Survey on Data-Centric based Routing Protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks

The great concern for energy that grew with the technological advances in the field of networks and especially in sensor network has triggered various approaches and protocols that relate to sensor networks. In this context, the routing protocols were of great interest. The aim of the present paper is to discuss routing protocols for sensor networks. This paper will focus mainly on the discussion of the data-centric approach (COUGAR, rumor, SPIN, flooding and Gossiping), while shedding light on the other approaches occasionally. The functions of the nodes will be discussed as well. The methodology selected for this paper is based on a close description and discussion of the protocol. As a conclusion, open research questions and limitations are proposed to the reader at the end of this paper

Octopus: A Secure and Anonymous DHT Lookup

Distributed Hash Table (DHT) lookup is a core technique in structured peer-to-peer (P2P) networks. Its decentralized nature introduces security and privacy vulnerabilities for applications built on top of them; we thus set out to design a lookup mechanism achieving both security and anonymity, heretofore an open problem. We present Octopus, a novel DHT lookup which provides strong guarantees for both security and anonymity. Octopus uses attacker identification mechanisms to discover and remove malicious nodes, severely limiting an adversary's ability to carry out active attacks, and splits lookup queries over separate anonymous paths and introduces dummy queries to achieve high levels of anonymity. We analyze the security of Octopus by developing an event-based simulator to show that the attacker discovery mechanisms can rapidly identify malicious nodes with low error rate. We calculate the anonymity of Octopus using probabilistic modeling and show that Octopus can achieve near-optimal anonymity. We evaluate Octopus's efficiency on Planetlab with 207 nodes and show that Octopus has reasonable lookup latency and manageable communication overhead

Secure Position-Based Routing for VANETs

Vehicular communication (VC) systems have the potential to improve road safety and driving comfort. Nevertheless, securing the operation is a prerequisite for deployment. So far, the security of VC applications has mostly drawn the attention of research efforts, while comprehensive solutions to protect the network operation have not been developed. In this paper, we address this problem: we provide a scheme that secures geographic position-based routing, which has been widely accepted as the appropriate one for VC. Moreover, we focus on the scheme currently chosen and evaluated in the Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC). We integrate security mechanisms to protect the position-based routing functionality and services (beaconing, multi-hop forwarding, and geo-location discovery), and enhance the network robustness. We propose defense mechanisms, relying both on cryptographic primitives, and plausibility checks mitigating false position injection. Our implementation and initial measurements show that the security overhead is low and the proposed scheme deployable

The Challenges in SDN/ML Based Network Security : A Survey

Machine Learning is gaining popularity in the network security domain as many more network-enabled devices get connected, as malicious activities become stealthier, and as new technologies like Software Defined Networking (SDN) emerge. Sitting at the application layer and communicating with the control layer, machine learning based SDN security models exercise a huge influence on the routing/switching of the entire SDN. Compromising the models is consequently a very desirable goal. Previous surveys have been done on either adversarial machine learning or the general vulnerabilities of SDNs but not both. Through examination of the latest ML-based SDN security applications and a good look at ML/SDN specific vulnerabilities accompanied by common attack methods on ML, this paper serves as a unique survey, making a case for more secure development processes of ML-based SDN security applications.Comment: 8 pages. arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1705.0056

Defending against Sybil Devices in Crowdsourced Mapping Services

Real-time crowdsourced maps such as Waze provide timely updates on traffic, congestion, accidents and points of interest. In this paper, we demonstrate how lack of strong location authentication allows creation of software-based {\em Sybil devices} that expose crowdsourced map systems to a variety of security and privacy attacks. Our experiments show that a single Sybil device with limited resources can cause havoc on Waze, reporting false congestion and accidents and automatically rerouting user traffic. More importantly, we describe techniques to generate Sybil devices at scale, creating armies of virtual vehicles capable of remotely tracking precise movements for large user populations while avoiding detection. We propose a new approach to defend against Sybil devices based on {\em co-location edges}, authenticated records that attest to the one-time physical co-location of a pair of devices. Over time, co-location edges combine to form large {\em proximity graphs} that attest to physical interactions between devices, allowing scalable detection of virtual vehicles. We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach using large-scale simulations, and discuss how they can be used to dramatically reduce the impact of attacks against crowdsourced mapping services.Comment: Measure and integratio