The Influence of Network Factors on Network Centric Operations

As Information Age changes the lifestyle of all humankinds, it also changes the way how to defense and secure the borders are secured and defended. The Information Age is about information superiority. It evolves the command and control concept, proactively, to optimize the size of the units and their connections within a combat force for effective mission accomplishment. The biggest issue is how big a unit will be and how they will arrange and connect it to the command and control structure in order for the unit to be effective on the battlefield. While some arrangements connect to each other so well that they endure and perform effectively during combat, other arrangements that connect each other are so cumbersome that they either barely succeed or are killed. Network Centric Operations concentrate on how to provide a warfighting unit with enough assets so that it can accomplish the assigned mission by itself effectively within its chain of command. The first thing that Network Centric Operations tries to achieve is to gain the shared awareness of the battlefield. This can be done by scouts, ground or air patrol, satellite image, radio frequency, etc. The situational awareness and the information superiority of the battlefield will definitely effect the enemy\u27s operations so that the enemy needs to change its strategy. The second thing that Network Centric Operations tries to achieve is to have an impact on every occasion being reported or unexpectedly sensed in order to disrupt the enemy\u27s will. How can a force achieve this? A well organized and a well connected force can have the information superiority and be able to transform that superiority to a success. For effectiveness, each asset in a combat force should have reliable connection capacity with command and control centers and other assets. The number of Sensors and Influencers being the driving entities of the war unit in the battlefield are integer-partitioned and connected to a Decider. There are well defined rules, regulations, and well established connections between the entities. They are initially placed random to the simulation environment as the BLUE and RED forces. Each force starts sensing, tracking, reporting, and killing the opposing side. Each force tries to win the other side. Each combination of an experiment replicates 30 times and then results are reported. The probability of a BLUE force win was studied to measure the performance of a networked force. The objectives of this research are to explore how units vary in size of organization, how they behave in a networked environment and to investigate how to increase the performance of a networked force. This research explores sufficient search space to understand the influence of network factors on Network Centric Operations

Global 2000

Modern information technology and current concepts for its use did not free the Global 2000 participants from the need for certain traditional constraints, at least not to the extent envisioned in theoretical discussions of network-centric operations. The problem remains how to capture the predicted advantages of information-rich environments

Graph Theoretical Analysis of Network Centric Operations Using Multi-Layer Models

As the Department of Defense continues its transformations to a network centric force, evaluating DoD\u27s progression towards net-centricity remains a challenge. This research proposes to extend the Network Centric Operation Common Framework Version 2.0 (draft) with the metrics based in graph theory and, specifically addresses, among other metrics, the measurement of a net-centric force\u27s mission effectiveness. The research incorporates the importance of understanding network topology for evaluating an environment for net-centricity and using network characteristics to help commanders assess the effects of network changes on mission effectiveness. The multi-layered model of Network Centric Operations and interlayer mapping are introduced to address the interdependent contributions of people, systems, and processes to the success of net-centric operations. A layered network model was populated with data derived from the 2006 Joint Expeditionary Forces Experiment (JEFX). Both static and dynamic network analyses were performed to characterize the network structures and to demonstrate how the interlayer mapping allows networks changes at one layer affects the networks characteristics of other layers. Thirty four excursions were performed on a three-layer model of JEFX network centric operations and the network characteristics were measured using twelve graph-theoretical metrics

President’s Forum

Tomorrow’s conflicts will present complex requirements, and many things will be required to ful- fill them. We need to pursue with great vigor the concept of network-centric operations and war- fare, and a set of initiatives that would be quite disruptive to an enemy. The rebalanced fleet of the future will require these kinds of characteristics

Presidents Forum

Tomorrow’s conflicts will present complex requirements, and many things will be required to ful- fill them. We need to pursue with great vigor the concept of network-centric operations and war- fare, and a set of initiatives that would be quite disruptive to an enemy. The rebalanced fleet of the future will require these kinds of characteristics

Network-centric Warfare

What is network-centric warfare? What does it bring to us? Why is it so critical to America’s future military power that we must give up other capabilities to buy it? A warfare-centered working con- cept of network-centric operations is needed. The measure of success will be the effect that net- working enables us to have on would-be enemies in peace and in war

Applying the Information Age Combat Model: Quantitative Analysis of Network Centric Operations

The nature of and the approach to command and control is evolving in order to meet the challenges of Information Age warfare. One of the main tasks of command and control is the arrangement of the assets within a combat force in order to ensure their ability to manage and exploit information. Connectivity between the various assets represents existence, capacity, reliability, and other attributes of links establishing the connectivity. The Information Age Combat Model was introduced by Cares in 2005 to contribute to the development of an understanding of the influence of connectivity on force effectiveness that can lead eventually to quantitative prediction and guidelines for design and employment. This paper describes the model and several extensions to it. It presents an initial attempt to achieve such an understanding through the quantitative analysis of a basic but powerful model of network centric operations to demonstrate the correlation between connectivity and effectiveness. It also documents first prototypical studies showing how these results can be used in current models and can even contribute to a new generation of combat models that are net-centric instead of using the current platform-centric approach

Network Centric Operations and the Brigade Unit of Action: A System Dynamics Perspective

In the midst of fighting a global War on Terror, the U.S. Army is concurrently attempting to transform to a more agile and deployable organization, which is centered largely on the integration of new information technologies into its command posts. While most Army leaders are reporting that many of these new information “tools” such as the Army Battle Command System (ABCS) give them an unprecedented level of situational awareness and are beginning to enable a new style of war labeled by some as Network Centric Warfare, other leaders are reporting that the integration of this new digital technology comes with some unintended consequences that in some cases actually slows and decreases the quality of information flow by orders of magnitude. We studied the “Brigade Unit of Action” concept with specific emphasis on the Brigade’s ability to disseminate and process information within and between command posts, using System Dynamics as a modeling tool to help better understand the impact of various policy decisions made by the U.S. Army. Our study concentrated on some of the possible strengths and pitfalls of NCW theory, and led to the formulation of five heuristics that Army leaders should consider when developing the future command and control architecture for the Brigade Unit of Action