18 research outputs found
On The Exact Security of Message Authentication Using Pseudorandom Functions
Traditionally, modes of Message Authentication Codes(MAC) such as Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) are instantiated using block ciphers or keyed Pseudo Random Permutations(PRP). However, one can also use domain preserving keyed Pseudo Random Functions(PRF) to instantiate MAC modes. The very first security proof of CBC-MAC [BKR00], essentially modeled the PRP as a PRF. Until now very little work has been done to investigate the difference between PRP vs PRF instantiations. Only known result is the rather loose folklore PRP-PRF transition of any PRP based security proof, which looses a factor of Ο( σ2/2n ) (domain of PRF/PRP is {0, 1}n and adversary makes σ many PRP/PRF calls in total). This loss is significant, considering the fact tight Θ( q2/2n ) security bounds have been known for PRP based EMAC and ECBC constructions (where q is the total number of adversary queries). In this work, we show for many variations of encrypted CBC MACs (i.e. EMAC, ECBC, FCBC, XCBC and TCBC), random function based instantiation has a security bound Ο( qσ/2n ). This is a significant improvement over the folklore PRP/PRF transition. We also show this bound is optimal by providing an attack against the underlying PRF based CBC construction. This shows for EMAC, ECBC and FCBC, PRP instantiations are substantially more secure than PRF instantiations. Where as, for XCBC and TMAC, PRP instantiations are at least as secure as PRF instantiations
Towards Tight Security Bounds for OMAC, XCBC and TMAC
OMAC -- a single-keyed variant of CBC-MAC by Iwata and
Kurosawa -- is a widely used and standardized (NIST FIPS 800-38B, ISO/IEC 29167-10:2017) message authentication code (MAC) algorithm. The best security bound for OMAC is due to Nandi who proved that OMAC's pseudorandom function (PRF) advantage is upper bounded by O(q^2\ell/2^n), where n, q, and \ell, denote the block size of the underlying block cipher, the number of queries, and the maximum permissible query length (in terms of n-bit blocks), respectively. In contrast, there
is no attack with matching lower bound. Indeed, the best known attack on OMAC is the folklore birthday attack achieving a lower bound of \Omega(q^2/2^n). In this work, we close this gap for a large range of message lengths. Specifically, we show that OMAC's PRF security is upper bounded by O(q^2/2^n + q\ell^2/2^n). In practical terms, this means that for a 128-bit block cipher, and message lengths up to 64 Gigabyte, OMAC
can process up to 264 messages before rekeying (same as the birthday bound). In comparison, the previous bound only allows 248 messages. As a side-effect of our proof technique, we also derive similar tight security bounds for XCBC (by Black and Rogaway) and TMAC (by Kurosawa and Iwata). As a direct consequence of this work, we have established tight security bounds (in a wide range of \ell) for all the CBC-MAC variants, except for the original CBC-MAC
MAC Constructions: Security Bounds and Distinguishing Attacks
We provide a simple and improved security analysis of PMAC, a
Parallelizable MAC (Message Authentication Code) defined over
arbitrary messages. A similar kind of result was shown by Bellare,
Pietrzak and Rogaway at Crypto 2005, where they have provided an
improved bound for CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) MAC, which was
introduced by Bellare, Killan and Rogaway at Crypto 1994. Our
analysis idea is much more simpler to understand and is borrowed
from the work by Nandi for proving Indistinguishability at
Indocrypt 2005 and work by Bernstein. It shows that the advantage
for any distinguishing attack for n-bit PMAC based on a random
function is bounded by O(σq / 2^n), where
σ is the total number of blocks in all q queries made by
the attacker. In the original paper by Black and Rogaway at
Eurocrypt 2002 where PMAC was introduced, the bound is
O(σ^2 / 2^n).
We also compute the collision probability of CBC MAC for suitably
chosen messages. We show that the probability is Ω( lq^2 / N) where l is the number of message blocks, N is the
size of the domain and q is the total number of queries. For
random oracles the probability is O(q^2 / N). This improved
collision probability will help us to have an efficient
distinguishing attack and MAC-forgery attack. We also show that the
collision probability for PMAC is Ω(q^2 / N) (strictly greater
than the birthday bound). We have used a purely combinatorial
approach to obtain this bound. Similar analysis can be made for
other CBC MAC extensions like XCBC, TMAC and OMAC
A Unified Method for Improving PRF Bounds for a Class of Blockcipher based MACs
This paper provides a unified framework for {\em improving} \PRF(pseudorandom function) advantages of several popular MACs (message authentication codes) based on a blockcipher modeled as \tx{RP} (random permutation). In many known MACs, the inputs of the underlying blockcipher are defined to be some deterministic affine functions of previously computed outputs of the blockcipher. Keeping the similarity in mind, we introduce a class of \tx{ADE}s (affine domain extensions) and a wide subclass of \tx{SADE}s (secure \tx{ADE}) containing \mathcal{C} = \{ \tx{CBC-MAC},\ \tx{GCBC}^*,\ \tx{OMAC},\ \tx{PMAC} \}. We define a parameter for each domain extension and show that all \tx{SADE}s have \PRF advantages where is the total number of blockcipher computations needed for all queries. We prove that \PRF advantage of any \tx{SADE} is by showing that is always at most . We provide a better estimate of for all members of and hence these MACs have {\em improved advantages }. Our proposed bounds for \tx{CBC-MAC} and \tx{GCBC}^* are better than previous best known bounds
Revisiting Structure Graphs: Applications to CBC-MAC and EMAC
