Overview and classification of coordination contracts within forward and reverse supply chains

Among coordination mechanisms, contracts are valuable tools used in both theory and practice to coordinate various supply chains. The focus of this paper is to present an overview of contracts and a classification of coordination contracts and contracting literature in the form of classification schemes. The two criteria used for contract classification, as resulted from contracting literature, are transfer payment contractual incentives and inventory risk sharing. The overview classification of the existing literature has as criteria the level of detail used in designing the coordination models with applicability on the forward and reverse supply chains.Coordination contracts; forward supply chain; reverse supply chain

Dynamic Inventory Control with Satisfaction-Dependent Demand

In this paper, we consider the discrete multiperiod newsvendor dynamic inventory control problem where customers follow a simple satisfaction-based demand process, where their probability of demand depends on whether their demand was satised the last time they demanded a product, and observe the differences between optimal policies and myopic policies which do not directly consider how inventory policies can affect future demand. We conrm the intuitive result that inventory managers should tend to order more than the myopic policy when satised customers are more likely to demand product, and less than the myopic policy when satised customers are less likely to demand. Moreover, we and that, when choosing a fixed order policy, even an empirically myopic solution with perfect demand distribution information will move away from the optimum towards a suboptimal solution.

A maximum entropy approach to the newsvendor problem with partial information

In this paper, we consider the newsvendor model under partial information, i.e., where the demand distribution D is partly unknown. We focus on the classical case where the retailer only knows the expectation and variance of D. The standard approach is then to determine the order quantity using conservative rules such as minimax regret or Scarf's rule. We compute instead the most likely demand distribution in the sense of maximum entropy. We then compare the performance of the maximum entropy approach with minimax regret and Scarf's rule on large samples of randomly drawn demand distributions. We show that the average performance of the maximum entropy approach is considerably better than either alternative, and more surprisingly, that it is in most cases a better hedge against bad results.Newsvendor model; entropy; partial information

A review of non-cooperative newsvendor games with horizontal inventory interactions

There are numerous applications of game theory in the analysis of supply chains where multiple actors interact with each other in order to reach their own objectives. In this paper we review the use of non-cooperative game theory in inventory management within the newsvendor framework describing a single period inventory control model with the focus on horizontal interactions among multiple independent newsvendors. We develop a framework for identifying these types of horizontal interactions including, for example, the models with the possibility of inventory sharing via transshipments, and situations with substitutable products sold by multiple newsvendors. Based on this framework, we discuss and relate the results of prior research and identify future research opportunities

TECHNICAL NOTE—Robust Newsvendor Competition Under Asymmetric Information

We generalize analysis of competition among newsvendors to a setting in which competitors possess asymmetric information about future demand realizations, and this information is limited to knowledge of the support of demand distribution. In such a setting, traditional expectation-based optimization criteria are not adequate, and therefore we focus on the alternative criterion used in the robust optimization literature: the absolute regret minimization. We show existence and derive closed-form expressions for the robust optimization Nash equilibrium solution for a game with an arbitrary number of players. This solution allows us to gain insight into the nature of robust asymmetric newsvendor competition. We show that the competitive solution in the presence of information asymmetry is an intuitive extension of the robust solution for the monopolistic newsvendor problem, which allows us to distill the impact of both competition and information asymmetry. In addition, we show that, contrary to the intuition, a competing newsvendor does not necessarily benefit from having better information about its own demand distribution than its competitor has

Buyback and return policies for a book publishing firm = Egy könyvkiadó vállalat visszavásárlási stratégiája

A dolgozat célja egy vállalati gyakorlatból származó eset elemzése. Egy könyvkiadót tekintünk. A kiadó kapcsolatban van kis- és nagykereskedőkkel, valamint a fogyasztók egy csoportjával is vannak kapcsolatai. A könyvkiadók projekt rendszerben működnek. A kiadó azzal a problémával szembesül, hogy hogyan ossza el egy frissen kiadott és nyomtatott könyv példányszámait a kis- és nagykereskedők között, valamint mekkora példányszámot tároljon maga a fogyasztók közvetlen kielégítésére. A kiadóról feltételezzük, hogy visszavásárlási szerződése van a kereskedőkkel. A könyv iránti kereslet nem ismert, de becsülhető. A kis- és nagykereskedők maximalizálják a nyereségüket. = The aim of the paper is to analyze a practical real world problem. A publishing house is given. The publishing firm has contacts to a number of wholesaler / retailer enterprises and direct contact to customers to satisfy the market demand. The book publishers work in a project industry. The publisher faces with the problem how to allocate the stocks of a given, newly published book to the wholesaler and retailer, and to hold some copies to satisfy the customers direct from the publisher. The publisher has a buyback option. The distribution of the demand is unknown, but it can be estimated. The wholesaler / retailer maximize the profits. The problem can be modeled as a one-warehouse and N-retailer supply chain with not identical demand distribution. The model can be transformed in a game theory problem. It is assumed that the demand distribution follows a Poisson distribution

Behavioral analyses of retailers’ ordering decisions

The main objective I pursue in this thesis is to better understand how different factors may independently and in combination influence retailers' ordering decisions under different supply chain structures (single agent and multi agent), different demand uncertainty (deterministic and stochastic), and different interaction among retailers (no interaction, competition and cooperation). I developed three different studies where I build on different formal management model and then run multiple behavioral studies to better understand subjects’ behavior. The first study analyzes order amplification in a single-supplier single-retailer supply chain. I used a behavioral experiment to test retailers’ orders under different ordering delays and different times to build supplier’s capacity. Results provide (i) a better understanding of the endogenous dynamics leading to retailers’ ordering amplification, and (ii) a description of subjects’ biases and deviation from optimal trajectories; despite subjects have full information about the system structure. The second study analyzes how order amplification can also take place when there is fierce retailer competition and limited supplier capacity. I study how different factors (different time to build supplier capacity, different levels of competition among retailers, different magnitudes of supply shortage and different allocation mechanisms) may independently and in combination influence retailers’ order in a system with two retailers under supply competition. Results show that (i) the bullwhip effect persists even when subjects do not have incentives to deviate, (ii) subjects amplify their orders in an attempt to build an unnecessary safety stock to respond to potential deviations from the other retailers, and (iii) retailers’ underperformance varies with the allocation mechanism used by the supplier. In the last study, I analyze retailers’ orders in a system where there is uncertainty in the final customer demand. I experimentally explore the effect of transshipments among retailers in a single-supplier multi-retailer supply chain. Specifically, I explore retailers’ orders under different profit and communication conditions. In addition, I integrate analytical and behavioral models to improve supply chain performance. Results show that (i) the persistence of common biases in a newsvendor problem (pull-to-center, demand chasing, loss aversion, psychological disutility), (ii) communication could improve coordination and may reduce demand chasing behavior, (iii) supply chain performance increases with the use of behavioral strategies embedded within a traditional optimization model, and (iv) dynamic heuristics improve overall coordination, outperforming a simple Nash Equilibrium strategy

Supply chain contracting with competing regretful retailers

We study a two-tier supply chain with demand uncertainty where retailers experience regret from ex-post inventory error. With a monopolist retailer, we find that individual rationality can lead to supply chain coordination and creates non-trivial differences between regret and other reference points previously shown to be mathematically equivalent. Under competition, inventory regret can lead to either a separating or a pooling equilibrium despite the heterogeneity in their disutility from regret. The potential for a separating or pooling equilibria also differs substantially from the extant literature with implications for the wholesale price contracts and how competition dynamics impact industry service levels