Game theory for collaboration in future networks

Cooperative strategies have the great potential of improving network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. This new paradigm in terms of network management, however, requires a novel design and analysis framework targeting a highly flexible networking solution with a distributed architecture. Game Theory is very suitable for this task, since it is a comprehensive mathematical tool for modeling the highly complex interactions among distributed and intelligent decision makers. In this way, the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g. content providers, cloud providers, home providers, brokers, network providers or users) should be found to optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure. The authors discuss in this chapter several Game Theory models/concepts that are highly relevant for enabling collaboration among the diverse players, using different ways to incentivize it, namely through pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight several related open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information games in this area.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

A Temporal Framework for Hypergame Analysis of Cyber Physical Systems in Contested Environments

Game theory is used to model conflicts between one or more players over resources. It offers players a way to reason, allowing rationale for selecting strategies that avoid the worst outcome. Game theory lacks the ability to incorporate advantages one player may have over another player. A meta-game, known as a hypergame, occurs when one player does not know or fully understand all the strategies of a game. Hypergame theory builds upon the utility of game theory by allowing a player to outmaneuver an opponent, thus obtaining a more preferred outcome with higher utility. Recent work in hypergame theory has focused on normal form static games that lack the ability to encode several realistic strategies. One example of this is when a player’s available actions in the future is dependent on his selection in the past. This work presents a temporal framework for hypergame models. This framework is the first application of temporal logic to hypergames and provides a more flexible modeling for domain experts. With this new framework for hypergames, the concepts of trust, distrust, mistrust, and deception are formalized. While past literature references deception in hypergame research, this work is the first to formalize the definition for hypergames. As a demonstration of the new temporal framework for hypergames, it is applied to classical game theoretical examples, as well as a complex supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network temporal hypergame. The SCADA network is an example includes actions that have a temporal dependency, where a choice in the first round affects what decisions can be made in the later round of the game. The demonstration results show that the framework is a realistic and flexible modeling method for a variety of applications

Game theory for cooperation in multi-access edge computing

Cooperative strategies amongst network players can improve network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. Game Theory is very suitable for these emerging scenarios, since it models high-complex interactions among distributed decision makers. It also finds the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g., content providers, cloud providers, edge providers, brokers, network providers, or users). These management policies optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure with a fair utilization of their resources. This chapter discusses relevant theoretical models that enable cooperation amongst the players in distinct ways through, namely, pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information scenarios. These upcoming scenarios are associated to computing and storage at the network edge, as well as, the deployment of large-scale IoT systems. The chapter finalizes by discussing a business model for future networks.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Collaborative Honeypot Defense in UAV Networks: A Learning-Based Game Approach

The proliferation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) opens up new opportunities for on-demand service provisioning anywhere and anytime, but also exposes UAVs to a variety of cyber threats. Low/medium interaction honeypots offer a promising lightweight defense for actively protecting mobile Internet of things, particularly UAV networks. While previous research has primarily focused on honeypot system design and attack pattern recognition, the incentive issue for motivating UAV's participation (e.g., sharing trapped attack data in honeypots) to collaboratively resist distributed and sophisticated attacks remains unexplored. This paper proposes a novel game-theoretical collaborative defense approach to address optimal, fair, and feasible incentive design, in the presence of network dynamics and UAVs' multi-dimensional private information (e.g., valid defense data (VDD) volume, communication delay, and UAV cost). Specifically, we first develop a honeypot game between UAVs and the network operator under both partial and complete information asymmetry scenarios. The optimal VDD-reward contract design problem with partial information asymmetry is then solved using a contract-theoretic approach that ensures budget feasibility, truthfulness, fairness, and computational efficiency. In addition, under complete information asymmetry, we devise a distributed reinforcement learning algorithm to dynamically design optimal contracts for distinct types of UAVs in the time-varying UAV network. Extensive simulations demonstrate that the proposed scheme can motivate UAV's cooperation in VDD sharing and improve defensive effectiveness, compared with conventional schemes.Comment: Accepted Aug. 28, 2023 by IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics & Security. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:2209.1381

Mitigating Stealthy Link Flooding DDoS Attacks Using SDN-Based Moving Target Defense

