Procedure-modular specification and verification of temporal safety properties

This paper describes ProMoVer, a tool for fully automated procedure-modular verification of Java programs equipped with method-local and global assertions that specify safety properties of sequences of method invocations. Modularity at the procedure-level is a natural instantiation of the modular verification paradigm, where correctness of global properties is relativized on the local properties of the methods rather than on their implementations. Here, it is based on the construction of maximal models for a program model that abstracts away from program data. This approach allows global properties to be verified in the presence of code evolution, multiple method implementations (as arising from software product lines), or even unknown method implementations (as in mobile code for open platforms). ProMoVer automates a typical verification scenario for a previously developed tool set for compositional verification of control flow safety properties, and provides appropriate pre- and post-processing. Both linear-time temporal logic and finite automata are supported as formalisms for expressing local and global safety properties, allowing the user to choose a suitable format for the property at hand. Modularity is exploited by a mechanism for proof reuse that detects and minimizes the verification tasks resulting from changes in the code and the specifications. The verification task is relatively light-weight due to support for abstraction from private methods and automatic extraction of candidate specifications from method implementations. We evaluate the tool on a number of applications from the domains of Java Card and web-based application

A Digital Signature Scheme for Long-Term Security

In this paper we propose a signature scheme based on two intractable problems, namely the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem for elliptic curves. It is suitable for applications requiring long-term security and provides a more efficient solution than the existing ones

Over-the-air software updates in the internet of things : an overview of key principles

Due to the fast pace at which IoT is evolving, there is an increasing need to support over-theair software updates for security updates, bug fixes, and software extensions. To this end, multiple over-the-air techniques have been proposed, each covering a specific aspect of the update process, such as (partial) code updates, data dissemination, and security. However, each technique introduces overhead, especially in terms of energy consumption, thereby impacting the operational lifetime of the battery constrained devices. Until now, a comprehensive overview describing the different update steps and quantifying the impact of each step is missing in the scientific literature, making it hard to assess the overall feasibility of an over-the-air update. To remedy this, our article analyzes which parts of an IoT operating system are most updated after device deployment, proposes a step-by-step approach to integrate software updates in IoT solutions, and quantifies the energy cost of each of the involved steps. The results show that besides the obvious dissemination cost, other phases such as security also introduce a significant overhead. For instance, a typical firmware update requires 135.026 mJ, of which the main portions are data dissemination (63.11 percent) and encryption (5.29 percent). However, when modular updates are used instead, the energy cost (e.g., for a MAC update) is reduced to 26.743 mJ (48.69 percent for data dissemination and 26.47 percent for encryption)

Verifying Privacy-Type Properties in a Modular Way

Formal methods have proved their usefulness for analysing the security of protocols. In this setting, privacy-type security properties (e.g. vote-privacy, anonymity, unlink ability) that play an important role in many modern applications are formalised using a notion of equivalence. In this paper, we study the notion of trace equivalence and we show how to establish such an equivalence relation in a modular way. It is well-known that composition works well when the processes do not share secrets. However, there is no result allowing us to compose processes that rely on some shared secrets such as long term keys. We show that composition works even when the processes share secrets provided that they satisfy some reasonable conditions. Our composition result allows us to prove various equivalence-based properties in a modular way, and works in a quite general setting. In particular, we consider arbitrary cryptographic primitives and processes that use non-trivial else branches. As an example, we consider the ICAO e-passport standard, and we show how the privacy guarantees of the whole application can be derived from the privacy guarantees of its sub-protocols