Never Hanging Defendants Out to Dry: Preserving the Policy Behind the Statute of Limitations in Money Laundering Conspiracies

How should conspiracies to commit money laundering that rely on stale evidence be handled by the federal government? Marusarz argues that an amendment to the Money Laundering Control Act is needed to preserve a defendant’s interest in having a conspiracy prosecution based on evidence proving the existence of a money laundering conspiracy long after the actual conspiracy to launder money has ended. The Money Laundering Control Act is widely applicable and implies that prosecutors have an unlimited amount of time to bring an indictment for conspiracy to launder money due to the complexity of money laundering crimes. Marusarz proposes amendments to the Money Laundering Control Act that provide temporal limits on conspiracy charges brought under the Act. The proposed amendment provides that prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 must be brought within five years of the last overt act committed in furtherance of any money laundering offenses

An exploratory study in to the money laundering threats, vulnerabilities, and controls within the UK bookmaker sector, with a specific focus on Fixed-Odds Betting Terminals

The purpose of this exploratory study was to generate an understanding in to the money laundering threats, vulnerabilities and controls found within UK betting shops, with a direct focus on the exponential growth of Fixed-Odd Betting Terminals. Qualitative research methods facilitated eight semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders linked to the gambling and/or money laundering sphere. This included the Gambling Commission, Campaign for Fairer Gambling, an ex-Head of Security and Safety at a major bookmaker, and five regular Fixed-Odd Betting Terminal users. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded for thematic analysis, subsequently resulting in the emergence of four interesting and meaningful themes. These were (1) Ineffective CDD enforcement facilitating anonymity (2) Weak anti-money laundering safeguards unable to mitigate known threats (3) A lack of anti-money laundering training, awareness, and resources (4) The Gambling Commission’s attempt for increased anti-money laundering regulation unsuccessful. By allowing a phenomenological framework to guide the data collection process, the interpreted subjective views and experiences of the participants involved, although somewhat limited, indicate that money laundering threats within the bookmaker sector are inherently high, with a lack of effective safeguards in place to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities

Customer Due Diligence and Its Role To Prevent The Global Economic Threat: Indonesian Anti Money Laundering Perspectives

Money laundering and financing of terrorism is one of the global threats which may occur problems for the economics of the world. The effect of Money Laundering and financing of terrorism have been manifested in the life of the nations. According to its characteristic as a transnational crime, Money laundering and financing of terrorism have been a major concern of all the countries and law enforcement agents. In this situation, law shall be a major instrument to tackle money laundering and financing of terrorism, but Customer Due Diligence and Enhance Due Diligence plays a great part to prevent money laundering and other variant of crime. The effective and efficient measure to recognize the customer who has a suspicious character of money laundering and financing of terrorism is using the method of knowing correctly and precisely their customer’s profile. Customer Due Diligence is the first resort which may operate as the first procedure which should be taken by all Financial Services Provider and also Goods and Services Providers. As a tool, Customer Due Diligence should be followed by the professionalism and awareness of the parties involved, such as bank and goods and service providers, since it is not easy to recognize the money laundering and also financing of terrorism. The presence of Law Number 8 of 2010 of Republic of Indonesia actually tries to strengthen the implementation of the Principle of Know Your Services Users or also known as the Know Your Customer Principle

Criminal liability of employees of financial intermediaries for money laundering: a British perspective

The money laundering rules, both those contained in the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (and the legislation which preceded it) and the provisions of the Money Laundering Regulations 1993, impose considerable liabilities not just on institutions but on their individual officers and employees. Although the Money Laundering Reporting Officer / Compliance Officer has particular responsibilities, this does not absolve the other employees of the firm from the requirement to exercise considerable diligence on their own account

Case Studies on Globalization and Money Laundering

Financial globalization has greatly improved the efficiency of capital transfers around the world, with the cost of facilitating criminal money laundering activities. Based on case studies on conditions for money laundering in the process of globalization and transformation in Europe, are discussed the challenges that a “global financial village” must confront.capital mobility, fight against capital/money laundering; payment systems, cooperation for financial stability

