Biomechanics as an Element of the Motion Clinimetry System

The study highlights the great progress in medicine, currently capable of a criterial, qualitative diagnosis of an increasing number of primary and secondary diseases in the musculoskeletal system, regardless persistent obstacles to a credible, systemic, and quantitative evaluation of the extent of existing motion dysfunctions, as well as subjective dimension of patient’s suffering. It is worth to add that only parametric estimation of a qualitative dysfunction profile makes it possible to reliably monitor treatment efficiency and forecast the level of health damage after its termination. The essence of biomechanics, understood as a science describing internal and external forces’ vectors, which determine specific, dynamic motion models (especially for balance and gait), has been presented in the study. Special attention has been given to anthropomotorics and psychomotorics, which give a broader context to motion’s driving phenomena and consequences, thus offering a variety of new parameters that have not been considered in close relation to motion so far. While developing symmetry concept, it was pointed out that dysfunction profile comprises of sequences of parametric asymmetries registered in twin body markers

Predictive processing and anti-representationalism

Many philosophers claim that the neurocomputational framework of predictive processing entails a globally inferentialist and representationalist view of cognition. Here, I contend that this is not correct. I argue that, given the theoretical commitments these philosophers endorse, no structure within predictive processing systems can be rightfully identified as a representational vehicle. To do so, I first examine some of the theoretical commitments these philosophers share, and show that these commitments provide a set of necessary conditions the satisfaction of which allows us to identify representational vehicles. Having done so, I introduce a predictive processing system capable of active inference, in the form of a simple robotic “brain”. I examine it thoroughly, and show that, given the necessary conditions highlighted above, none of its components qualifies as a representational vehicle. I then consider and allay some worries my claim could raise. I consider whether the anti-representationalist verdict thus obtained could be generalized, and provide some reasons favoring a positive answer. I further consider whether my arguments here could be blocked by allowing the same representational vehicle to possess multiple contents, and whether my arguments entail some extreme form of revisionism, answering in the negative in both cases. A quick conclusion follows