Multi-Source Multi-Sink Nash Flows over Time

Nash flows over time describe the behavior of selfish users eager to reach their destination as early as possible while traveling along the arcs of a network with capacities and transit times. Throughout the past decade, they have been thoroughly studied in single-source single-sink networks for the deterministic queuing model, which is of particular relevance and frequently used in the context of traffic and transport networks. In this setting there exist Nash flows over time that can be described by a sequence of static flows featuring special properties, so-called `thin flows with resetting\u27. This insight can also be used algorithmically to compute Nash flows over time. We present an extension of these results to networks with multiple sources and sinks which are much more relevant in practical applications. In particular, we come up with a subtle generalization of thin flows with resetting, which yields a compact description as well as an algorithmic approach for computing multi-terminal Nash flows over time

A Strategic Routing Framework and Algorithms for Computing Alternative Paths

Traditional navigation services find the fastest route for a single driver. Though always using the fastest route seems desirable for every individual, selfish behavior can have undesirable effects such as higher energy consumption and avoidable congestion, even leading to higher overall and individual travel times. In contrast, strategic routing aims at optimizing the traffic for all agents regarding a global optimization goal. We introduce a framework to formalize real-world strategic routing scenarios as algorithmic problems and study one of them, which we call Single Alternative Path (SAP), in detail. There, we are given an original route between a single origin-destination pair. The goal is to suggest an alternative route to all agents that optimizes the overall travel time under the assumption that the agents distribute among both routes according to a psychological model, for which we introduce the concept of Pareto-conformity. We show that the SAP problem is NP-complete, even for such models. Nonetheless, assuming Pareto-conformity, we give multiple algorithms for different variants of SAP, using multi-criteria shortest path algorithms as subroutines. Moreover, we prove that several natural models are in fact Pareto-conform. The implementation and evaluation of our algorithms serve as a proof of concept, showing that SAP can be solved in reasonable time even though the algorithms have exponential running time in the worst case

Long-term behavior of dynamic equilibria in fluid queuing networks

A fluid queuing network constitutes one of the simplest models in which to study flow dynamics over a network. In this model we have a single source-sink pair, and each link has a per-time-unit capacity and a transit time. A dynamic equilibrium (or equilibrium flow over time) is a flow pattern over time such that no flow particle has incentives to unilaterally change its path. Although the model has been around for almost 50 years, only recently results regarding existence and characterization of equilibria have been obtained. In particular, the long-term behavior remains poorly understood. Our main result in this paper is to show that, under a natural (and obviously necessary) condition on the queuing capacity, a dynamic equilibrium reaches a steady state (after which queue lengths remain constant) in finite time. Previously, it was not even known that queue lengths would remain bounded. The proof is based on the analysis of a rather nonobvious potential function that turns out to be monotone along the evolution of the equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that the steady state is characterized as an optimal solution of a certain linear program. When this program has a unique solution, which occurs generically, the long-term behavior is completely predictable. On the contrary, if the linear program has multiple solutions, the steady state is more difficult to identify as it depends on the whole temporal evolution of the equilibrium

Atomic Splittable Flow Over Time Games

In an atomic splittable flow over time game, finitely many players route flow dynamically through a network, in which edges are equipped with transit times, specifying the traversing time, and with capacities, restricting flow rates. Infinitesimally small flow particles controlled by the same player arrive at a constant rate at the player's origin and the player's goal is to maximize the flow volume that arrives at the player's destination within a given time horizon. Here, the flow dynamics are described by the deterministic queuing model, i.e., flow of different players merges perfectly, but excessive flow has to wait in a queue in front of the bottle-neck. In order to determine Nash equilibria in such games, the main challenge is to consider suitable definitions for the players' strategies, which depend on the level of information the players receive throughout the game. For the most restricted version, in which the players receive no information on the network state at all, we can show that there is no Nash equilibrium in general, not even for networks with only two edges. However, if the current edge congestions are provided over time, the players can adapt their route choices dynamically. We show that a profile of those strategies always lead to a unique feasible flow over time. Hence, those atomic splittable flow over time games are well-defined. For parallel-edge networks Nash equilibria exists and the total flow arriving in time equals the value of a maximum flow over time leading to a price of anarchy of 1.ISSN:1868-896

On the Price of Anarchy for flows over time

Dynamic network flows, or network flows over time, constitute an important model for real-world situations where steady states are unusual, such as urban traffic and the Internet. These applications immediately raise the issue of analyzing dynamic network flows from a game-theoretic perspective. In this paper we study dynamic equilibria in the deterministic fluid queuing model in single-source single-sink networks, arguably the most basic model for flows over time. In the last decade we have witnessed significant developments in the theoretical understanding of the model. However, several fundamental questions remain open. One of the most prominent ones concerns the Price of Anarchy, measured as the worst case ratio between the minimum time required to route a given amount of flow from the source to the sink, and the time a dynamic equilibrium takes to perform the same task. Our main result states that if we could reduce the inflow of the network in a dynamic equilibrium, then the Price of Anarchy is exactly e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.582. This significantly extends a result by Bhaskar, Fleischer, and Anshelevich (SODA 2011). Furthermore, our methods allow to determine that the Price of Anarchy in parallel-link networks is exactly 4/3. Finally, we argue that if a certain very natural monotonicity conjecture holds, the Price of Anarchy in the general case is exactly e/(e − 1)

Algorithms for flows over time with scheduling costs

Flows over time have received substantial attention from both an optimization and (more recently) a game-theoretic perspective. In this model, each arc has an associated delay for traversing the arc, and a bound on the rate of flow entering the arc; flows are time-varying. We consider a setting which is very standard within the transportation economic literature, but has received little attention from an algorithmic perspective. The flow consists of users who are able to choose their route but also their departure time, and who desire to arrive at their destination at a particular time, incurring a scheduling cost if they arrive earlier or later. The total cost of a user is then a combination of the time they spend commuting, and the scheduling cost they incur. We present a combinatorial algorithm for the natural optimization problem, that of minimizing the average total cost of all users (i.e., maximizing the social welfare). Based on this, we also show how to set tolls so that this optimal flow is induced as an equilibrium of the underlying game