Offshore Financial Havens: Their Role in International Capital Flows

The purpose of this paper is to study the role of offshore financial havens in international capital flows. We examine the effects of being a tax haven, a money laundering centre or an offshore financial centre (OFC), which often overlap. We want to see whether these places are used as entrepots (which means temporary storage for funds) or as investment places or both. We mainly use two complementary data sets: bilateral cross-border asset holding and financial intermediation. One is a stock variable and the other one is a flow variable. We apply the gravity model to bilateral cross-border asset holding between 223 host countries and 67 source countries from Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). We find that tax havens and OFCs attract more asset investment while money laundering centers scare potential investors away. We then use the flow variable of financial intermediation from UNdatabase and find value of financial intermediation is higher in OFCs and lower in money laundering centers. There is no significant relationship between tax haven and financial intermediation. Our results show that the role of offshore havens in facilitating illegal activities like tax evasion and money laundering is overstated in the previous studies. By allowing parameter shifting in the model, we also find the competitive advantages of offshore finance in facilitating tax avoidance or evasion and money laundering have been eroded due to recent years' global action against tax evasion and money laundering

Money Laundering and Financial Means of Organized Crime: Some Preliminary Empirical Findings

After giving a short literature review, the paper tries a quantification of the volume of money laundering activities, with the help of a MIMIC estimation procedure for the years 1995 to 2006 for 20 highly developed OECD countries. The volume of laundered money was 273 billions USD in the year 1995 for these 20 OECD countries and increased to 603 billions USD in 2006. The overall turnover in organized crime had a value of 595 billion USD in 2001 and increased to 790 billion USD in 2006. These figures are very preliminary but give a clear indication how important money laundering and the turnover of organized crime is nowadays.Definition and stages of money laundering, volume of money laundering, MIMIC estimation, financial means of organized crime

International Money Laundering and Its Prevention in the Banking Sector

Money laundering and especially its sub-division trade based money laundering have been identified as increasing threats to the international economy. Money laundering harms the entire global economy however the knowledge about the nature of money laundering and therefore the actions to prevent it is still at a low level. Trade based money laundering abuses the international trade system and the parties involved in it such as importers, exporters and financial institutions. In the money laundering process the banks can be used as a remittance system and thereby as means to make the illegal money deriving from a criminal act appear clean. Not only the trade finance products but also the other banking products are under the risk of being used in the money laundering process by the criminals. The research tries to find out what are the perceptions of people working closely with anti-money laundering on why, how and what –aspects of trade based money laundering and anti-money laundering. Moreover, the aim was to increase the awareness of trade based money laundering and fill the existing gap within the research on trade based money laundering and anti-money laundering. The research was conducted as interviews with four experts working either in trade finance, compliance, national crime investigation or banking supervision. The aim was to include views from different stages from the anti-money laundering chain. These interviews were conducted as theme interviews and the analysis compared the perceptions from the interviewees to the current available literature and studies. It was noticed during the research that the knowledge among the interviewees was dispersed and especially the money laundering process was unfamiliar and the different phases were not well recognized. However, the signals for the suspicious money laundering cases were widely recognized and they reflected the current literature well. Still, it was noted that at the moment the anti-money laundering process is based on reactive actions instead of being proactive. Therefore, there is a need for more proactive approach to anti-money laundering in order to be able to respond to the increasing threat of money laundering in the international business.siirretty Doriast

Does Money Laundering on Ethereum Have Traditional Traits?

As the largest blockchain platform that supports smart contracts, Ethereum has developed with an incredible speed. Yet due to the anonymity of blockchain, the popularity of Ethereum has fostered the emergence of various illegal activities and money laundering by converting ill-gotten funds to cash. In the traditional money laundering scenario, researchers have uncovered the prevalent traits of money laundering. However, since money laundering on Ethereum is an emerging means, little is known about money laundering on Ethereum. To fill the gap, in this paper, we conduct an in-depth study on Ethereum money laundering networks through the lens of a representative security event on \textit{Upbit Exchange} to explore whether money laundering on Ethereum has traditional traits. Specifically, we construct a money laundering network on Ethereum by crawling the transaction records of \textit{Upbit Hack}. Then, we present five questions based on the traditional traits of money laundering networks. By leveraging network analysis, we characterize the money laundering network on Ethereum and answer these questions. In the end, we summarize the findings of money laundering networks on Ethereum, which lay the groundwork for money laundering detection on Ethereum

The latent factors of money laundering risk: A cross-national study

I present a new perspective on ‘money laundering,’ understanding it from a risk perspective using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). I initially discuss the models studied so far in the money laundering and anti-money laundering literature, pointing out their shortcomings. I then set up my CFA model to identify the hidden factors of money laundering risk using observed variables across 203 countries. I compare my model with a competing data configuration proposed by the Basel Institute on Governance. I present a comprehensive application of CFA to understand how to combat money laundering risk and touch on the role of structural equation modelling in anti-money laundering policy-making. Using this method, I illustrate the hidden dimensions of money laundering risk. My findings will be useful for anti-money laundering policy experts around the world