Countering crime in hostile environments: securing vulnerable humanitarian aid workers in Paua New Guinea

Crime is a core issue for companies and more recently for NGOs working in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The nation is facing major challenges as crime levels rise exponentially across the country. Erstwhile un-affected humanitarian operations were often seen as immune from criminality, but now have become just as likely to be targeted as any other organisation. Consequently, there is a need to adopt security measures, but maybe not necessarily as draconian as those used hitherto by major companies. People-centered, locally-owned is a concept whereby the local population is encouraged to protect the delivery of health services and aid from humanitarian providers. The inclusive approach challenges previous concepts of what is required to protect workers in intimidating and dangerous areas. A mind-set change is required. The proposed multi-layered approach stems from defence-in-depth strategies. Although such a strategy is still primarily based upon the security risk assessment process, at the core of all operational security required in challenging environments, it also requires a proactive approach combined with engagement with the local population based around the Aid-security-triangle. The methodology used interpretative analysis of relevant literature underpinned by personal interviews with selected stake holders in the PNG during 2014

Network Capital and Social Trust: Pre-Conditions for ‘Good’ Diversity?

This paper unpicks the assumption that because social networks underpin social capital, they directly create it – more of one inevitably making more of the other. If it were that simple, the sheer quantity of networks criss-crossing a defined urban space would be a proxy measure for the local stock of social capital. Of course the interrelationships are more complex. Two kinds of complication stand out. The first is specific: networks have both quantitative and qualitative dimensions, but the two elements have no necessary bearing on each other. The shape and extent of a network says nothing about the content of the links between its nodes. Certainly the line we draw between any two of them indicates contact and potential connection, but what kind of contact, how often, how trusting, in what circumstances, to what end…? Reliable answers to these questions need more than surface maps or bird’s eye accounts of who goes where, who speaks to whom. The second complication is a general, not to say universal, difficulty. We are stuck with the fact that sociological concepts - networks, social capital and trust included - are ‘only’ abstractions. They are ways of thinking about the apparent chaos of people behaving all over the place – here, to make it worse, in multi-cultural urban environments - but none of them is visible to be measured, weighed or quantified. This does not make the concepts ‘untrue’, and it should not stop them being useful. My hope is that we can find a nuanced perspective which will at least make the complications intelligible. At best, a multi-layered model will account for diversity in the nature of trust; and for variations in the way social capital is hoarded or distributed within and across ethnic boundaries. It would be contribution enough if we were able to specify the conditions which cause social capital, as Puttnam formulates it, to be exclusionary or inclusionary in its effect.Network capital, Social trust, ‘Good’ diversity

The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002: A Potemkin Village

Due to the daunting possibilities of cyberwarfare, and the ease with which cyberattacks may be conducted, the United Nations has warned that the next world war could be initiated through worldwide cyberattacks between countries. In response to the growing threat of cyberwarfare and the increasing importance of information security, Congress passed the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA). FISMA recognizes the importance of information security to the national economic and security interests of the United States. However, this Note argues that FISMA has failed to significantly bolster information security, primarily because FISMA treats information security as a technological problem and not an economic problem. This Note analyzes existing proposals to incentivize heightened software quality assurance, and proposes a new solution designed to strengthen federal information security in light of the failings of FISMA and the trappings of Congress’s 2001 amendment to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

