Non-blind watermarking of network flows

Linking network flows is an important problem in intrusion detection as well as anonymity. Passive traffic analysis can link flows but requires long periods of observation to reduce errors. Active traffic analysis, also known as flow watermarking, allows for better precision and is more scalable. Previous flow watermarks introduce significant delays to the traffic flow as a side effect of using a blind detection scheme; this enables attacks that detect and remove the watermark, while at the same time slowing down legitimate traffic. We propose the first non-blind approach for flow watermarking, called RAINBOW, that improves watermark invisibility by inserting delays hundreds of times smaller than previous blind watermarks, hence reduces the watermark interference on network flows. We derive and analyze the optimum detectors for RAINBOW as well as the passive traffic analysis under different traffic models by using hypothesis testing. Comparing the detection performance of RAINBOW and the passive approach we observe that both RAINBOW and passive traffic analysis perform similarly good in the case of uncorrelated traffic, however, the RAINBOW detector drastically outperforms the optimum passive detector in the case of correlated network flows. This justifies the use of non-blind watermarks over passive traffic analysis even though both approaches have similar scalability constraints. We confirm our analysis by simulating the detectors and testing them against large traces of real network flows

Towards Provably Invisible Network Flow Fingerprints

Network traffic analysis reveals important information even when messages are encrypted. We consider active traffic analysis via flow fingerprinting by invisibly embedding information into packet timings of flows. In particular, assume Alice wishes to embed fingerprints into flows of a set of network input links, whose packet timings are modeled by Poisson processes, without being detected by a watchful adversary Willie. Bob, who receives the set of fingerprinted flows after they pass through the network modeled as a collection of independent and parallel $M/M/1$ queues, wishes to extract Alice's embedded fingerprints to infer the connection between input and output links of the network. We consider two scenarios: 1) Alice embeds fingerprints in all of the flows; 2) Alice embeds fingerprints in each flow independently with probability $p$. Assuming that the flow rates are equal, we calculate the maximum number of flows in which Alice can invisibly embed fingerprints while having those fingerprints successfully decoded by Bob. Then, we extend the construction and analysis to the case where flow rates are distinct, and discuss the extension of the network model

Steganography: a Class of Algorithms having Secure Properties

Chaos-based approaches are frequently proposed in information hiding, but without obvious justification. Indeed, the reason why chaos is useful to tackle with discretion, robustness, or security, is rarely elucidated. This research work presents a new class of non-blind information hidingalgorithms based on some finite domains iterations that are Devaney's topologically chaotic. The approach is entirely formalized and reasons to take place into the mathematical theory of chaos are explained. Finally, stego-security and chaos security are consequently proven for a large class of algorithms.Comment: 4 pages, published in Seventh International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, IIH-MSP 2011, Dalian, China, October 14-16, 201

Steganography: a class of secure and robust algorithms

This research work presents a new class of non-blind information hiding algorithms that are stego-secure and robust. They are based on some finite domains iterations having the Devaney's topological chaos property. Thanks to a complete formalization of the approach we prove security against watermark-only attacks of a large class of steganographic algorithms. Finally a complete study of robustness is given in frequency DWT and DCT domains.Comment: Published in The Computer Journal special issue about steganograph

DeMarking: A Defense for Network Flow Watermarking in Real-Time

The network flow watermarking technique associates the two communicating parties by actively modifying certain characteristics of the stream generated by the sender so that it covertly carries some special marking information. Some curious users communicating with the hidden server as a Tor client may attempt de-anonymization attacks to uncover the real identity of the hidden server by using this technique. This compromises the privacy of the anonymized communication system. Therefore, we propose a defense scheme against flow watermarking. The scheme is based on deep neural networks and utilizes generative adversarial networks to convert the original Inter-Packet Delays (IPD) into new IPDs generated by the model. We also adopt the concept of adversarial attacks to ensure that the detector will produce an incorrect classification when detecting these new IPDs. This approach ensures that these IPDs are considered "clean", effectively covering the potential watermarks. This scheme is effective against time-based flow watermarking techniques