118,475 research outputs found

    Review of codes of conduct, voluntary guidelines and principles relevant for farm data sharing

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    Codes of conduct, voluntary guidelines, sets of principles on how to transparently govern farm data are a recent thing. While laws and regulations that govern personal data are becoming more and more common, legislation still does not cover data flows in many industries where different actors in the value chain need to share data and at the same time protect all involved from the risks of data sharing. Data in these value chains is currently governed through private data contracts or licensing agreements, which are normally very complex and on which data producers have very little negotiating power. Codes of conduct have started to emerge to fill the legislative void and to set common standards for data sharing contracts: codes provide principles that the signatories/subscribers/members agree to apply in their contracts

    Negotiating for computer services: Papers presented at the 1977 Clinic on Library Applications of Data Processing, April 24-27, 1977

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    The increasing use of automation in libraries has made many librarians painfully aware of the difficulty of negotiating for computer products and services. This is true for a wide range of situations, such as acquiring a turnkey system, joining a network, subscribing to an information retrieval service and many others. While negotiation should be a give-and-take process between parties on an equal footing, librarians often see themselves as being at a disadvantage. The product or service is technically complex, the legal instruments are mysterious, and the other party has greater experience with the technology, the law and the art of negotiating. The purpose of the 1977 clinic was to enable librarians to be stronger, more knowledgeable negotiators. Some of the papers printed here present negotiation from the librarian's viewpoint; other papers deal with the special needs and concerns of the vendor. In every case, the intent is to make negotiation a rational and orderly process. In their complementary papers, Boss and Gurr show that differing interests need not result in an adversary relationship between vendor and librarian. In his paper, Corey examines in some detail the special problems of negotiating when legally enforceable contracts are not possible. This paper includes several specific suggestions that prove extremely helpful for libraries that obtain data processing from a parent organization. Three sessions of the clinic were devoted to explaining the basics of data processing contracts and conducting simulated negotiating sessions. The material used in the role-playing sessions is included here so that readers may practice negotiating in a risk-free setting.published or submitted for publicatio

    Successful Union Strategies for Winning Certification Elections and First Contracts: Report to Union Participants (Part 2: First Contract Survey Results)

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    Summary of results from 1986-1988 survey of 100 chief negotiators conducted by Kate Bronfenbrenner in cooperation with the Organizing Department of the AFL-CIO

    Addressing stability issues in mediated complex contract negotiations for constraint-based, non-monotonic utility spaces

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    Negotiating contracts with multiple interdependent issues may yield non- monotonic, highly uncorrelated preference spaces for the participating agents. These scenarios are specially challenging because the complexity of the agents’ utility functions makes traditional negotiation mechanisms not applicable. There is a number of recent research lines addressing complex negotiations in uncorrelated utility spaces. However, most of them focus on overcoming the problems imposed by the complexity of the scenario, without analyzing the potential consequences of the strategic behavior of the negotiating agents in the models they propose. Analyzing the dynamics of the negotiation process when agents with different strategies interact is necessary to apply these models to real, competitive environments. Specially problematic are high price of anarchy situations, which imply that individual rationality drives the agents towards strategies which yield low individual and social welfares. In scenarios involving highly uncorrelated utility spaces, “low social welfare” usually means that the negotiations fail, and therefore high price of anarchy situations should be avoided in the negotiation mechanisms. In our previous work, we proposed an auction-based negotiation model designed for negotiations about complex contracts when highly uncorrelated, constraint-based utility spaces are involved. This paper performs a strategy analysis of this model, revealing that the approach raises stability concerns, leading to situations with a high (or even infinite) price of anarchy. In addition, a set of techniques to solve this problem are proposed, and an experimental evaluation is performed to validate the adequacy of the proposed approaches to improve the strategic stability of the negotiation process. Finally, incentive-compatibility of the model is studied.Spain. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (grant TIN2008-06739-C04-04

    Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering

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    Following the contraction in demand for law firms’ services during the Great Recession, “Big Law” was widely diagnosed as suffering from several maladies that would spell its ultimate demise, including excessive fees, excessive size, increased competition from in-house counsel, the commoditization of legal work, and the decline in demand for “relationship firms.” While each of these market pressures is only too real for certain segments of the law-firm population, their threat to the most elite U.S. law firms has been largely misunderstood. Even as many firms reduce their fees and contract in size, we should expect certain firms to continue to charge more and grow bigger. The current prescriptions for fixing Big Law fail to recognize that the top-tier firms within the group serve a unique market function. Focusing on a particular type of legal work – major corporate transactions – this Article proposes a novel theory of the value created by elite law firms: their private information about “market” deal terms, acquired through repeated exposure to the same types of transactions, provides clients with a significant bargaining advantage in deal negotiations. By aggregating expertise in the ever-changing and ever-increasing set of deal terms for certain transactions, law firms help their clients price such terms more accurately and thereby maximize their surplus from the deal. This pricing function – traditionally thought to be limited to investment banks – is one that cannot be replicated or subsumed by in-house counsel, other service providers, or commoditized contracts

    Negotiating: Experiences of community nurses when contracting with clients

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    A community nurse is required to have excellent interpersonal, teaching, collaborative and clinical skills in order to develop effective individualised client care contracts. Using a descriptive qualitative design data was collected from two focus groups of fourteen community nurses to explore the issues surrounding negotiating and contracting client care contracts from the perspective of community nurses. Thematic analysis revealed three themes: ‘assessment of needs’, ‘education towards enablement’, and ‘negotiation’. ‘Assessment of needs’ identified that community nurses assess both the client’s requirements for health care as well as the ability of the nurse to provide that care. ‘Education towards enablement’ described that education of the client is a common strategy used by community nurses to establish realistic goals of health care as part of developing an ongoing care plan. The final theme, ‘negotiation’, involved an informed agreement between the client and the community nurse which forms the origin of the care contract that will direct the partnership between the client and the nurse. Of importance for community nurses is that development of successful person-centred care contracts requires skillful negotiation of care that strikes the balance between the needs of the client and the ability of the nurse to meet those needs

    Inefficiencies in markets for intellectual property rights: experiences of academic and public research institutions

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    The formal use of such intellectual property rights (IPR) as patents and registered copyright by universities has increased steadily in the last two decades. Mainstream arguments, embedded in economic theory and policy, advocating the use of IPR to protect academic research results are based on the view that IPR marketplaces work well and allow universities to reap significant benefits. However, there is a lack of evidence-based research to justify or critically evaluate these claims. Building upon an original survey of 46 universities and public research organizations in the United Kingdom, this study analyses the quality of the institutions underpinning the markets for patents and copyright, investigating potential inefficiencies that could lead to underperformance of the IPR system. These include ‘IPR market failures’ with respect to search processes and transparency; price negotiation processes; uncertainties in the perception of the economic value of IRP and the relationship with R&D cost. Further sources of underperformance may include ‘institutional failures’ with respect to enforcement and regulation. Particular attention is paid to the role of governance forms (e.g. alternative types of licensing agreements) through which IPR exchanges take place. We find that a high share of universities report market failures in IPR transactions and that the choice of IPR governance forms matter for the obstacles that are encountered. Given the importance of widely disseminating university research outcomes to foster innovation and economic development, the presence of inefficiencies in IPR markets suggests that such objectives could best be achieved by encouraging open distribution of knowledge, rather than privatization of academic knowledge

    Alliance contractual design

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    Our purpose in this paper is to provide an overview of what we know about alliance contracts. After a short introduction to the contents of alliance contracts, we start by contrasting alliance contractual form and governance form. Next, we focus on two related constructs: contractual complexity and contractual completeness. We suggest that contractual complexity is a more adequate construct to investigate in the absence of information about the transaction contemplated in the contract. After that, we present the measures of contractual complexity used in past studies. Then, we go over the determinants of contractual complexity by considering their influence on contracting costs and benefits given environmental and behavioral uncertainty. Conclusions and suggestions for research are offered at the end.alliance contracts; collaborative relationships; contractual complexity; strategic alliances; cooperation; joint ventures;
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