Digital Architecture as Crime Control

This paper explains how theories of realspace architecture inform the prevention of computer crime. Despite the prevalence of the metaphor, architects in realspace and cyberspace have not talked to one another. There is a dearth of literature about digital architecture and crime altogether, and the realspace architectural literature on crime prevention is often far too soft for many software engineers. This paper will suggest the broad brushstrokes of potential design solutions to cybercrime, and in the course of so doing, will pose severe criticisms of the White House\u27s recent proposals on cybersecurity. The paper begins by introducing four concepts of realspace crime prevention through architecture. Design should: (1) create opportunities for natural surveillance, meaning its visibility and susceptibility to monitoring by residents, neighbors, and bystanders; (2) instill a sense of territoriality so that residents develop proprietary attitudes and outsiders feel deterred from entering a private space; (3) build communities and avoid social isolation; and (4) protect targets of crime. There are digital analogues to each goal. Natural-surveillance principles suggest new virtues of open-source platforms, such as Linux, and territoriality outlines a strong case for moving away from digital anonymity towards psuedonymity. The goal of building communities will similarly expose some new advantages for the original, and now eroding, end-to-end design of the Internet. An understanding of architecture and target prevention will illuminate why firewalls at end points will more effectively guarantee security than will attempts to bundle security into the architecture of the Net. And, in total, these architectural lessons will help us chart an alternative course to the federal government\u27s tepid approach to computer crime. By leaving the bulk of crime prevention to market forces, the government will encourage private barricades to develop - the equivalent of digital gated communities - with terrible consequences for the Net in general and interconnectivity in particular

Electronic security - risk mitigation in financial transactions : public policy issues

This paper builds on a previous series of papers (see Claessens, Glaessner, and Klingebiel, 2001, 2002) that identified electronic security as a key component to the delivery of electronic finance benefits. This paper and its technical annexes (available separately at http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/) identify and discuss seven key pillars necessary to fostering a secure electronic environment. Hence, it is intended for those formulating broad policies in the area of electronic security and those working with financial services providers (for example, executives and management). The detailed annexes of this paper are especially relevant for chief information and security officers responsible for establishing layered security. First, this paper provides definitions of electronic finance and electronic security and explains why these issues deserve attention. Next, it presents a picture of the burgeoning global electronic security industry. Then it develops a risk-management framework for understanding the risks and tradeoffs inherent in the electronic security infrastructure. It also provides examples of tradeoffs that may arise with respect to technological innovation, privacy, quality of service, and security in designing an electronic security policy framework. Finally, it outlines issues in seven interrelated areas that often need attention in building an adequate electronic security infrastructure. These are: 1) The legal framework and enforcement. 2) Electronic security of payment systems. 3) Supervision and prevention challenges. 4) The role of private insurance as an essential monitoring mechanism. 5) Certification, standards, and the role of the public and private sectors. 6) Improving the accuracy of information on electronic security incidents and creating better arrangements for sharing this information. 7) Improving overall education on these issues as a key to enhancing prevention.Knowledge Economy,Labor Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Education for the Knowledge Economy,Knowledge Economy,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Governance Indicators

Abstracts : Policy Research working paper series - numbers 2857 - 2882

This paper contains abstracts of Policy Research Working Paper series, numbers 2857 - 2882Banks&Banking Reform,ICT Policy and Strategies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Economics&Finance,Economic Theory&Research

Single Market 2.0: the European Union as a Platform. Research Papers in Law 2/2020.

ften defined as “unfinished business”, the European Union’s market integration process appears to have become more fragile than ever at the beginning of the new decade. Already in 2010, the Monti report denounced the existence of a Single Market “fatigue”, which made it difficult to complete the market integration process, especially in most difficult areas such as services.1 Today, Brexit potentially threatens the future attractiveness of the Single Market, by depriving the Union of its third largest economy and leading to an unprecedented thorn in the EU’s pride, as a Member of the Union sets sail. At the same time, the post-Brexit single market may become more cohesive and ambitious, as one of the most reluctant Member States leaves the group: the Union may also have the opportunity to re-discover some of the features of continental Europe’s legal and economic traditions, from Civil Law rules to state-led industrial policy, which faced obstacles when the UK was in the Union.2 Against this background, the challenges for the Single Market project do not end with Brexit. To the contrary, EU policymakers are confronted with a frustrating prospect: as they try to complete the Single Market, technological evolution is pushing the frontier of integration further, requiring new efforts and policies to fully achieve the desired goal. In particular, the digital transformation is changing the traditional, textbook economics of market integration, based on tenets such as economies of scale and the four freedoms. The rise of the digital economy requires a radical change in the policies for the Single Market, as well as in the trade policies that underpin the whole market integration process. Trends such as the virtualisation, servitisation and platformisation of the economy (as described below), coupled with the rise of the Internet of Things and Artificial Intelligence, make market integration at once more appealing and increasingly challenging for EU policymakers, projecting the Single Market into a complete new dimension, in which the “Fifth Freedom” (the free circulation of non-personal data) is intertwined with new concerns with the need to protect fundamental rights, and at the same time secure Europe’s technological sovereignty

