Distinguishing personal belief from scientific knowledge for the betterment of killer whale welfare – a commentary

We contest publication of Marino et al. regarding captive killer whale (Orcinus orca) welfare because of misrepresentations of available data and the use of citations that do not support assertions. Marino et al. misrepresent stress response concepts and erroneously cite studies, which appear to support Marino et al.’s philosophical beliefs regarding the cetacean hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis. To be clear, these misrepresentations are not differences of scientific opinion, as the authors’ conclusions lack any scientific basis. More extensive review of Marino et al.’s citations reveal a dearth of empirical evidence to support their assertions. Further, Marino et al.’s approach to animal welfare is not consistent with conventional veterinary approaches to animal welfare, including their apparent opposition to use of preventative and therapeutic veterinary interventions. While Marino et al. argue that killer whales’ cognitive and spatial needs preclude management of this species under human care, misrepresentation of the citations used to support this opinion invalidates their arguments. Misleading interpretations of data relative to killer whales’ cognitive and emotional needs and specious and unsubstantiated comparisons with states experienced by humans with posttraumatic stress disorder and other conditions, represent a number of strategies used to misrepresent knowledge regarding killer whale welfare. These misrepresentations and fallacies are inconsistent with scientific ethical standards for credible, peer-reviewed journals (ICMJE, 2018), and are barriers to rigorous discourse and identification of strategies for optimizing killer whale welfare. Assertions in the paper amount to nothing more than a compilation of conclusory, philosophical statements. We would also like to mention that manuscripts such as Marino et al.’s do great damage to the fields of comparative psychology and to behavioral science as a whole

Failure of the market, state and economics from the perspective of the financial crisis

The debate between the advocates of market and interventionist solutions, primarily based on pitting the market against regulation, has escalated as a result of the financial crisis. The objective of the paper is not only to analyze the advantages and drawbacks of alternative regulatory mechanisms in the light of the global economic downturn, but also to evaluate the modern economy from this perspective. The paper focuses on three hypotheses. 1. It is illegitimate to pit the market against regulation. 2. The crisis resulted from the violation of the principles of classical liberalism, which was precipitated both by inadequate policies and by modern economic methodology. 3. Critical analysis of the methodology and logic of the development of 20th century economic thought reveals the existence of a systemic failure of the dominant doctrines in mainstream economics.Spór między zwolennikami rozwiązań rynkowych i interwencjonistycznych, oparty zazwyczaj na przeciwstawianiu rynku i regulacji, uległ zaostrzeniu wskutek kryzysu finansowego. Celem artykułu jest nie tylko analiza zalet i zagrożeń alternatywnych mechanizmów regulacji z perspektywy kryzysu w gospodarce światowej, ale także próba oceny z tej perspektywy współczesnej ekonomii. Rozważania skoncentrowane są wokół trzech hipotez. Po pierwsze, błędne jest przeciwstawianie systemu rynkowego i regulacji. Po drugie, u podstaw kryzysu leży pogwałcenie zasad klasycznego liberalizmu, które ma źródła zarówno w polityce, jak i metodologii współczesnej ekonomii. Po trzecie, krytyczna analiza metodologii i logiki rozwoju myśli ekonomicznej w XX wieku może uzasadniać tezę o systematycznym błędzie doktryn, który zdominowały główny nurt ekonomii

Cognitive science and epistemic openness

Recent findings in cognitive science suggest that the epistemic subject is more complex and epistemically porous than is generally pictured. Human knowers are open to the world via multiple channels, each operating for particular purposes and according to its own logic. These findings need to be understood and addressed by the philosophical community. The current essay argues that one consequence of the new findings is to invalidate certain arguments for epistemic anti-realism

Unawareness, Beliefs, and Speculative Trade

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized "No-speculative-trade" theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we prove a generalization of the "No-agreeing-to-disagree" theorem. Finally, we show the existence of a universal unawareness belief type space.Unawareness, awareness, common prior, agreement, speculative trade, universal type-space, interactive epistemology, inattention

Unawareness, Beliefs and Speculative Trade

We define a generalized state-space model with interactive unawareness and probabilistic beliefs. Such models are desirable for potential applications of asymmetric unawareness. We compare unawareness with probability zero belief. Applying our unawareness belief structures, we show that the common prior assumption is too weak to rule out speculative trade in all states. Yet, we prove a generalized ""No-trade"" theorem according to which there can not be common certainty of strict preference to trade. Moreover, we show a generalization of the ""No-agreeing-to-disagree"" theorem.unawareness, awareness, zero probability, type-space, common prior, agreement, speculative trade, interactive epistemology

Reducing book theft at university libraries

After the local press reported how a student stole books from the University Library and sold them on the online marketplace, eBay, it became clear that hardly any research had been undertaken into book theft at university libraries. This article puts forward some valuable recommendations that could be practically implemented, mindful of the dilemma of the juxtaposed needs of social inclusion and stock security

A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results

Strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency (equilibrium) are three key modelling principles in noncooperative game theory. This paper relaxes mutual consistency to predict how players are likely to behave in in one-shot games before they can learn to equilibrate. We introduce a one-parameter cognitive hierarchy (CH) model to predict behavior in one-shot games, and initial conditions in repeated games. The CH approach assumes that players use k steps of reasoning with frequency f (k). Zero-step players randomize. Players using k (≥ 1) steps best respond given partially rational expectations about what players doing 0 through k - 1 steps actually choose. A simple axiom which expresses the intuition that steps of thinking are increasingly constrained by working memory, implies that f (k) has a Poisson distribution (characterized by a mean number of thinking steps τ ). The CH model converges to dominance-solvable equilibria when τ is large, predicts monotonic entry in binary entry games for τ < 1:25, and predicts effects of group size which are not predicted by Nash equilibrium. Best-fitting values of τ have an interquartile range of (.98,2.40) and a median of 1.65 across 80 experimental samples of matrix games, entry games, mixed-equilibrium games, and dominance-solvable p-beauty contests. The CH model also has economic value because subjects would have raised their earnings substantially if they had best-responded to model forecasts instead of making the choices they did

Expectational coordination failures and Market outcomes' volatility

The first part of this text reviews the standard economic viewpoint on expectational coordination, a viewpoint that the recent events have challenged. The second part reviews different existing directions assessments of the rational expectations hypothesis that have been made to-date. The third part shows how such a critical assessment, along the lines of the so-called "eductive" learning approach, radically modifies our view of three key problems : the economic role of speculation, the informational efficiency of markets and, last but not least, the ability of agents with long horizon to anticipate the future. The fourth part stresses what has been achieved so far well as the future challenges of the approaches advocated in this paper.expectational coordination ; rational expectations hypothesis

Weather forecast or rain-dance? On inter-war business barometers

In this paper, I use the materials of the debate on the reliability and the utility of “business barometers” of the Twenties in order to show that the theoretical reflexions of the time could be used by economic historians as a working hypothesis to analyze the influence exerted by circulating statistical data on the decisions of economic operators and institutions. I offer a short illustration of the origins and circulation of economic trends forecasting in the first decades of 20th century, paying particular attention to the critical attitude shown by Corrado Gini and Oskar Morgenstern and to the debate arisen inside the Harvard Committee for Economic Research on the inefficiency of its “index of economic conditions” during the 1929 crisis. I finally suggest that thorough research on the circulation and the influence exerted by the Harvard index on the business world, still after the slump in prices of New York Stock Exchange, could contribute to explain the behaviour of American businessmen and investors during the first Thirties, and the deepening of the crisis.Economic forecasts, 1930s crisis, US