Temporally Networked Cournot Platform Markets

In networked markets, information can help firms make better decisions on which market (platform), and how much, to participate. However, these markets may be temporally separated, e.g., independent system operators in different geographical locations. We model these via networked Cournot markets, but instead consider the participation of one firm to either be with the realization (or full information) of a random market, or only with the statistics of the random market, modeled by an additive zero-mean random variable on the maximal price. We show that firms not knowing the realization of the random variable would participate in both markets in the same way as if the mean was realized. We then present global effects: we prove that profit is improved for every firm when one\u27s information improves but social welfare may get better or worst with more information

Networked Cournot Competition in Platform Markets: Access Control and Efficiency Loss

This paper studies network design and efficiency loss in open and discriminatory access platforms under networked Cournot competition. In open platforms, every firm connects to every market, while discriminatory platforms limit connections between firms and markets to improve social welfare. We provide tight bounds on the efficiency loss of both platforms; (i) that the efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium under open access is bounded by 3/2, and (ii) for discriminatory access platforms, we provide a greedy algorithm for optimizing network connections that guarantees efficiency loss at a Nash equilibrium is bounded by 4/3, under an assumption on the linearity of cost functions

Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets

In this work, we analyze the worst case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Cournot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms today, the platform designs considered tradeoffs between transparency and control, namely, (i) open access, (ii) controlled allocation and (iii) discriminatory access. Our results show that open access designs incentivize increased production towards perfectly competitive levels and limit efficiency loss, while controlled allocation designs lead to producer-platform incentive misalignment, resulting in low participation and unbounded efficiency loss. We also show that discriminatory access designs seek a balance between transparency and control, and achieve the best of both worlds, maintaining high participation rates while limiting efficiency loss. We also study a model of consumer search cost which further distinguishes between the three designs

Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets

In this work, we analyze the worst case efficiency loss of online platform designs under a networked Cournot competition model. Inspired by some of the largest platforms today, the platform designs considered tradeoffs between transparency and control, namely, (i) open access, (ii) controlled allocation and (iii) discriminatory access. Our results show that open access designs incentivize increased production towards perfectly competitive levels and limit efficiency loss, while controlled allocation designs lead to producer-platform incentive misalignment, resulting in low participation and unbounded efficiency loss. We also show that discriminatory access designs seek a balance between transparency and control, and achieve the best of both worlds, maintaining high participation rates while limiting efficiency loss. We also study a model of consumer search cost which further distinguishes between the three designs

Revenue Maximization in Networked Cournot Markets

This thesis studies the revenue maximization problem in the networked cournot markets. In a networked cournot market, platform decides whether a firm has access to a specific market and tries to find an optimal matching that maximizes the revenue. We begin with several examples with quadratic production costs, and then conduct detailed analysis on the linear cost case as well as the linear cost case with production capacities. At the end of the thesis, we also conduct analysis on computational complexity of revenue maximization problems under homogeneous firms and markets and heterogeneous firms and markets respectively