Nonbanks in the payments system: innovation, competition, and risk - a conference summary

From the early days of automated card sorting to the more recent times of the Internet and check imaging, payments and payments processing have continually embraced new technology. At the same time, the industry has been shaped by its share of entry and exit, through startups, mergers, and the reorganization of businesses seeking the proper scope of horizontal and vertical integration. ; These changes have enabled nonbank organizations to play a larger role in the payments system. Nonbanks have followed a number of pathways to more prominence: purchasing bank payment processing subsidiaries, carving out niches in the payments market through innovation, and taking advantage of economies of scale made possible by shifting to electronic forms of payment. ; Nonbanks have introduced some of the most far-reaching innovations to the payments system in recent years, leading to greater efficiencies in payments processing. At the same time, nonbanks have changed the dynamics of competition in payments, leading to a significant change in the system’s risk profile. ; Sullivan and Wang summarize the proceedings of a conference on nonbanks in the payments system held by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City in Santa Fe, New Mexico, on May 2-4, 2007. The conference addressed many of the key questions raised by the growing presence of nonbanks in payments, including: Have recent payment innovations been more likely to come from nonbanks? Have nonbanks improved or harmed competition in payments? Have nonbanks increased risk or helped to develop tools to manage it? How should public policy respond as increasingly more activity in payments lies outside of the banking system?Payment systems ; Nonbank financial institutions

Security Life Cycle framework for Exploring & Prevention of Zero day attacks in Cyberterrorism

The rise of cyber terrorism poses a significant threat to governments, businesses, and individuals worldwide. Cyber terrorists use information technology to carry out attacks that range from simple hacking attempts to more sophisticated attacks involving malware, ransomware, and zero-day exploits. This paper aims to provide an in-depth understanding of cyber terrorism, with a special focus on zero-day attacks. As the world becomes more digitized and automated, it brings convenience to everyone\u27s lives. However, it also leads to growing concerns about security threats, including data leakage, website hacking, attacks, phishing, and zero-day attacks. These concerns are not only for organizations, businesses, and society, but also for governments worldwide. This paper aims to provide an introductory literature review on the basics of cyber-terrorism, focusing on zero-day attacks. The paper explores the economic and financial destruction caused by zero-day attacks and examines various types of zero-day attacks. It also looks at the steps taken by international organizations to address these issues and the recommendations they have made. Additionally, the paper examines the impact of these externalities on policymaking and society. As cyber-security becomes increasingly important for businesses and policymakers, the paper aims to delve deeper into this aspect, which has the potential to threaten national security, public life, and the economic and financial stability of developed, developing, and underdeveloped economies

Countering crime in hostile environments: Securing vulnerable humanitarian aid workers in Papua New Guinea

Crime is a core issue for companies and more recently for NGOs working in Papua New Guinea (PNG). The nation is facing major challenges as crime levels rise exponentially across the country. Erstwhile un-affected humanitarian operations were often seen as immune from criminality, but now have become just as likely to be targeted as any other organisation. Consequently, there is a need to adopt security measures, but maybe not necessarily as draconian as those used hitherto by major companies. People-centered, locally-owned is a concept whereby the local population is encouraged to protect the delivery of health services and aid from humanitarian providers. The inclusive approach challenges previous concepts of what is required to protect workers in intimidating and dangerous areas. A mind-set change is required. The proposed multi-layered approach stems from defence-in-depth strategies. Although such a strategy is still primarily based upon the security risk assessment process, at the core of all operational security required in challenging environments, it also requires a proactive approach combined with engagement with the local population based around the Aid-security-triangle. The methodology used interpretative analysis of relevant literature underpinned by personal interviews with selected stake holders in the PNG during 2014