The first-order approach to moral hazard problems with hidden saving

This paper proposes a general method to validate the first-order approach for moral hazard problems with hidden saving. I show that strong convexity assumptions both on the agent’s marginal utility of consumption and the distribution function of output arise naturally in this context. The first-order approach is valid given nonincreasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) utility and log-convex distribution functions (LCDF) with monotone likelihood ratios (MLR). In a second step, I relax the LCDF condition by restricting the class of preferences and by imposing more structure on optimal wage schemes

Debt and equity as optimal contracts

Using a principal-agent model in which an entrepreneur has an investment project whose returns depend on his effort, which is not observable by the financier, the author shows that the optimal contract used to finance such a project can be replicated by a unique combination of debt and equity, proving the optimality of these financial instruments. ; A look at the evolution of the collection, clearinghouse, and regulatory provisions of the Federal Reserve Act. The Reserve Banks’ check collection service was designed in 1913 to serve as "glue," attaching the new central bank to the commercial and financial markets through member banks.Contracts ; Corporations - Finance

Optimal Income Taxation and Hidden Borrowing and Lending: The First-Order Approach in Two Periods

We provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach for two period dynamic moral hazard problems, where the agent can save and borrow secretly. We show that in addition to the concavity requirements for the standard moral hazard problem, non-increasing absolute risk aversion (NIARA) utility functions and Frisch elasticity of leisure less than one imply that the agent's problem is jointly concave in effort and asset decisions when facing the optimal contract. We also characterize the optimal contract in detail. One of the key observations is that the possibility of hidden asset accumulation makes the supporting tax-transfer system more regressive (or the optimal compensation scheme more convex) under a general class of preferences (HARA).Moral Hazard, Hidden Savings, First Order Approach, Optimal Income Taxation

Equity, Options and Efficiency in the Presence of Moral Hazard

This paper provides a general equilibrium analysis of an economy with production under uncertainty in which the firms' capital (ownership) structure creates a moral hazard problem for their managers. The paper studies the concept of an equilibrium with rational, competitive price perceptions (RCPP) in which investors correctly anticipate the optimal effort of entrepreneurs by observing their financial decisions, and entrepreneurs are aware that investors use their financial decisions as signals. The competitive element in the equilibrium valuation of firms comes from the fact that entrepreneurs cannot affect the market price of risks. It is shown that under appropriate spanning assumptions an RCPP is constrained Pareto optimal. Furthermore, if sufficiently many options are traded, then full optimality can be obtained despite the moral hazard problem: options serve both to increase the span of the market and to provide incentives for entrepreneurs.

Bank capital and equity investment regulations

An intermediation model that examines the efficiency and welfare implications of banks' required capital-asset ratio and of the regulations that limit - and in some countries forbid - banks' investments in equity to a certain proportion of each firm's capital. ; A look at how episodes of competing currencies can provide insight on 1) the qualities of a commodity that lead to its becoming a dominant currency, 2) the route by which a nationally mandated paper currency becomes acceptable as a medium of exchange, and 3) the way in which competition between currencies sustains the exchange value of a fiat currency by restricting the actions available to the monetary authority. ; A look at how episodes of competing currencies can provide insight on 1) the qualities of a commodity that lead to its becoming a dominant currency, 2) the route by which a nationally mandated paper currency becomes acceptable as a medium of exchange, and 3) the way in which competition between currencies sustains the exchange value of a fiat currency by restricting the actions available to the monetary authority.Bank capital ; Bank investments

THE PROBABILITY APPROACH TO GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH PRODUCTION

We develop an alternative approach to the general equilibrium analysis of a stochastic production economy when firms’ choices of investment influence the probability distributions of their output. Using a normative approach we derive the criterion that a firm should maximize to obtain a Pareto optimal equilibrium: the criterion expresses the firm’s contribution to the expected social utility of output, and is not the linear criterion of market value. If firms do not know agents utility functions, and are restricted to using the information conveyed by prices then they can construct an approximate criterion which leads to a second-best choice of investment which, in examples, is found to be close to the first best.equilibrium, production

Moral Hazard, Aggregate Risk and Nominal Linear Financial Contracts

We study competitive equilibria with moral hazard in economies with aggregate risk and where trading occurs with an incomplete set of financial assets. The main conclusion of the paper is that, contrary to the individual risk economies, moral hazard is compatible with trading in competitive linear financial contracts, and gives rise to no manipulation problem. We establish existence of nonmanipulable equilibria provided that there are no relative price effects (e.g., a one-commoditiy economy), and that financial markets display nonlinearly homogeneous payoffs (e.g., nominal), and are sufficiently incomplete. Finally, we justify the linear contract as the optimal pricing schedule in a specific trading game with an auctioneer.moral hazard; linear contracts

The optimality of a monetary union without a fiscal union

EMS;fiscal policy;moral hazard

Entrepreneurial Moral Hazard in Income Insurance: Empirical Evidence from a Large Administrative Sample

We study risk behavior of Danish self-employed entrepreneurs, whose income risk may be driven by both exogenous factors and effort choice (moral hazard). Partial insurance is available through voluntary unemployment insurance (UI). Additional incentives to sign insurance contracts stem from a UI-embedded, government-subsidized early retirement (ER) program, giving benefits that are unrelated to business risk. Indeed, we argue that the self-employeds’ incentives to insure themselves stem from the ER plan rather than from the UI cover. We show how to use a policy reform to identify moral hazard in observed transitions to unemployment when insurance is a choice variable. We use administrative (register) panel data covering 10% of the Danish population. We find that the insured are indeed more likely to transit into unemployment than the uninsured, once we properly instrument for the insurance choice.entrepreneurs; self-employment; early retirement; unemployment insurance; moral hazard; Denmark; panel data