Nobody’s Perfect: Moral Responsibility in Negligence

Given the unwittingness of negligence, personal responsibility for negligent conduct is puzzling. After all, how is it that one is responsible for what one did not intend to do or was unaware that one was doing? How, therefore, is one’s agency involved with one’s negligence so as to ground one’s responsibility for it? Negligence is an unwitting failure in agency to meet a standard requiring conduct that falls within one’s competency. Accordingly, negligent conduct involves agency in that negligence is a manifestation of agency failure. Now, nobody’s perfect. Human agency is innately fallible, and a measure of agency failure is, therefore, unavoidable. The more one’s negligence manifests failure in one’s agency as an individual, the more one is responsible for it. In contrast, the more one’s negligence involves the shortcomings innate to all human agency the less responsible one becomes, because one’s agency as an individual is less and less involved in one’s failure. Determinative of the measure of individual and of human failings mixed into an instance of negligent phi-ing is the background quality of one’s agency at meeting one’s competency at phi-ing. That is, how able one is at delivering on what one is able to competently do. The more able, the less one’s occasional instances of negligence involve manifestations of failures of one’s agency as an individual – nobody’s perfect – and are more manifestations of one’s agency’s innate human fallibility, making one less and less responsible for one’s negligence

Valuers' Liability: the impact of torts reform in Queensland

Historically there has been a correlation between the economic cycles and litigation in the area of professional negligence relating to valuers. Negligence actions have principally been instigated by financiers for valuations prepared during more buoyant economic times but where there has been a subsequent loss due to a reduction in property value. More specifically during periods of economic downturn such as 1982 to 1983 and 1990 to 1998 there has been an increased focus by academic writers on professional negligence as it relates to property valuers. Based on historical trends it is anticipated that the end of an extended period of economic prosperity such as has been experienced in Australia, will once again be marked by an increase in litigation against valuers for professional negligence. However, the context of valuers liability has become increasingly complex as a result of statutory reforms introduced in response to the Review of the Law of Negligence Final Report 2002 (“the IPP Report”), in particular the introduction of Civil Liability Acts introducing proportionate liability provisions. This paper looks at valuers’ liability for professional negligence in the context of statutory reforms in Queensland and recent case law to determine the most significant impacts of recent statutory reform on property valuers

Reputational Injury Without a Reputational Attack: Addressing Negligence Claims for Pure Reputational Harm

This Note examines the unsettled relationship between defamation and negligence. The law of defamation, through the torts of libel and slander, constitutes a well-developed and complex body of state common law and constitutional considerations. However, some claims for reputational harm may fall outside of this framework, as the law of defamation does not account for all of the ways that an individual’s reputation may be injured. Thus, plaintiffs sometimes bring negligence claims to seek redress for damage to reputation. When a plaintiff brings a negligence claim for pure reputational harm, the court is faced with a variety of options for handling the claim. This Note argues that courts should adopt a multistep approach to handling such claims. The court should first determine whether the claim is communication-based or not. If it is a noncommunicative claim, it should be allowed to stand as a simple negligence claim. If, however, the claim is communication-based, it should be presumptively displaced by the torts of libel and slander

Manslaughter and Negligence

About 1000 people die every year in Britain because of mistakes made by surgeons. At what degree of negligence should professional conduct resulting in death become criminal? The question has a particular significance for medical and dental practitioners. This article gives a critical examination of law and practice

Educational Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?

This comment explores three avenues to pursue educational malpractice suits. First, a negligence action for malpractice. Second, a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation. And finally, an action sounding in negligence for breach of statutory duty. Each avenue is explored in detail in terms of the likelihood of success. Importantly, the comment recognizes the inherent difficult of pursuing any education malpractice claim

Insolvency and Biased Standards - The Case for Proportional Liability

We analyze liability rules in a setting where injurers are potentially insolvent and where negligence standards may deviate from the socially optimal level. We show that proportional liability, which sets the measure of damages equal to the harm multiplied by the probability that it was caused by an injurer’s negligence, is preferable to other existing negligence-based rules. Moreover, proportional liability outperforms strict liability if the standard of due care is not set too low. Our analysis also suggests that courts should rely on statistical evidence and bar individualized causal claims that link the harm suffered by a plaintiff to the actions of the defendant. Finally, we provide a result which might be useful to regulators when calculating minimum capital requirements or minimum mandatory insurance for different industries

Jaramillo v. Ramos, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (Apr. 2, 2020)

The Court found a plaintiff is not required to provide expert testimony to survive a defendant’s summary judgment motion when the plaintiff is relying on the res ipsa loquitur statute’s prima facie case of negligence. Rather, plaintiff must only establish facts that entitle it to a rebuttable presumption of negligence under Nevada’s res ipsa loquitur statute. Whether a defendant can rebut the presumption through their own expert testimony or evidence is a question of fact for the jury

Chur v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 7 (Feb. 27, 2020)

Former directors of Lewis & Clark LTC Risk Retention Group, Inc. filed a writ of mandamus in the Nevada Supreme Court, seeking (1) direction concerning the district court’s application of Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp. and (2) relief from that court’s judgment. The directors asserted that gross negligence does not support a viable claim for personal liability under the NRS 78.138. The Commissioner of Insurance for the State of Nevada maintained that gross negligence is an appropriate claim against directors under Shoen. The Court elected to consider the director’s petition for a writ of mandamus, clarified the language in Shoen, and held that NRS 78.138 provides the exclusive mechanism to hold directors and officers individually liable for damages in Nevada. The statute says that “knowing violations of law” require a knowledge of wrongfulness. Therefore, gross negligence allegations do not state an actionable claim under NRS 78.138

A Neglected Interdependency in Liability Theory

The standard economic model of bilateral precaution concludes that (in the absence of uncertainty, misperception, or error) all negligence-based liability rules induce socially optimal behavior by both injurers and victims. This paper generalizes the standard model to consider situations in which one party’s precaution affects not only expected accident loss, but also directly affects the other party’s effort—or cost—of taking precaution. If the injurer’s care affects the victim’s precaution costs (but not vice versa), most of the standard results continue to hold (except for strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence). If the victim’s precaution affects the injurer’s costs of care (but not vice versa), only strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence leads to the social optimum, while the other negligence-based rules lead to suboptimal outcomes. In the general case (where each party’s costs depend on both parties’ levels of precaution), none of the standard liability rules induce socially optimal behavior in both parties. The paper’s other main result concerns the possibility of self-interested, negligent behavior in equilibrium. Under negligence with a defense of contributory negligence, the only equilibrium is in the mixed strategies of both injurer and victim. This involves the parties choosing (with strictly positive probability) to behave negligently, and gives rise to the possibility of successful litigation in equilibrium, even though there is no uncertainty, misperception, or error. The paper concludes by considering the implications of these results for the design of liability rules.law and economics, and tort law