With the increasing diversity and complication of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, it has become extremely challenging to design a fully protected network. For instance, recently, a new type of attack called Stealthy Link Flooding Attack (SLFA) has been shown to cause critical network disconnection problems, where the attacker targets the communication links in the surrounding area of a server. The existing defense mechanisms for this type of attack are based on the detection of some unusual traffic patterns; however, this might be too late as some severe damage might already be done. These mechanisms also do not consider countermeasures during the reconnaissance phase of these attacks. Over the last few years, moving target defense (MTD) has received increasing attention from the research community. The idea is based on frequently changing the network configurations to make it much more difficult for the attackers to attack the network. In this dissertation, we investigate several novel frameworks based on MTD to defend against contemporary DDoS attacks. Specifically, we first introduce MTD against the data phase of SLFA, where the bots are sending data packets to target links. In this framework, we mitigate the traffic if the bandwidth of communication links exceeds the given threshold, and experimentally show that our method significantly alleviates the congestion. As a second work, we propose a framework that considers the reconnaissance phase of SLFA, where the attacker strives to discover critical communication links. We create virtual networks to deceive the attacker and provide forensic features. In our third work, we consider the legitimate network reconnaissance requests while keeping the attacker confused. To this end, we integrate cloud technologies as overlay networks to our system. We demonstrate that the developed mechanism preserves the security of the network information with negligible delays. Finally, we address the problem of identifying and potentially engaging with the attacker. We model the interaction between attackers and defenders into a game and derive a defense mechanism based on the equilibria of the game. We show that game-based mechanisms could provide similar protection against SLFAs like the extensive periodic MTD solution with significantly reduced overhead. The frameworks in this dissertation were verified with extensive experiments as well as with the theoretical analysis. The research in this dissertation has yielded several novel defense mechanisms that provide comprehensive protection against SLFA. Besides, we have shown that they can be integrated conveniently and efficiently to the current network infrastructure

Cyber Defense Remediation in Energy Delivery Systems

The integration of Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) has resulted in increased efficiency and facilitated real-time information acquisition, processing, and decision making. However, the increase in automation technology and the use of the internet for connecting, remote controlling, and supervising systems and facilities has also increased the likelihood of cybersecurity threats that can impact safety of humans and property. There is a need to assess cybersecurity risks in the power grid, nuclear plants, chemical factories, etc. to gain insight into the likelihood of safety hazards. Quantitative cybersecurity risk assessment will lead to informed cyber defense remediation and will ensure the presence of a mitigation plan to prevent safety hazards. In this dissertation, using Energy Delivery Systems (EDS) as a use case to contextualize a CPS, we address key research challenges in managing cyber risk for cyber defense remediation. First, we developed a platform for modeling and analyzing the effect of cyber threats and random system faults on EDS\u27s safety that could lead to catastrophic damages. We developed a data-driven attack graph and fault graph-based model to characterize the exploitability and impact of threats in EDS. We created an operational impact assessment to quantify the damages. Finally, we developed a strategic response decision capability that presents optimal mitigation actions and policies that balance the tradeoff between operational resilience (tactical risk) and strategic risk. Next, we addressed the challenge of management of tactical risk based on a prioritized cyber defense remediation plan. A prioritized cyber defense remediation plan is critical for effective risk management in EDS. Due to EDS\u27s complexity in terms of the heterogeneous nature of blending IT and OT and Industrial Control System (ICS), scale, and critical processes tasks, prioritized remediation should be applied gradually to protect critical assets. We proposed a methodology for prioritizing cyber risk remediation plans by detecting and evaluating critical EDS nodes\u27 paths. We conducted evaluation of critical nodes characteristics based on nodes\u27 architectural positions, measure of centrality based on nodes\u27 connectivity and frequency of network traffic, as well as the controlled amount of electrical power. The model also examines the relationship between cost models of budget allocation for removing vulnerabilities on critical nodes and their impact on gradual readiness. The proposed cost models were empirically validated in an existing network ICS test-bed computing nodes criticality. Two cost models were examined, and although varied, we concluded the lack of correlation between types of cost models to most damageable attack path and critical nodes readiness. Finally, we proposed a time-varying dynamical model for the cyber defense remediation in EDS. We utilize the stochastic evolutionary game model to simulate the dynamic adversary of cyber-attack-defense. We leveraged the Logit Quantal Response Dynamics (LQRD) model to quantify real-world players\u27 cognitive differences. We proposed the optimal decision making approach by calculating the stable evolutionary equilibrium and balancing defense costs and benefits. Case studies on EDS indicate that the proposed method can help the defender predict possible attack action, select the related optimal defense strategy over time, and gain the maximum defense payoffs. We also leveraged software-defined networking (SDN) in EDS for dynamical cyber defense remediation. We presented an approach to aid the selection security controls dynamically in an SDN-enabled EDS and achieve tradeoffs between providing security and Quality of Service (QoS). We modeled the security costs based on end-to-end packet delay and throughput. We proposed a non-dominated sorting based multi-objective optimization framework which can be implemented within an SDN controller to address the joint problem of optimizing between security and QoS parameters by alleviating time complexity at O(MN2). The M is the number of objective functions, and N is the population for each generation, respectively. We presented simulation results that illustrate how data availability and data integrity can be achieved while maintaining QoS constraints

