159 research outputs found
Approval-Based Shortlisting
Shortlisting is the task of reducing a long list of alternatives to a
(smaller) set of best or most suitable alternatives from which a final winner
will be chosen. Shortlisting is often used in the nomination process of awards
or in recommender systems to display featured objects. In this paper, we
analyze shortlisting methods that are based on approval data, a common type of
preferences. Furthermore, we assume that the size of the shortlist, i.e., the
number of best or most suitable alternatives, is not fixed but determined by
the shortlisting method. We axiomatically analyze established and new
shortlisting methods and complement this analysis with an experimental
evaluation based on biased voters and noisy quality estimates. Our results lead
to recommendations which shortlisting methods to use, depending on the desired
properties
A Unified Framework of Multi-Stage Multi-Winner Voting: An Axiomatic Exploration
Multi-winner voting plays a crucial role in selecting representative
committees based on voter preferences. Previous research has predominantly
focused on single-stage voting rules, which are susceptible to manipulation
during preference collection. In order to mitigate manipulation and increase
the cost associated with it, we propose the introduction of multiple stages in
the voting procedure, leading to the development of a unified framework of
multi-stage multi-winner voting rules. To shed light on this framework of
voting methods, we conduct an axiomatic study, establishing provable conditions
for achieving desired axioms within our model. Our theoretical findings can
serve as a guide for the selection of appropriate multi-stage multi-winner
voting rules
A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods
We define and study a general framework for approval-based budgeting methods
and compare certain methods within this framework by their axiomatic and
computational properties. Furthermore, we visualize their behavior on certain
Euclidean distributions and analyze them experimentally
Differentially Private Approval-Based Committee Voting
In this paper, we investigate tradeoffs between differential privacy (DP) and
several voting axioms for approval-based committee voting, including
proportionality, Pareto efficiency, Condorcet criterion, and strategyproofness.
For all the axioms except strategyproofness, we show their incompatibility with
DP, and provide both upper and lower bounds for their tradeoffs with DP.
Furthermore, we show that any -DP mechanism satisfies
-cardinality strategyproofness, and the satisfaction can be
further improved if the mechanism satisfies monotonicity
Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
Approval-based committee (ABC) rules are voting rules that output a
fixed-size subset of candidates, a so-called committee. ABC rules select
committees based on dichotomous preferences, i.e., a voter either approves or
disapproves a candidate. This simple type of preferences makes ABC rules widely
suitable for practical use. In this book, we summarize the current
understanding of ABC rules from the viewpoint of computational social choice.
The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results, and relevant
applications.Comment: This is a draft of the upcoming book "Multi-Winner Voting with
Approval Preferences
Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
From fundamental concepts and results to recent advances in computational social choice, this open access book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results and several applications that are relevant in artificial intelligence, computer science and elections of any kind. What is the best way to select a set of candidates for a shortlist, for an executive committee, or for product recommendations? Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of candidates based on the preferences expressed by the voters. A wide variety of decision processes in settings ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer applications (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversity in search results, etc.) share the problem of identifying a representative subset of alternatives. The study of multi-winner voting provides the principled analysis of this task. Approval-based committee voting rules (in short: ABC rules) are multi-winner voting rules particularly suitable for practical use. Their usability is founded on the straightforward form in which the voters can express preferences: voters simply have to differentiate between approved and disapproved candidates. Proposals for ABC rules are numerous, some dating back to the late 19th century while others have been introduced only very recently. This book explains and discusses these rules, highlighting their individual strengths and weaknesses. With the help of this book, the reader will be able to choose a suitable ABC voting rule in a principled fashion, participate in, and be up to date with the ongoing research on this topic
- …