498,042 research outputs found
Networks in cognitive science
Networks of interconnected nodes have long played a key role in Cognitive Science, from artificial neural networks to spreading activation models of semantic memory. Recently, however, a new Network Science has been developed, providing insights into the emergence of global, system-scale properties in contexts as diverse as the Internet, metabolic reactions, and collaborations among scientists. Today, the inclusion of network theory into Cognitive Sciences, and the expansion of complex-systems science, promises to significantly change the way in which the organization and dynamics of cognitive and behavioral processes are understood. In this paper, we review recent contributions of network theory at different levels and domains within the Cognitive Sciences.Postprint (author's final draft
Connectionism, Analogicity and Mental Content
In Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Horgan and Tienson (1996) argue that cognitive
processes, pace classicism, are not governed by exceptionless, “representation-level” rules; they
are instead the work of defeasible cognitive tendencies subserved by the non-linear dynamics of
the brainÂ’s neural networks. Many theorists are sympathetic with the dynamical characterisation
of connectionism and the general (re)conception of cognition that it affords. But in all the
excitement surrounding the connectionist revolution in cognitive science, it has largely gone
unnoticed that connectionism adds to the traditional focus on computational processes, a new
focus – one on the vehicles of mental representation, on the entities that carry content through the
mind. Indeed, if Horgan and TiensonÂ’s dynamical characterisation of connectionism is on the
right track, then so intimate is the relationship between computational processes and
representational vehicles, that connectionist cognitive science is committed to a resemblance
theory of mental content
Models of Cognition: Neurological possibility does not indicate neurological plausibility
Many activities in Cognitive Science involve complex computer models and simulations of both theoretical and real entities. Artificial Intelligence and the study of artificial neural nets in particular, are seen as major contributors in the quest for understanding the human mind. Computational models serve as objects of experimentation, and results from these virtual experiments are tacitly included in the framework of empirical science. Cognitive functions, like learning to speak, or discovering syntactical structures in language, have been modeled and these models are the basis for many claims about human cognitive capacities. Artificial neural nets (ANNs) have had some successes in the field of Artificial Intelligence, but the results from experiments with simple ANNs may have little value in explaining cognitive functions. The problem seems to be in relating cognitive concepts that belong in the `top-down' approach to models grounded in the `bottom-up' connectionist methodology. Merging the two fundamentally different paradigms within a single model can obfuscate what is really modeled. When the tools (simple artificial neural networks) to solve the problems (explaining aspects of higher cognitive functions) are mismatched, models with little value in terms of explaining functions of the human mind are produced. The ability to learn functions from data-points makes ANNs very attractive analytical tools. These tools can be developed into valuable models, if the data is adequate and a meaningful interpretation of the data is possible. The problem is, that with appropriate data and labels that fit the desired level of description, almost any function can be modeled. It is my argument that small networks offer a universal framework for modeling any conceivable cognitive theory, so that neurological possibility can be demonstrated easily with relatively simple models. However, a model demonstrating the possibility of implementation of a cognitive function using a distributed methodology, does not necessarily add support to any claims or assumptions that the cognitive function in question, is neurologically plausible
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Cognitive Radio Networks: Highlights of Information Theoretic Limits, Models and Design
In recent years, the development of intelligent, adaptive wireless devices called cognitive radios, together with the introduction of secondary spectrum licensing, has led to a new paradigm in communications: cognitive networks. Cognitive networks are wireless networks that consist of several types of users: often a primary user (the primary license-holder of a spectrum band) and secondary users (cognitive radios). These cognitive users employ their cognitive abilities to communicate without harming the primary users. The study of cognitive networks is relatively new and many questions are yet to be answered. In this article we highlight some of the recent information theoretic limits, models, and design of these promising networks.Engineering and Applied Science
Connecting adaptive behaviour and expectations in models of innovation: The Potential Role of Artificial Neural Networks
In this methodological work I explore the possibility of explicitly modelling expectations conditioning the R&D decisions of firms. In order to isolate this problem from the controversies of cognitive science, I propose a black box strategy through the concept of “internal model”. The last part of the article uses artificial neural networks to model the expectations of firms in a model of industry dynamics based on Nelson & Winter (1982)
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