Channel assignment and routing in cooperative and competitive wireless mesh networks

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Docter of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.In this thesis, the channel assignment and routing problems have been investigated for both cooperative and competitive Wireless Mesh networks (WMNs). A dynamic and distributed channel assignment scheme has been proposed which generates the network topologies ensuring less interference and better connectivity. The proposed channel assignment scheme is capable of detecting the node failures and mobility in an efficient manner. The channel monitoring module precisely records the quality of bi-directional links in terms of link delays. In addition, a Quality of Service based Multi-Radio Ad-hoc On Demand Distance Vector (QMR-AODV) routing protocol has been devised. QMR-AODV is multi-radio compatible and provides delay guarantees on end-to-end paths. The inherited problem of AODV’s network wide flooding has been solved by selectively forwarding the routing queries on specified interfaces. The QoS based delay routing metric, combined with the selective route request forwarding, reduces the routing overhead from 24% up to 36% and produces 40.4% to 55.89% less network delays for traffic profiles of 10 to 60 flows, respectively. A distributed channel assignment scheme has been proposed for competitive WMNs, where the problem has been investigated by applying the concepts from non-cooperative bargaining Game Theory in two stages. In the first stage of the game, individual nodes of the non-cooperative setup is considered as the unit of analysis, where sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of Nash Equilibrium (NE) and Negotiation-Proof Nash Equilibrium (N-PNE) have been derived. A distributed algorithm has been presented with perfect information available to the nodes of the network. In the presence of perfect information, each node has the knowledge of interference experience by the channels in its collision domain. The game converges to N-PNE in finite time and the average fairness achieved by all the nodes is greater than 0.79 (79%) as measured through Jain Fairness Index. Since N-PNE and NE are not always a system optimal solutions when considered from the end-nodes prospective, the model is further extended to incorporate non-cooperative end-users bargaining between two end user’s Mesh Access Points (MAPs), where an increase of 10% to 27% in end-to-end throughput is achieved. Furthermore, a non-cooperative game theoretical model is proposed for end-users flow routing in a multi-radio multi-channel WMNs. The end user nodes are selfish and compete for the channel resources across the WMNs backbone, aiming to maximize their own benefit without taking care for the overall system optimization. The end-to-end throughputs achieved by the flows of an end node and interference experienced across the WMNs backbone are considered as the performance parameters in the utility function. Theoretical foundation has been drawn based on the concepts from the Game Theory and necessary conditions for the existence of NE have been extensively derived. A distributed algorithm running on each end node with imperfect information has been implemented to assess the usefulness of the proposed mechanism. The analytical results have proven that a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium exists with the proposed necessary conditions in a game of imperfect information. Based on a distributed algorithm, the game converges to a stable state in finite time. The proposed game theoretical model provides a more reasonable solution with a standard deviation of 2.19Mbps as compared to 3.74Mbps of the random flow routing. Finally, the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of the system is close to one which shows the efficiency of the proposed scheme.The Higher Education Commission of Pakistan and the University of Engineering and Technology, Peshawar

Theoretical and Applied Foundations for Intrusion Detection in Single and Federated Clouds

