-founded recursive functionspecifications the process of deriving the original specification from thedomain theory one has been automated as well, though a user mustsupply a well-founded relation and prove certain termination propertiesof the specification. There are constructions for building well-foundedrelations easily

Sub-computable Boundedness Randomness

This paper defines a new notion of bounded computable randomness for certain classes of sub-computable functions which lack a universal machine. In particular, we define such versions of randomness for primitive recursive functions and for PSPACE functions. These new notions are robust in that there are equivalent formulations in terms of (1) Martin-L\"of tests, (2) Kolmogorov complexity, and (3) martingales. We show these notions can be equivalently defined with prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity. We prove that one direction of van Lambalgen's theorem holds for relative computability, but the other direction fails. We discuss statistical properties of these notions of randomness

Do Goedel's incompleteness theorems set absolute limits on the ability of the brain to express and communicate mental concepts verifiably?

Classical interpretations of Goedel's formal reasoning imply that the truth of some arithmetical propositions of any formal mathematical language, under any interpretation, is essentially unverifiable. However, a language of general, scientific, discourse cannot allow its mathematical propositions to be interpreted ambiguously. Such a language must, therefore, define mathematical truth verifiably. We consider a constructive interpretation of classical, Tarskian, truth, and of Goedel's reasoning, under which any formal system of Peano Arithmetic is verifiably complete. We show how some paradoxical concepts of Quantum mechanics can be expressed, and interpreted, naturally under a constructive definition of mathematical truth.Comment: 73 pages; this is an updated version of the NQ essay; an HTML version is available at http://alixcomsi.com/Do_Goedel_incompleteness_theorems.ht

Data Definitions in the ACL2 Sedan

We present a data definition framework that enables the convenient specification of data types in ACL2s, the ACL2 Sedan. Our primary motivation for developing the data definition framework was pedagogical. We were teaching undergraduate students how to reason about programs using ACL2s and wanted to provide them with an effective method for defining, testing, and reasoning about data types in the context of an untyped theorem prover. Our framework is now routinely used not only for pedagogical purposes, but also by advanced users. Our framework concisely supports common data definition patterns, e.g. list types, map types, and record types. It also provides support for polymorphic functions. A distinguishing feature of our approach is that we maintain both a predicative and an enumerative characterization of data definitions. In this paper we present our data definition framework via a sequence of examples. We give a complete characterization in terms of tau rules of the inclusion/exclusion relations a data definition induces, under suitable restrictions. The data definition framework is a key component of counterexample generation support in ACL2s, but can be independently used in ACL2, and is available as a community book.Comment: In Proceedings ACL2 2014, arXiv:1406.123

Wittgenstein on Pseudo-Irrationals, Diagonal Numbers and Decidability

In his early philosophy as well as in his middle period, Wittgenstein holds a purely syntactic view of logic and mathematics. However, his syntactic foundation of logic and mathematics is opposed to the axiomatic approach of modern mathematical logic. The object of Wittgenstein’s approach is not the representation of mathematical properties within a logical axiomatic system, but their representation by a symbolism that identifies the properties in question by its syntactic features. It rests on his distinction of descriptions and operations; its aim is to reduce mathematics to operations. This paper illustrates Wittgenstein’s approach by examining his discussion of irrational numbers