In Crypto\u2705, Bellare et al. proved an bound for the PRF (pseudorandom function) security of the CBC-MAC based on an -bit random permutation , provided . Here an adversary can make at most prefix-free queries each having at most many ``blocks\u27\u27 (elements of ). In the same paper an bound for EMAC (or encrypted CBC-MAC) was proved, provided . Both proofs are based on {\bf structure graphs} representing all collisions among ``intermediate inputs\u27\u27 to during the computation of CBC. The problem of bounding PRF-advantage is shown to be reduced to bounding the number of structure graphs satisfying certain collision patterns. In the present paper, we show that the Lemma 10 in the Crypto \u2705 paper, stating an important result on structure graphs, is incorrect. This is due to the fact that the authors overlooked certain structure graphs. This invalidates the proofs of the PRF bounds. In ICALP \u2706, Pietrzak improved the bound for EMAC by showing a tight bound under the restriction that . As he used the same flawed lemma, this proof also becomes invalid. In this paper, we have revised and sometimes simplified these proofs. We revisit structure graphs in a slightly different mathematical language and provide a complete characterization of certain types of structure graphs. Using this characterization, we show that PRF security of CBC-MAC is about provided where is the total number of blocks in all queries. We also recover tight bound for PRF security of EMAC with a much relaxed constraint () than the original ()
A MAC Mode for Lightweight Block Ciphers
status: accepte
The Exact Security of PMAC with Three Powering-Up Masks
PMAC is a rate-1, parallelizable, block-cipher-based message authentication code (MAC), proposed by Black and Rogaway (EUROCRYPT 2002). Improving the security bound is a main research topic for PMAC. In particular, showing a tight bound is the primary goal of the research, since Luykx et al.\u27s paper (EUROCRYPT 2016). Regarding the pseudo-random-function (PRF) security of PMAC, a collision of the hash function, or the difference between a random permutation and a random function offers the lower bound for queries and the block cipher size . Regarding the MAC security (unforgeability), a hash collision for MAC queries, or guessing a tag offers the lower bound for MAC queries and verification queries (forgery attempts). The tight upper bound of the PRF-security of PMAC was given by Gaž et el. (ToSC 2017, Issue 1), but their proof requires a 4-wise independent masking scheme that uses 4 -bit random values. Open problems from their work are:
(1) find a masking scheme with three or less random values with which PMAC has the tight upper bound for PRF-security;
(2) find a masking scheme with which PMAC has the tight upper bound for MAC-security.
In this paper, we consider PMAC with three powering-up masks that uses three random values for the masking scheme.
We show that the PMAC has the tight upper bound for PRF-security, which answers the open problem (1),
and the tight upper bound for MAC-security, which answers the open problem (2). Note that
these results deal with two-key PMAC, thus showing tight upper bounds of PMACs with single-key and/or with two (or one) powering-up masks are open problems
The Exact Security of PMAC
PMAC is a simple and parallel block-cipher mode of operation, which was introduced by Black and Rogaway at Eurocrypt 2002. If instantiated with a (pseudo)random permutation over n-bit strings, PMAC constitutes a provably secure variable input-length (pseudo)random function. For adversaries making q queries, each of length at most l (in n-bit blocks), and of total length σ ≤ ql, the original paper proves an upper bound on the distinguishing advantage of Ο(σ2/2n), while the currently best bound is Ο (qσ/2n).In this work we show that this bound is tight by giving an attack with advantage Ω (q2l/2n). In the PMAC construction one initially XORs a mask to every message block, where the mask for the ith block is computed as τi := γi·L, where L is a (secret) random value, and γi is the i-th codeword of the Gray code. Our attack applies more generally to any sequence of γi’s which contains a large coset of a subgroup of GF(2n). We then investigate if the security of PMAC can be further improved by using τi’s that are k-wise independent, for k > 1 (the original distribution is only 1-wise independent). We observe that the security of PMAC will not increase in general, even if the masks are chosen from a 2-wise independent distribution, and then prove that the security increases to O(q<2/2n), if the τi are 4-wise independent. Due to simple extension attacks, this is the best bound one can hope for, using any distribution on the masks. Whether 3-wise independence is already sufficient to get this level of security is left as an open problem
Revisiting Full-PRF-Secure PMAC and Using It for Beyond-Birthday Authenticated Encryption
This paper proposes an authenticated encryption scheme, called SIVx, that preserves BBB security also in the case of unlimited nonce reuses. For this purpose, we propose a single-key BBB-secure message authentication code with 2n-bit outputs, called PMAC2x, based on a tweakable block cipher. PMAC2x is motivated by PMAC_TBC1k by Naito; we revisit its security proof and point out an invalid assumption. As a remedy, we provide an alternative proof for our construction, and derive a corrected bound for PMAC_TBC1k
LNCS
This paper studies the concrete security of PRFs and MACs obtained by keying hash functions based on the sponge paradigm. One such hash function is KECCAK, selected as NIST’s new SHA-3 standard. In contrast to other approaches like HMAC, the exact security of keyed sponges is not well understood. Indeed, recent security analyses delivered concrete security bounds which are far from existing attacks. This paper aims to close this gap. We prove (nearly) exact bounds on the concrete PRF security of keyed sponges using a random permutation. These bounds are tight for the most relevant ranges of parameters, i.e., for messages of length (roughly) l ≤ min{2n/4, 2r} blocks, where n is the state size and r is the desired output length; and for l ≤ q queries (to the construction or the underlying permutation). Moreover, we also improve standard-model bounds. As an intermediate step of independent interest, we prove tight bounds on the PRF security of the truncated CBC-MAC construction, which operates as plain CBC-MAC, but only returns a prefix of the output