Les systèmes infonuagiques deviennent de plus en plus complexes, plus dynamiques et hétérogènes. Un tel environnement produit souvent des données complexes et bruitées, empêchant les systèmes de détection d’intrusion (IDS) de détecter des variantes d’attaques connues. Une seule intrusion ou une attaque dans un tel système hétérogène peut se présenter sous des formes différentes, logiquement mais non synthétiquement similaires. Les IDS traditionnels sont incapables d’identifier ces attaques, car ils sont conçus pour des infrastructures spécifiques et limitées. Par conséquent, une détection précise dans le nuage ne sera absolument pas identifiée. Outre le problème de l’infonuagique, les cyber-attaques sont de plus en plus sophistiquées et difficiles à détecter. Il est donc extrêmement compliqué pour un unique IDS d’un nuage de détecter toutes les attaques, en raison de leurs implications, et leurs connaissances limitées et insuffisantes de celles-ci. Les solutions IDS actuelles de l’infonuagique résident dans le fait qu’elles ne tiennent pas compte des aspects dynamiques et hétérogènes de l’infonuagique. En outre, elles s’appuient fondamentalement sur les connaissances et l’expérience locales pour identifier les attaques et les modèles existants. Cela rend le nuage vulnérable aux attaques «Zero-Day». À cette fin, nous résolvons dans cette thèse deux défis associés à l’IDS de l’infonuagique : la détection des cyberattaques dans des environnements complexes, dynamiques et hétérogènes, et la détection des cyberattaques ayant des informations limitées et/ou incomplètes sur les intrusions et leurs conséquences. Dans cette thèse, nous sommes intéressés aux IDS génériques de l’infonuagique afin d’identifier les intrusions qui sont indépendantes de l’infrastructure utilisée. Par conséquent, à chaque fois qu’un pressentiment d’attaque est identifié, le système de détection d’intrusion doit être capable de reconnaître toutes les variantes d’une telle attaque, quelle que soit l’infrastructure utilisée. De plus, les IDS de l’infonuagique coopèrent et échangent des informations afin de faire bénéficier chacun des expertises des autres, pour identifier des modèles d’attaques inconnues.----------ABSTRACT: Cloud Computing systems are becoming more and more complex, dynamic and heterogeneous. Such an environment frequently produces complex and noisy data that make Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) unable to detect unknown variants of known attacks. A single intrusion or an attack in such a heterogeneous system could take various forms that are logically but not synthetically similar. This, in turn, makes traditional IDSs unable to identify these attacks, since they are designed for specific and limited infrastructures. Therefore, the accuracy of the detection in the cloud will be very negatively affected. In addition to the problem of the cloud computing environment, cyber attacks are getting more sophisticated and harder to detect. Thus, it is becoming increasingly difficult for a single cloud-based IDS to detect all attacks, because of limited and incomplete knowledge about attacks and implications. The problem of the existing cloud-based IDS solutions is that they overlook the dynamic and changing nature of the cloud. Moreover, they are fundamentally based on the local knowledge and experience to perform the classification of attacks and normal patterns. This renders the cloud vulnerable to “Zero-Day” attacks. To this end, we address throughout this thesis two challenges associated with the cloud-based IDS which are: the detection of cyber attacks under complex, dynamic and heterogeneous environments; and the detection of cyber attacks under limited and/or incomplete information about intrusions and implications. We are interested in this thesis in allowing cloud-based IDSs to be generic, in order to identify intrusions regardless of the infrastructure used. Therefore, whenever an intrusion has been identified, an IDS should be able to recognize all the different structures of such an attack, regardless of the infrastructure that is being used. Moreover, we are interested in allowing cloud-based IDSs to cooperate and share knowledge with each other, in order to make them benefit from each other’s expertise to cover unknown attack patterns. The originality of this thesis lies within two aspects: 1) the design of a generic cloud-based IDS that allows the detection under changing and heterogeneous environments and 2) the design of a multi-cloud cooperative IDS that ensures trustworthiness, fairness and sustainability. By trustworthiness, we mean that the cloud-based IDS should be able to ensure that it will consult, cooperate and share knowledge with trusted parties (i.e., cloud-based IDSs). By fairness, we mean that the cloud-based IDS should be able to guarantee that mutual benefits will be achieved through minimising the chance of cooperating with selfish IDSs. This is useful to give IDSs the motivation to participate in the community